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In 1963 Hoffman claimed that no single piece of research can supply the 
answers to the important questions in complex areas such as morality and its 
antecedents (Hoffman, 1963). Now, more than a quarter of a century later, this 
assertion is still valid. This study, therefore, is intended to shed light on a small 
facet of moral internalization. 
Because the theoretical considerations are primarily based on Martin 
Hoffman's theory, moral internalization will be defined in accord with Hoffman's 
formulation. Care of others is the focus of Hoffman's moral theory (Hoffman, 
1987), and he defined a moral norm as considering the needs of others (Hoffman, 
1983). According to Hoffman (1970) this norm is initially alien. The young 
child is motivated only by hedonistic needs. The origin of these hedonistic needs 
may be largely constitutional (Hoffman, 1975a). In a moral encounter, there is a 
conflict between the child's own hedonistic needs and the needs of another person. 
When the child has not yet internalized the moral norm to take the needs of 
another person into account, such a conflict may be induced by another person, 
such as the caretaker. When the norm is internalized, the child's behavior is 
accordingly guided even when an external authority is not present to enforce the 
norm. In other words, the development of the motivation to control hedonistic 
needs for social purposes is hypothesized to be the outcome of socialization. 
Just what kind of socialization experiences may be of importance for this 
internalization process? Hoffman suggested that the way in which parents disci-
pline (i.e., the strategy used to change the child's behavior) may be crucial. On 
the one hand, inductive techniques such as pointing out the consequences of the 
child's behavior for the other person, stimulating the child to place him- or her-
self in the other's position, or giving explanations should promote children to 
take another's needs into account. On the other hand, trying to influence the 
children's behavior primarily by asserting power (e.g., punishing the child) is 
expected to focus children on their own position rather than the situation of 
others. Relations between parental discipline and moral internalization are fre-
quently found, indicating that Hoffman's presupposition may make sense (for 
reviews see Hoffman, 1963, 1970; Rollins & Thomas, 1979; Shaffer & Brody, 
1981; and section 3.3.1 below). 
Using Hoffman's theory, the present study is intended to shed light on the 
relation between parental discipline strategies and the child's moral internaliza-
tion. Two problems will be studied. The first problem concerns the relation 
between parental discipline and the child's internalization of norms focusing on 
the problem of 'who is influencing whom?' This topic is rather traditional (see 
Bell, 1968, 1977; Clarke-Stewart, 1988; Hoffman, 1975a; Lewis, 1981), but 
nevertheless relevant because of the various unresolved issues. 
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Hoffman assumed the child's moral internalization to be primarily influenced 
by the way parents discipline. In contrast, it can be argued that the extent to 
which children have internalized norms (i.e., the extent to which children are 
motivated to consider another's need) influences the strategies used by parents. 
Hoffman (1975a), however, argued parental discipline to most likely influence 
long-term moral internalization rather than the reverse. 
Many studies relating parent and child variables are strictly correlational, 
leaving the problem of causal direction unresolved (Bell, 1968; Hoffman, 1975a). 
Some studies, however, have investigated the effects children exert on parents 
and/or parents on children. In a recently published review, Clarke-Stewart (1988) 
concluded that we can no longer make simple generalizations about the one-sided 
effects of parental discipline on child behavior and development. The question of 
who influences whom when discipline and moral internalization are concerned 
nevertheless remains unanswered. This is in part because studies designed to 
make inferences about the causality of parent-child interactions have primarily 
referred to short-term interactions (e.g., Brunk & Henggeler, 1984; Chapman, 
1979; Yarrow, Waxier & Scott, 1971) or infants (e.g., Clarke-Stewart, 1973; 
Clarke-Stewart & Hevey, 1981). In addition, variables that are not of direct rele-
vance to the issue of moral internalization are often employed. For example, 
person orientation (Keller & Bell, 1979), responsiveness (Bugental, Caporael & 
Shennum, 1980) or compliance (Lytton, 1979) are among the variables typically 
studied. 
The second problem to be studied concerns the role of the child's empathy 
and perspective taking in the relation between parental discipline and moral inter-
nalization. According to Hoffman (1987), empathy may provide the basis for a 
comprehensive theory of moral internalization. Empathy is defined as an affective 
response that is more appropriate to someone else's situation than to one's own 
(e.g., Hoffman, 1983, 1987). Hoffman suggested that empathy and perspective 
taking are critical to the internalization of norms. Empathy may motivate the 
child to take the needs of the other into account Whether or not empathy is such 
a motive depends on the subjective experience of empathy. This subjective expe-
rience of empathy is not stable but is related to the child's cognitive sense of 
others. Hoffman (1984a, 1987) assumed the child to have an inborn capacity to 
react affectively to another person. When confronted with another's emotions the 
child reacts affectively. An infant is initially unable to distinguish between 
another's distress and one's own feeling of distress. An infant who reacts with 
empathy is not aware that another person and not the self is in distress. Even the 
young child (until approximately 2 or 3-years-oId) may not realize that the cause 
of the experienced feelings of distress is the distress of the other person and it is 
therefore unlikely that the child would offer help. When the child realizes, per-
haps as a consequence of the growing ability to take perspectives, that the 
experience of distress is actually a reaction to the other's distress, the child may 
become motivated to help the other person. This suggests that the development 
of empathie distress corresponds with the development of perspective taking. 
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Particular discipline strategies may stimulate the child to react empathically and, 
at the same time, stimulate the child's perspective-taking ability. According to 
Hoffman's information-processing approach to moral internalization, discipline 
influences both the child's affective and cognitive processes (e.g., 1975b, 1982a, 
1983,1984a). As far as we know, however, Hoffman's hypothesis that empathy 
and perspective taking mediate between parental discipline and moral internaliza-
tion has not been tested. 
As already mentioned, only a small facet of morality will be studied based on 
Martin Hoffman's theory of the development of moral internalization. We focus 
on two key issues: the causality problem and the role of empathy and perspective 
taking when parental discipline strategies influence the child's moral internaliza-
tion. Various aspects will not be investigated. First, only relations between 
parents and children are treated. We are aware that this is just a part of the broader 
system in which children and parents live. Socialization by siblings, peers, 
teachers, television programs etc., is omitted. Moreover, the interaction is 
simplified by primarily referring to parent-child pairs. So we focus on parent-
child socialization. 
Second, we focus on the relation between parental discipline strategies and 
moral internalization, even though there are many more variables that might be 
critical to the child's moral internalization. The child's temperament, for exam-
ple, may influence both the discipline strategies parents use and the child's moral 
internalization (Belsky, 1984). A variable which may mediate between parental 
discipline and the child's moral internalization is the child's identification with 
the parent (Hoffman, 1971a). Because of the emphasis Hoffman put on empathy 
and the close relationship between empathy and perspective taking, only the role 
of empathy and perspective taking will be examined in this study. 
A third factor that should be kept in mind but will not be directly examined 
here is the possibility of other variables influencing parental discipline. Just as 
there are numerous variables determining the child's moral internalization, there 
are also numerous determinants of individual differences in parental functioning. 
Parental child-rearing practices may not only be influenced by the child's moral 
internalization, but also by the personality of the parent, marital relations, and 
the surrounding social network (Belsky, 1984). The present research focuses 
exclusively on the interaction between the child's moral internalization and 
parental discipline, leaving other determinants of parenting aside. 
Fourth, we are not interested in interactions at a microanalytic level (e.g., 
analyzing the parent-child interaction from a single, brief observational session 
in fine detail). The present study, rather, applies a broader perspective to parent-
child interaction, examining interactions over an extended period of time. Re-
peated observations will be analyzed to unravel the causal relations between dis-
cipline strategies employed by the parents and the moral internalization of the 
child. Repeated observations will also be used to show both stability in the kind 
of discipline strategies used and the moral internalization of the child. 
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In summary, the aim of this study is to test part of Hoffman's theory of 
moral internalization. First, the directionality of the relation between parental 
discipline and moral internalization will be examined in chapter 2. Hoffman's 
rationale for why discipline should most likely be the antecedent to moral 
internalization will be outlined. Then, it will be argued that it is nevertheless 
possible for the child to influence parental reactions, suggesting a bidirectional 
model. The chapter is concluded by summarizing methodological consequences 
for the study of the directionality problem. In chapter 3 the way in which the 
child's ability to react empathically to others and perspective-taking capacity 
might mediate between discipline and moral internalization is discussed. In 
chapter 4 the hypotheses to be tested in the present study will be outlined. The 
procedures and research methods used in this study are described in chapter S. In 
chapter 6 the results of our research are reported and in chapter 7 the results are 
interpreted and evaluated. 
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2 PARENTAL DISCIPLINE: ANTECEDENT OR CONSEQUENCE 
OF MORAL INTERNALIZATION 
Central to this chapter is the relation between discipline and moral internali-
zation. Hoffman presupposed that parental discipline strategies will have a crucial 
effect on the child's moral internalization. Before discussing this presupposition 
(section 2.2), however, we must first describe discipline more precisely and why 
Hoffman hypothesized parental discipline to be so important for moral internali-
zation (section 2.1). We will then consider his arguments in more detail and an 
alternative, namely that parental discipline strategies might be a consequence of 
the child's level of moral internalization (section 2.3). A design intended to exa-
mine the long-term effects of parental discipline on moral internalization will 
then be presented (section 2.4). 
2.1 Discipline and its importance to moral internalization 
Hoffman claimed that parental discipline strategies play a central role in the 
internalization of moral norms (Hoffman, 1963, 1970). Parents obviously use 
discipline techniques to attempt to change the child's behavior in the direction 
desirable to the parents. 
It should be noted, however, that Hoffman considered discipline in particular 
situations in where the parent attempts to change the child's behavior against the 
child's will (e.g., Hoffman, 1983). Discipline strategies apply to many different 
situations. For example, the parent may simply want the child involved in a 
different activity, such as going to bed rather than watching TV (Hoffman, 
1975a). The parent may want to teach the child the conventions of etiquette (e.g., 
"don't eat with your fingers"). Or, in other situations, the parent may want the 
child to help another child (e.g., "she cannot do it by herself, she is too little"). 
These situations were referred to by Hoffman as "discipline encounters". In 
theoretical considerations, however, Hoffman focused on those discipline en-
counters that involved a moral norm (Hoffman, 1983). In the present study, 
therefore, discipline is exclusively related to situations in which the child is 
going to transgress a norm or already has transgressed a norm. That is, a narrow 
definition of discipline encounter is used, referring only to moral situations. 
Hoffman admitted that information about moral norms and messages regarding 
how the child should act are communicated to the child outside the discipline 
encounter (e.g., in table conversations, television programs, and by the parent's 
own actions). Nevertheless, Hoffman considered discipline encounters in particu-
lar to be crucial to moral internalization. 
5 
It should be noted that an attempt to change the child's behavior against the 
child's will does not imply that the child necessarily intended to harm another 
person or wanted to fulfill some hedonistic needs. In discipline encounters pa-
rents simply encourage their children to consider the needs of others. 
Three discipline categories can be distinguished (Hoffman, 1970; Hoffman & 
Saltzstein, 1967; Rollins & Thomas, 1979): 
1. Induction refers to techniques in which the parent gives explanations or 
reasons for requiring the child to change his behavior (e.g., by pointing out 
the painful consequences of the child's behavior for others). The parent 
attempts to induce the child to voluntarily comply. 
2. Power assertion can be defined as behavior that results in considerable exter-
nal pressure on the child to behave according to the parent's desires. It 
includes physical punishment, deprivation of material objects or privileges, 
the direct application of force, or the threat of any of these. Rather than rely 
on the child's inner resources (e.g., empathy, guilt, shame, love) or provide 
the child with information necessary for the development of such resources, 
the parent punishes the child physically or materially, or relies on the child's 
fear of punishment. 
3. Love withdrawal is defined as nonphysical expression of the parent's anger or 
disapproval of the child with the implication that love will not be restored 
until the child behaves in accordance with the parent's wishes (e.g., igno-
ring, isolating, or rejecting the child)^ 
Parental control attempts (i.e., discipline) is one of the variables that Rollins 
and Thomas (1979) identified as critical to the socialization of children. The 
second variable is parental support, which refers to parental behavior that makes 
the child feel comfortable in the presence of the parent. The child feels accepted 
and approved of by the parent as a person (Rollins & Thomas, 1979). 
There seems to be ample evidence for a positive relationship between paren-
tal support and aspects of moral development (Rollins & Thomas, 1979; Shaffer 
& Brody, 1981; Zahn-Waxler, Radkc-Yanow & King, 1979). There is also some 
evidence that any type of discipline may be more effective when administered in a 
wann, affectionate context (Shaffer & Brody, 1981). 
Hoffman highlighted the potential relevance of parental warmth by pointing 
out its ability to promote identification, make the child more receptive to disci-
pline, make the child more likely to imitate the parent, and make the child 
emotionally secure enough to be open to the needs of others (Hoffman, 1963, 
1979). Notwithstanding the influence of parental warmth and other socialization 
Originally, love withdrawal and induction belonged lo one broad category 
"psychological discipline" because both techniques motivated the child to 
change his future behavior (Hoffman, 1963). Later this category was divided 
into induction and love withdrawal (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967). 
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experiences, the discipline strategies parents choose are dominant in influencing 
the child's moral internalization according to Hoffman (1983). 
Why should discipline be so important? Central to Hoffman's argument is 
his characterization of moral internalization. Moral internalization in Hoffman's 
view consists of considering the needs of others (e.g., Hoffman, 1963,1975a). A 
child has internalized this norm when the child experiences a conflict between the 
moral requirements of the situation and his own hedonistic desires. Because the 
origin of hedonistic needs may be largely constitutional, moreover, development 
of the motivation to control these hedonistic desires for social purposes must be 
a product of socialization. 
What past experiences might make a person particularly sensitive to such a 
moral conflict? According to Hoffman this sensitivity to moral conflicts is asso-
ciated with the kind of experiences one had when faced with the same conflict. 
That is, a conflict between one's desires at a given moment and the norm to 
consider the needs of the other. The norm is initially external. The norm is 
embedded in the many physical and verbal messages from the parent regarding 
how the child should act In discipline encounters, moreover, this moral conflict 
may be raised by the use of inductive messages. It is mainly in the discipline 
encounter that the connection is made between the norms, the child's egoistic 
desires, and the child's behavior (Hoffman, 1975a, 1983,1984b). 
A second factor that may make discipline so critical to children's awareness 
of a moral conflict is their active involvement in the conflict (Hoffman, 1983, 
1984b). The child is the interested party and involved as an actor in the conflict 
at the same time. The message of the parent, embedded in the discipline tech-
nique, is meaningfully related to the child's ongoing activity and therefore may 
be better processed and remembered in the future. 
Aside from these theoretical reasons for expecting discipline situations to be 
important for moral internalization, Hoffman also mentioned empirical evidence 
that discipline is a recurrent salient feature in the child's daily life. Young 
children (i.e., children 2-10 years of age) appear to experience pressure from 
parents to change their behavior every 6 to 7 minutes on the average throughout 
their waking hours. In other words, these situations occur so often that it seems 
reasonable to assume that the type of discipline used by parents will affect the 
child's moral internalization (Hoffman, 1983,1984b). In most of these instances, 
moreover, the child does end up complying. 
Although Hoffman frequendy relied on these data concerning the frequency of 
discipline encounters, this argument may not be as convincing as it seems to be. 
When Hoffman cited studies of the frequency of discipline encounters he does not 
pay attention to the particular kind of behavior being performed by the child. 
Studies indicate that moral situations (e.g., harm another or help another) consti-
tute a conceptual and developmental system distinct from situations concerning 
social conventions (more or less arbitrary rules such as table manners) (Turici & 
Smetana, 1984). It can be hypothesized, thus, that parents react differently when 
they perceive the child's behavior as a moral transgression or a conventional 
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transgression. Genis, Vermulst and Franken (1988) asked parents of 4 to 18-year-
olds to describe those child-rearing interactions that frequently caused a conflict 
between the parent and the child. Only 33% of the situations parents mentioned 
referred to transgressions of norms and rules, such as social conventions. Thus, 
discipline encounters that involve a moral norm in the more restricted sense 
might be much less than every 6 to 7 minutes. 
In sum, notwithstanding the fact that the relevance of every disciplinary 
action to moral internalization can be questioned, the similarity between a moral 
discipline encounter and an internal moral encounter is crucial for Hoffman to 
stress the importance of parental discipline strategies for in the child's internaliza­
tion of norms. 
2.2 Discipline as an antecedent to moral internalization 
Many authors consider socialization as an adult initiated process by which 
children acquire norms (Bell, 1968). According to Baumrind (1980) children, by 
virtue of their immaturity and dependent status, do not have the same contribu­
tion to the interaction as parents. Caretakers play a dominant role in the way 
their children develop. Maccoby and Martin (1983), for example, also believed 
that when the infant is quite young, the mother shapes the infant's behavior to a 
greater extent than the infant influences the mother's behavior. Developmental 
changes in the parent-child relationship may involve a shift of regulatory func­
tions from the parent to the child. According to others the unilateral relation 
between parent and child is crucial (e.g., Piaget, 1965; Youniss, 1980). Such a 
unilateral relation means that, although the parent-child interaction includes a 
two-way flow, the child must also make unilateral adjustments. That is, adults 
bring in their viewpoint based on their own experiences to the situation and are 
not ready to abandon this viewpoint for the relatively inexperienced view of the 
child. 
In Hoffman's view, as well, it is more likely that parental discipline is the 
antecedent and not a consequence of the child's moral internalization. Hoffman did 
not deny that children often affect their parents' behavior, particularly in short-
range day-to-day interactions. Nevertheless, parental discipline is more likely to 
be the antecedent than the consequence of children's long-term moral internaliza­
tion, argued Hoffman (1975a), and central in this argument is the concept of 
power (Hoffman, 1975a). 
Power is the potential an individual A has for compelling individual В to 
behave in a way contrary to B's desires (Hoffman, 1975a). The parent has total 
control over the child's material and emotional supplies. Other institutions (e.g., 
the law) exercise little constraint in this domain and the parent therefore has a 
great deal of power over the child. This power, moreover, plays a crucial role in 
encounters where the parent wants to change the child's behavior. The parent 
decides how to react and chooses the discipline strategies accordingly. The parent 
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may directly assert his or her power (i.e., apply external pressure on the child to 
comply) or may choose techniques intended to gain 'voluntary' behavior change 
by eliciting internal forces in the child. Even in cases where the child has a 
certain amount of behavioral freedom, this freedom depends entirely on how 
much the parent is willing to allow the child. 
In sum, the parent has an overwhelming amount of control over the parent-
child interaction and the amount of influence a child can exert on this interaction 
depends on the permissiveness of the parent. 
Hoffman tried to further underscore his argument by reasoning from the 
opposite perspective as well (see, for example, Hoffman, 1975a, 1960,1970). If 
moral internalization precedes parental discipline then parental discipline should 
not only relate to the degree of moral internalization exhibited at school but, 
above all, to the degree of moral internalization manifested at home. For this 
reason Hoffman (1960) studied the relation between the child's resistance to the 
mother and the mother's disciplinary strategy. Despite the positive relation 
between power assertion and the child's aggressiveness at school, Hoffman found 
no relation between power assertion and rebelliousness at home. Therefore he 
concluded parental discipline does not follow from moral internalization. Other 
findings, however, are in disagreement with this research: Hoffman and Salt/stein 
(1967), for example, found a relation between the child's overt reaction to trans-
gression at home and discipline. 
A second consequence of assuming that the child's moral internalization 
influences discipline (rather than the reverse) is that another theory is then 
required to explain the development of moral internalization itself. Here Hoffman 
confmed himself to the relation between inductive discipline and moral internali-
zation. Hoffman (1975a) offered three possibilities promoting moral internaliza-
tion. Subsequently, however, he rejected all three alternatives on the basis of 
empirical or logical reasons and adopted the assumption that moral internaliza-
tion is a consequence of discipline. The first alternative stimulator of moral 
internalization Hoffman suggested was that a parent who uses induction also 
often uses love withdrawal. Love withdrawal may produce anxiety over loss of 
parental love, which promotes the child's moral internalization. Thus love 
withdrawal and not inductive discipline may cause moral internalization. 
According to Hoffman there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. No 
consistent relations are found between love withdrawal and moral internalization 
(Hoffman, 1975a). Second, Hoffman proposed that the child's identification with 
the parent may lead to adoption of the parent's moral orientation. This hypothe-
sis is rejected because empirical research appears not to verify the existence of a 
relationship between the child's identification with the parent and the child's 
moral internalization. The final alternative Hoffman put forward to explain the 
emergence of moral internalization is that an exposure to levels of moral reaso-
ning that are moderately higher than one's current level may result in moral 
internalization. Hoffman mentioned several arguments why this hypothesis may 
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not be relevant. One argument is that this is a purely cognitive hypothesis and 
says nothing about noncognitive aspects of morality. 
Even if moral internalization should be caused by variables other than 
discipline, this does not necessarily relate to the causal relation between disci-
pline and moral internalization. Bell (1977), for example, suggested that a child-
effect on the process of moral internalization need not imply that the child's 
moral internalization produces the parental technique. 
Hoffman (1975a) also verified his theory of moral internalization as a conse-
quence of parental discipline with his own empirical research bearing on the basis 
of parental discipline choice. Parents view their techniques as deriving from 
considerations outside the child's control (e.g., the parents' long-term goals). In 
addition to his findings that parents viewed themselves as the original source for 
using a particular technique, parental attributes such as educational level, parental 
values, and marital relationship were also found to influence the discipline tech-
nique used by parents (Hoffman, 1975a). 
As a second source of empirical evidence, Hoffman (1975a) referred to several 
studies on the frequency of discipline encounters. He concluded that parents 
attempt to influence the child four to five times as often as the child attempts to 
dominate the parent Furthermore, parents do usually have their way when they 
wish to change their child's behavior. As already mentioned in the previous 
section, however, this evidence is not particularly compelling because the speci-
fic content of the conflict was not taken into account. 
In addition to Hoffman's arguments, other research has also indicated that 
parental behavior towards their children is often affected by variables other than 
the children themselves. In Belsky's process model of parenting the parent's 
personality, marital relation, developmental history, and social network are also 
seen as some of the determinants of parenting (Belsky, 1984). In a longitudinal 
study on determinants of parenting, moreover, it was found that the child-rearing 
experienced by the parents themselves and the parent's personality influenced 
their later interactions with their own children (Belsky, Hertzog & Rovine, 
1986). 
Other studies suggesting that parental discipline precedes moral internaliza-
tion are studies reporting correlations between parental beliefs and their discipline 
technique (Janssens & Gerris, 1988), although this does not exclude the interpre-
tation that beliefs are a justification for action (Goodnow, 1988). Furthermore, 
correlations have been found between the moral reasoning of the child and 
parental moral reasoning (Haan, Langer & Kohlberg, 1976; Buck, Walsh & 
Rothman, 1981) and between parental moral reasoning and child-rearing method 
(Buck, Walsh & Rothman, 1981). It is likely that parental moral reasoning 
influences the child-rearing method rather than the reverse. Thus, these findings 
also suggest that parental behavior is affected by variables that are not under the 
control of the child and that the child's moral reasoning is influenced by the 
parent. 
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Despite the influences on parenting that lie outside the child's control, disci-
pline need not be the antecedent to moral internalization. Stated differently, if it 
is true that parental discipline is influenced by a number of variables on which 
children cannot exert any influence, it is still possible that parental discipline is 
also influenced by child variables such as moral internalization. Furthermore, it 
does not rule out the possibility that moral internalization is best described with 
a reciprocal influence model. In addition to the parental characteristics that may 
influence discipline strategies, child effects on parental discipline may also have 
to be taken into consideration. In the next section, therefore, the research to child 
effects on adult discipline will be reviewed. 
2.3 Discipline as a consequence of moral internalization 
In 1968 Bell criticized much of the work done in this area because of its 
unilateral perspective. Bell pointed out that many of the findings that had been 
interpreted as evidence of parental effects on the child's functioning could logi-
cally be construed as child effects on parenting. Adults not only socialize children 
but children also socialize adults. Bell assumed that parents do not have fixed 
techniques for socializing children. They have a repertoire of actions and different 
children trigger different actions. Bell highlighted congenital influences (e.g., the 
child's aggressiveness, competence and social responsivity) because they clearly 
emanate from the child. But child effects on parental behavior are not just a con-
sequence of congenital and genetic factors (Bell, 1968, 1971,1977). Bell argued 
that child behavior influences the parent, whatever the origin of the behavior is. 
Thus, whereas Hoffman proposed a unidirectional model, Bell stressed a bidi-
rectional model and attempted to explain and predict adult-child interaction in 
terms of reciprocal effects. 
Using the aforementioned statement of congenital influences, Bell (1968) 
also gave an alternative interpretation of the findings of Hoffman. Bell's suppo-
sition was that the children showing little moral internalization are congenitally 
low in person orientation. They respond less to rather subüe hints, demands, and 
expressions of love of the parents than children high in person orientation. Be-
cause of this unresponsiveness to social stimuli their parents will be less affec-
tionate and do not appeal to the child's personal or social values with inductive 
discipline. 
Hoffman (1975a, 1983) has admitted that the parent-child interaction can be 
influenced by factors such as the aggressive tendencies in the child, the child's 
person orientation, the emotional attitude toward the parent, and the level of 
cognitive development. However, these child characteristics are not the same as 
moral internalization. Although these factors may affect parental discipline 
strategies this does not invalidate the argument that parental discipline is an 
antecedent of moral internalization. 
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This distinction between congenital child characteristics and moral inter-
nalization is also made by Belsky (1984). In Belsky's model child characteristics 
influence child development as well as parental discipline. However, parental 
discipline is also assumed to directly influence the child's development. 
A second conclusion of Bell, interfacing with Hoffman's concept of power, 
is that the relation between parent and child might be reciprocal despite the 
inequality of maturity (Bell, 1977). Bell agreed with Hoffman that parents have 
the physical size and control of resources to determine the outcome of an interac-
tion more often than the child. But, as Bell argued, this dominance is not com-
pletely onesided. Children start approximately 50% of the interactions and also 
dominate a substantial number of interactions. They can get their way by their 
appealing nature and can exercise a steady and persistent resistance to the parent's 
objectives (Bell, 1977). 
Support for Bell's viewpoint comes from observations of adult-child interac-
tions that indicate that the adults' responses to children vary with the responses 
the children bring to a given situation (e.g., Anderson, Lytton & Romney, 1986; 
Yarrow, Waxier & Scott, 1971). Yarrow, Waxier and Scott (1971) trained adults 
to play a high- or a low-nurturance role with small groups of children. In spite of 
this training the adult's responsiveness varied with child variables such as the 
child's attention-seeking behavior and friendly or aggressive interactions with 
their peers. 
Bell (1977) used studies on the relative frequency of interaction initiation to 
demonstrate the child's influence. Studies on this subject must be interpreted 
with caution, however. Maccoby and Martin (1983) concluded from observations 
of parent-infant interactions that there is probably no general answer to the ques-
tion of which member of the mother-child pair is more likely to initiate the 
interaction. The balance depends heavily on the situational characteristics such as 
the parent's engagement in another task (e.g., cooking). 
In summary. Bell criticized the unidirectional model of Hoffman by pointing 
out the influences of, particularly congenital, child factors on parental behavior 
and by weakening the claim that parents have much more power in the interac-
tion than children. 
Whereas Bell's arguments are primarily logical and empirical, showing that 
children can influence parental behavior, Hoffman might still argue that the crux 
of the whole matter is not the possible influence of other child characteristics on 
parental discipline but the influence of moral internalization on parental disci-
pline. Can theoretical arguments be found for the thesis that parental discipline is 
a consequence of moral internalization? 
Saltzstein (1976) proposed a model of how moral internalization may 
influence parental discipline based on the parallel between theories of social 
influence processes and Kohlberg's levels of moral development. He suggested 
that the moral development of the child may determine the social influences to 
which the child is susceptible, which in tum shape the kind of discipline the 
parents use. For example, children who conform to moral rules for extrinsic 
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reasons are primarily susceptible to social influence aimed at compliance and 
therefore elicit various forms of power assertion from their parents. Whereas 
children who conform to moral rules based on concern for the welfare of others 
(the norm is internalized according to Hoffman) are susceptible to social in-
fluence designed to be internally consistent with one's own values. These 
children elicit reasoning and other principled appeals from their parents. 
Saltzstein concluded that the process is best conceived as circular: the moral 
development of the child determines his susceptibility to different discipline 
techniques and these techniques, in tum, influence the child's moral development. 
In sum, Hoffman's hypothesis that the discipline techniques parents use with 
children constitute an antecedent to long-term moral internalization has neither 
been confirmed nor rejected. Pros and cons were pointed out, but further research 
is clearly needed to unravel who is influencing whom in the domain of parental 
discipline and moral internalization. 
2.4 The problem of causal directionality 
As outlined in the preceding section, Hoffman's thesis that parental disci-
pline is the antecedent to moral internalization has been criticized heavily on 
logical, empirical and theoretical grounds. A bidirectional model seems obvious. 
Although the study of a parent-child bidirectional model has found many advo-
cates, very few data have been collected or published within a bidirectional 
model. The first aim in this study, thus, is to find evidence for Hoffman's 
presupposition that parental discipline precedes moral internalization. 
How can Hoffman's thesis be examined? First, Hoffman's thesis concerns 
long-term effects of parental discipline on moral internalization. Experimental 
laboratory studies and sequential analyses usually focus on short-term interaction. 
Chapman (1981) illustrated that isolation of short-term causal effects may yield 
results different from those reached by the isolation of long-term effects. Second, 
because Hoffman rejected the influence of congenital factors on discipline as a 
falsification of his thesis, parental discipline and moral internalization must be 
the main variables. Third, Hoffman's theory refers to global disciplinary strate-
gies and global measures of moral internalization. Yarrow, Waxier and Scott 
(1971), however, have pointed out the importance of distinguishing global traits 
from direct interaction characteristics because it may yield different results. 
Fourth, Hoffman stated that parental influence on children is stronger than the 
influence of children on their parents. Thus, the design should permit inferences 
about the relative strength of child effects and parent effects. Finally, Hoffman 
(1970) preferred naturalistic research, keeping us closer to real life concepts. 
Keeping the above-mentioned items in mind, a panel design was used. This 
design has been recommended by several authors working on the relation between 
parental discipline and moral internalization because it allows inferences to be 
drawn over time (cf. Hoffman, 1979; Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Saltzstein, 
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1976; Shaffer & Brody, 1981). In this panel design the behavior of both partici-
pants (parent and child) is assessed at two measurement periods. Measures of 
parental discipline obtained at time 1 can then be related with indicators of the 
child's moral internalization at time 2, providing a measure of the contribution of 
discipline to moral internalization. Conversely, measures of the child's moral 
internalization obtained at the beginning of the interval can be related to meas-
ures of parental discipline at the end of the interval in order to obtain a measure 
of the impact of the child on parental discipline. If a significant relation between 
parental discipline at time 1 and the child's moral internalization at time 2 
emerges, this fact alone does not justify an inference of a cross time causal rela-
tionship between the two measures. The relation may be spurious because it may 
reflect a relation between the parent's discipline strategies at time 1 and the 
child's moral internalization at time 1 combined with a simple continuation of 
the child's moral internalization from time 1 to time 2. Similarly, a significant 
relation between the child's moral internalization at time 1 and the parent's disci-
plinary strategics at time 2 may be the product of a cross-sectional relation be-
tween the child's moral internalization and parental discipline at time 1 and a 
stability of parental discipline from time 1 to time 2. An analysis of all relations 
between parental discipline strategies and the child's moral internalization 
assessed at two occasions will probably shed more light on the long-term effect 
of parental discipline and moral internalization. 
The second aim of this study is to examine the mechanism hypothesized by 
Hoffman to influence the internalization of norms. Hoffman assumed that moral 
internalization is the consequence of parental discipline. He hypothesized that 
parental discipline may influence the child's moral internalization by stimulating 
the child's perspective taking within the moral encounter and by arousing empa-
thy within the child. The mediating role of perspective taking and empathy in the 
relationship between parental disciplinary strategies and the child's moral inter-
nalization will therefore be described in the next chapter. 
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3 THE INFLUENCE OF PARENTAL DISCIPLINE ON 
CHILDREN'S MORAL INTERNALIZATION 
Discussing the direction of the relation between parental discipline and moral 
internalization does not isolate the way in which discipline techniques relate to 
moral internalization. It will be hypothesized that parents influence the child's 
empathy and perspective-taking capacity with their disciplinary strategies and 
that these empathie and perspective-taking capabilities further influence the 
child's moral internalization. In the discipline encounter the parent tries to 
control the child's behavior. In chapter 2 (section 2.1) we distinguished between 
induction, power assertion, and withdrawal of love as three techniques a parent 
may use to achieve a behavioral change. In this chapter we will further elaborate 
Hoffman's theory on moral internalization in order to isolate the mechanisms 
responsible for the influence of discipline on moral internalization. Thus, 
although we do not preclude the possibility that moral internalization also 
influences discipline, we further confine ourselves to only a consideration of how 
discipline can affect internalization. 
As Hoffman (1983) noted, moral internalization means different things in 
different theoretical contexts. Before giving a theoretical explanation of how 
norms may become internalized, therefore, a description of the concept of moral 
internalization will be given (section 3.1). Hoffman's theoretical formulation of 
how discipline influences moral internalization will then be outlined (section 
3.2) and research on the relation between discipline techniques and moral inter-
nalization briefly summarized (section 3.3). 
3.1 Moral internalization 
Of central importance in theories of moral development is the definition of 
the concept of moral internalization. Many approaches to moral internalization 
exist, such as the psychoanalytic view (see Hoffman, 1970), the behavioristic 
view (e.g., Aronfreed, 1976), and the cognitively oriented stage theories of Piaget 
and Kohlberg (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1965). Every approach has its own 
conception of morality and this conception of course influences further theorizing 
about moral development. This will be illustrated in the following, using the 
theories of Kohlberg and Piaget. 
Kohlberg stressed the cognitive-structural component of moral development. 
He identified morality with justice and his theory concentrates on the develop-
ment of cognitive justice structures. The different moral stages reflect the diffe-
rent types of relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations 
(Kohlberg, 1976) and Kohlberg is concerned with the development of moral 
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reasoning in particular. As a result of the interactions with the environment the 
child's reasoning may become restructured, creating a series of hierarchical stages. 
Cognition and rationality are central to morality and the role of affect is mini-
mal. The motivation for morality is a need for acceptance, competence, self-
esteem, or self realization (Kohlberg, 1976). Kohlberg's cognitive starting point 
implies that the structuring of information, the exchange of social perspectives, 
role taking opportunities and situations stimulating an internal cognitive conflict 
are important for development. Though family-interaction may provide opportu-
nities for each of these experiences, it is only one of many social groups that 
may do so. Thus, in Kohlberg's theory neither discipline, nor the family, is most 
important for stimulating moral development. 
Cognitive development is also central to Piaget's two-stage theory of morali-
ty (Piaget, 1965). Piaget stressed topics such as the child's concept of rules, 
respect for rules, and the child's sense of justice, all of which refer to the rights 
of persons stemming from considerations of equality, social contract, and reci-
procity in human relations (Lickona, 1976). In contrast to Hoffman's theory, 
Piaget considered parents to be of minor importance in stimulating moral judg-
ment. The child respects the parent's authority and thus need not change perspec-
tives. Piaget presupposed that exchange of perspectives may be crucial for the 
development of autonomous morality. Such an exchange is hypothesized to take 
place only with other persons equal in social and developmental level, however. 
Therefore, parents generally may not be capable of stimulating the child's moral 
development. According to Piaget the interaction with peers is most important 
for the development of an autonomous morality. The equality of the relationship 
gives the child the possibility to experiment and to exchange roles freely. 
In contrast to Kohlberg's and Piaget's theory Hoffman (1983, 1984b) attri-
butes a central role in stimulating moral internalization to parents (see section 
2.1). Hoffman admitted that interactions among peers in homes where inductions 
are frequently used may also have a constructive effect (Hoffman, 1983). How-
ever, the most critical influences are expected to come from the parents. This 
difference in theorizing is directly related to the conception of morality used. 
According to Hoffman a norm refers to a conflict between needs felt within a 
person. A child who has internalized norms not only experiences hedonistic needs 
but also experiences the needs of other persons. A norm is the internal motiva-
tion to consider the needs of others. A child who has internalized norms has a 
moral orientation characterized by an independence of external sanctions and guilt 
experience (Hoffman, 1975a). When internalization does not occur the child has a 
moral orientation based on fear of external detection and punishment. 
Hoffman (1970) used a subjective definition of external sanctions. External 
sanctions are not an objective feature but in the mind of the actor. A child can 
behave in accord with a moral standard in situations where detection is unlikely, 
but this behavior may nevertheless be motivated by irrational fears of authority 
figures or retribution by ghosts or gods. Thus, according to Hoffman, moral 
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internalization refers to a freedom from subjective concerns about external 
sanctions. 
Hoffman characterized a norm using three components (Hoffman, 1983). 
First, the person feels an obligation to act in accord with a norm and may feel 
guilty if he does not. Hoffman called this the affective-motivational component 
of a norm. Hoffman asserted that affect, especially empathy and sympathy, often 
motivates moral behavior (Hoffman, 1984a). The activation of a moral norm, 
however, does not guarantee moral action because the egoistic motive may be 
more powerful. Moral action is not simply the expression of a moral motive but 
the attempt to achieve an acceptable balance between one's egoistic and moral 
motives. 
Second, and in addition to this affective-motivational component, moral 
norms also have a cognitive component that includes one's representation of the 
consequences of one's actual or anticipated behavior for someone else, one's 
awareness of prohibitions against acting in ways that may harm others physical-
ly or psychologically, and one's judgments about the rightness or wrongness of 
particular acts and the reasons for these judgments. These cognitions pertain to 
the shaping and transformation of the affective experience. For example, seeing 
another person's need can make a child feel sorry for him. When the child realizes 
that he, himself, may have been the cause of the observed distress (i.e., cognitive 
component) these feelings may be transformed into feelings of guilt 
The third and final component of moral internalization distinguished by 
Hoffman, is the autonomous component. Activation of a moral norm must be 
experienced as deriving autonomously from within the self. That is, the cogni-
tive dimensions of a norm should eventually be taken as one's own idea and the 
associated affect (usually guilt) and disposition to act in accord with the norm 
experienced as coming from within the self. 
To summarize, Hoffman's moral internalization refers to considering the 
needs of others and has a cognitive as well as a compelling, obligatory quality 
that is not based on fear of punishment and should derive from oneself. As argued 
before, Hoffman hypothesized that the discipline techniques parents choose 
should influence moral internalization. 
3.2 Hoffman's information-processing approach to discipline 
and moral internalization 
Hoffman offered a theory of moral internalization integrating affect and 
cognition. As we have seen in the preceding section an internalized norm is 
characterized by an affective, a cognitive and an autonomous component. Parental 
discipline is hypothesized to have the potential power to accomplish internaliza-
tion (see section 2.1). Hoffman's theory on the underlying process is based on 
the conceptualizations of representations of events in memory. While informa-
tion is given to the child in the discipline encounter, however, the child must 
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pay attention to this information. We will therefore discuss how this necessary 
condition gets fulfilled (section 3.2.1) and how the relevant information gets 
processed (section 3.2.2). As will be seen, the schemata resulting from such 
moral encounters motivate an empathie reaction that, in tum encourages the child 
to take the needs of others into account in subsequent moral encounters (section 
3.2.3). 
3.2.1 What happens in the discipline encounter? 
In the disciplinary encounter the parent attempts to change the child's beha-
vior. The child has done harm to another person, is going to harm someone, or 
fails to help another person who needs assistance. It appears as if the child either 
does not notice or neglects the needs of others, and it is up to the parent, accor-
ding to Hoffman, to draw the child's attention to this oversight. This is exactly 
what happens in the discipline encounter (Hoffman, 1983). 
Many different reactions may communicate to the child that the parent 
disapproves of the child's behavior. The parent can give all kinds of punishment, 
warnings, explanations, statements, suggestions, or demands. A child who only 
gets punished probably has some idea of having done something wrong and 
although this may stimulate compliance, it does not necessarily promote inter-
nalization. Hoffman's conceptualization of moral internalization, implies con-
sideration of the needs of others. But because young children are hypothesized to 
be hedonistically oriented from birth and not aware of the needs of others, parents 
must point out another's needs to the child. Thus, to promote internalization 
inductive reactions are necessary. 
Before a child is able to process information about the environment the child 
must notice this information. More fundamentally, the child must pay attention 
to the parent's message. According to Hoffman the discipline strategies employed 
by parents are usually multidimensional (Hoffman, 1970, 1983). Most discipli-
nary reactions contain both power assertive and love withdrawing properties. 
These properties are necessary to get the child to attend to the inductive informa-
tion that may also be present. Too little arousal may prompt the child to ignore 
the parent. Too much arousal, produced by fear, anxiety, or resentment, may 
prevent effective processing of the inductive information and focus the child's 
attention on the consequences of the action for the self and not the consequences 
for the other. 
Not only power assertion and love withdrawal are arousing. Even an induc-
tive message may contain arousing aspects (e.g., the tone of the parent's voice). 
Furthermore, a certain amount of arousal presumably derives from the parent-
child relation itself and the young child's desire to maintain harmony and a good 
relation to the parent (Hoffman, 1983). It might be difficult to decide whether or 
not the child is optimally motivated to listen to the parent. Hoffman suggested 
the optimal level of arousal for processing information is likely be achieved by 
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merely using inductive strategies (Hoffman, 1983). This is also suggested by 
Lepper (1983), who explained the relation between discipline and moral internali-
zation nom an attributional perspective. According to Lepper techniques of social 
control that are successful in producing compliance and at the same time subtle 
enough to prevent the child from viewing such compliance as solely a function 
of extrinsic controls are most likely to promote internalization. Lepper suggested 
that inductive discipline is sufficiently powerful to stimulate internalization. 
Consequently, one may wonder whether the use of power and the withdrawal of 
love only have negative effects on the process of internalization. According to 
Hoffman in some instances power assertion will be necessary. For example, 
when a child is beating up on another child and is very angry, the parent may 
have to exert some power to stop the child. Afterwards, when things have quieted 
down, the parent may provide an explanation. In this situation the function of 
power is to stop the ongoing situation rather than to motivate the child to listen 
to the explanation. Nevertheless, the arousal level is high because the child was 
already highly aroused (i.e., fighting) and the parent's intervention may have 
intensified this. It seems obvious under such circumstances that the inductive 
information will not be optimally processed. Thus it can be hypothesized that 
although in some situations the use of power is functional, it still may have a 
negative influence on the information processing. 
In sum, when the parent wants to stimulate the child to internalize norms in 
a disciplinary encounter, the parent should motivate the child to listen, stimula-
ting an optimal level of arousal, and then present an inductive message. An 
inductive strategy may contain enough components to trigger an optimal level of 
arousal. The use of power or love withdrawal only increases the level and proba-
bly causes a decline of effective information processing by the child. 
3.2.2 The processing of information 
As already emphasized, the child must process the information provided in 
the discipline encounter. That is, internalization of norms is characterized by a 
cognitive, affective and autonomous component (section 3.1). But what informa-
tion and what kind of processing is necessary to internalize these norms? 
In the preceding section we argued that successful discipline involving expla-
nation to the child of why certain behaviors are right or wrong focuses attention 
on the behavior and allows the arousal present during the disciplinary encounter 
to be attributed to the act of transgression rather than to the threat of punish-
ment. 
When power assertion and/or love withdrawal predominate the aroused anger 
and/or anxiety may prevent the child from effectively processing any inductive 
message (Hoffman, 1983). Hoffman based his thesis on research on attention 
showing that high emotional arousal generally disrupts cognitive processing in 
complex tasks. Power assertion and love withdrawal may also arouse a motive to 
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restore freedom. Images of past disciplinary encounters may be associated with 
anxiety as a result of classical conditioning. Consequently, the anticipation of 
the deviant act may produce anxiety in children and this may lead to avoidance of 
the deviant act. Power assertion and love withdrawal may be very effective in 
restraining a child from behaving in a disapproved way, but when the parent is 
not present the child may not anticipate the anxiety associated with the parent 
and may behave according to his or her own needs. 
What happens when the inductive component predominates with an optimal 
level of arousal? Hoffman (1983) distinguished cognitive and affective responses 
to the inductive message: 
1. Cognitive responses. 
The inductive message directs the child's attention to the consequences of 
the transgression for someone else rather than for the self. As a result the 
child can make a causal connection between his or her own action and the 
physical or psychological state of the victim. Induction may also commu-
nicate to the child that the child is responsible for the distress of the other 
person. Furthermore, the parent can give the child information about other 
aspects of the situation such as norms and expectations about how to be-
have. The parent can also suggest alternative ways of behaving. This infor-
mation may be totally new to the child in any given instance or it may be a 
reminder of something previously known but overlooked. The information 
contains the cognitive component of a norm. Depending on the particular 
content of the induction used the child's perspective-taking capacity may 
also be stimulated by the parent's reaction. 
2. Affective responses. 
A second component of a norm is the affective component, which produces 
the obligatory quality of the norm. Before the parent interferes the child 
does not attend to the other's needs and emotional state. The inductive 
message directs the child's attention to another's needs and emotions and 
this produces an affective response in the child. Hoffman (1984a, 1987) 
assumed the child has an inborn capacity to react affectively to the affect of 
another child. For example, when a baby hears another baby crying this 
results in a distress response. Hoffman called such a distress response an 
empathie reaction. Inductive discipline focuses the child's attention on the 
victim of the child's actions and, as a result of perceiving the victim's 
distress, the child experiences empathie distress. *• 
These two responses, moreover, contribute to the cognitive and affective compo-
nents of a norm (section 3.1). 
1 There is a qualitative difference between this affective reaction and the affec-
tive reaction to love withdrawal or power assertion. As already noted, the 
affective reaction to love withdrawal or power assertion concerns the well-
being of the self. The affect that derives from the inductive component 
concerns the well-being of the victim. 
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As already noted, the third component of a norm is its autonomous quality. 
Children's cognitive and affective responses to the parent's inductions should be 
transformed and encoded into memory. Hoffman (1983) explained the dissociation 
of affective and cognitive responses from the original discipline encounter in 
terms of information processing. Discipline techniques focusing on the child's 
action and its harmful consequences allows parental pressure to be low in sa-
lience. The child should therefore notice primarily this information and perhaps 
forget the external pressures. 
Furthermore, Hoffman suggested that language should facilitate memory storage 
of the appropriate materials. Verbal messages are usually stored in memory by 
their semantic content If inductive messages are stored at the semantic level, the 
contextual aspects (e.g., who gave the inductive message, the exact circumstan-
ces, the exact words) should disappear. Thus verbal messages may be more easily 
stored than many power assertive and love withdrawing components. 
Hoffman relied on Tulving's dual-storage theory and a model of memory 
from Craik. The dual-storage theory presupposes the existence of a semantic and 
an episodic memory. The semantic memory is concerned with the storage of 
knowledge and meanings. The episodic memory is concerned with the storage of 
episodes and events. Semantic memory appears to be more enduring than episo-
dic memory. Information in semantic memory is usually incorporated into a 
complex structure of concepts and their relationships, which also facilitates 
information retrieval. Thus, semantic aspects will be remembered better than 
episodic aspects such as who gave the discipline reaction. The parental image is 
not semantically related to the inductive content. 
According to the model of Craik, there are basically three levels of proces-
sing that operate successively. First, there is the simple sensory registration of 
the stimulus. This is followed by the perceptual level of pattern recognition and 
matching. Finally, there is a deep, semantic level at which the stimulus is 
enriched by being associated with past images and cognitive structures. The 
extent to which a stimulus persists in memory depends on the level at which it 
is processed. Here again, it is assumed that verbal messages will be more easily 
stored than situational characteristics at the deep semantic level and that semantic 
messages may be retained in memory for a relatively long time. 
In both memory models semantic aspects are stored independent of situatio-
nal characteristics. Both explain the storage of the information independent of the 
external agent who provided the information. As already noted, the third compo-
nent of internalized norms is the autonomous component, which means that 
although the source may not be forgotten, the moral norm is nevertheless 
experienced as emanating from the self. Hoffman (1983) gave two explanations 
which both may further contribute to this experience as originating from within 
the self. First, self-attribution theory (see Lepper, 1983) suggests that if the 
external sources are not perceived, or if they are unclear or invisible, children 
may attribute their actions and thoughts to themselves. When the children do not 
know the source of the message they will consider the norm as stemming from 
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-acquisition of a coherent set 
of cognitive dimensions that 
make up the norm of consi-
dering others 
-an internal motive to act in 
accord to this norm 
-the motive is experienced as 
autonomous 
Figure 1 The stimulation of moral internalization 
themselves rather than from their parents. Second, the child may perform certain 
meta-cognitive operations. It is reasonable to expect that this mental activity 
further loosens the connection between parental image and inductive content. 
Thus, when asked about the source of the norm, it is assumed that children will 
attribute their actions and thoughts to themselves (Hoffman, 1983). This reflects 
the autonomous component of a norm. 
The above-mentioned process of how norms become internalized as a con-
sequence of parental discipline is outlined in Figure 1. In a single discipline 
encounter an inductive message may produce an affective and cognitive reaction 
within the child, which is then processed and stored in memory. What happens in 
a single discipline encounter is diagrammed in the (horizontal) upper part of 
Figure 1. If the parent frequently gives such inductive messages in discipline 
encounters the child acquires knowledge about how to behave and acquires the 
capacity to react empathically lo a diversity of situations in which another person 
is involved. The child is motivated to consider the needs of another without 
feeling urged to do so by any external force. Stated differently, the child has 
- affective product (empathy) 
- cognitive product (consideration 
of other perspectives, knowledge 
Inductive ^ concerning causality, expecta-
discipline | tions how to behave, general 
norms, alternative ways of 
behaving etc.) 
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internalized the norm to consider the needs of others (see right (vertical) part of 
Figure 1). 
In summarize, power assertion and love withdrawal may cause fear and anxie-
ty which in turn motivate the child to comply. Classical conditioning may asso-
ciate certain aspects of the situation, in particular the presence of the parent, with 
fear and anxiety. Then, although the child does not behave in accordance with his 
or her own desires, it is unlikely that the needs of others are properly considered. 
The frequent use of induction, however, increases the likelihood that representa-
tions of moral-cognitive structures and feelings associated with these structures 
are stored together in memory. Because of this semantic storage, moreover, the 
original source of the norm may disappear and the norm subsequently experienced 
as autonomous (i.e., internalized). A change in behavior in response to inductive 
discipline is not a clear instance of compliance in the sense of submitting to 
someone but rather a change in perspective resulting from the semantic proces-
sing of information. Cognitive psychologists originally paid little attention to 
the influences of affect on cognitive behavior and development. In the IÇSO's, 
however, the relationship between affect and cognition has received greater atten-
tion (e.g., Arsenio, 1987, 1988; Hoffman, 1986; Radkc-Yarrow & Sherman, 
1985; Strongman, 1987). 
In this section Hoffman's theory of how disciplinary information may be 
processed was outlined in order to illustrate how norms may be internalized. It 
seems obvious, however, that the criterion of moral internalization is not just 
wether or not certain information is stored but also the consideration of another's 
needs in subsequent moral encounters. In these new situations empathie arousal 
can be seen as the motive for this consideration (Hoffman, 1982a, 1987). In the 
following section the relation between empathy and perspective taking, and the 
relation between empathy and perspective taking with moral internalization will 
therefore be considered. 
3.2.3 The mediating role of empathy and perspective taking in 
the relationship between discipline and moral internali-
zation 
According to Hoffman empathie distress is a motive to consider the needs of 
others. Consequently empathy plays a central role in his theory of moral inter-
nalization. Empathy is closely related to the child's perspective taking. That is, a 
child may react empathically to another's situation and then wonder where the 
experienced distress comes from. When the child realizes that the distress stems 
from another person, the child may then wonder why the other person is dis-
tressed. Thus empathie arousal may motivate the child to take the perspective of 
the other. An empathie reaction may also, however, be the consequence of taking 
another's perspective (Hoffman, 1987). This reciprocal influence between empa-
thy and perspective taking will be worked out 
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Hoffman (1987) distinguished five modes in which empathy may be aroused. 
Some of these arousal modes require rather shallow levels of cognitive pro­
cessing and are largely involuntary (e.g., sensory registration, mimicry, condi­
tioning and direct associations), while other modes require deeper levels of pro­
cessing (e.g., putting oneself in other's place). When empathy is aroused the 
experience of this affective response can be influenced by the child's social-cogni­
tive development. That is, the way in which children experience empathy may 
depend on their perception of others. Hoffman (1987) called this the "cognitive 
sense of others". The cognitive sense of others develops and interacts with the 
affective experience of empathy. 
Hoffman (1975b, 1984a, 1987) distinguished four levels in the development 
of a cognitive sense of others: 
a Self-other fusion. There is no clear separation between the self and the 
other. 
b. Person permanence (at about 12 months of age). The other is a physical 
entity distinct from self. The child has a stable sense of the separate exis­
tence of the other person even when the person is outside the individual's 
immediate perceptual field, but the child nevertheless tends to attribute to 
others the characteristics that belong to the self. 
с Perspective taking (at about 2-3 years). The child is aware that the other has 
independent internal states. The first rudiments of role-taking competence 
may be present under certain conditions in very young children (even under 
two years of age). Role-taking competence improves and becomes increas­
ingly complex with age. 
d. Personal identity (between 6 and 9 years of age). Others have experiences 
beyond the immediate situation and their own history and identity as indivi­
duals. 
According to Hoffman the different levels of social-cognitive development com­
bined with the capacity for affective responding produce the following sequence 
of the development of empathie distress: 
a. Global empathy. Infants may experience empathie distress as a result of 
automatic, involuntary processes. They have not yet acquired a sense of 
others as physical entities distinct from the self and therefore the distress 
cues from the dimly perceived other are confounded with unpleasant feelings 
aroused in the self. 
b. Egocentric empathy. The child may now be aware that another person and 
not the self is in distress, but the other's internal states remain unknown 
and may be assumed to be the same as one's own. 
с Empathy for another's feelings. With the onset of role-taking one recog­
nizes that other people's feelings may differ from one's own and are based 
on their own needs and interpretations of events. Consequently one be­
comes more responsive to cues about what the other is actually feeling. 
d. Empathy for another's life condition. Although one still responds empathi-
cally to another's immediate distress, one's empathie response may be 
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intensified or reduced when one realizes the specific circumstances concer-
ning the other person. 
Hoffman (1987) also claimed that it is possible that the child's perspective on the 
situation may change the child's empathie reaction into a related moral affect. 
When the child realizes that he may be the cause of the victim's distress, empa-
thy may be transformed into feelings of guilt. Similarly, when the child is 
empathically aroused and cues indicate that someone else caused the victim's 
distress the child may feel anger at the transgressor or "empathie anger". It is also 
possible that empathie distress leads to a reciprocal concern for the victim. In 
this case the child feels compassion or "sympathetic distress" for the victim. 
According to Hoffman (1984a, 1987), this sympathetic distress arises when the 
child has a notion of self-other differentiation (second level of cognitive sense of 
others) and experiences egocentric empathy. 
In summary, empathie experiences are influenced by the child's cognitive 
sense of others and may be transformed into other affects depending on the child's 
perspective on the situation. 
We also argued that empathie distress may be the consequence of the child's 
perspective taking. According to Hoffman (1984a, 1987) empathy can also be 
aroused by putting the self in another's place. Perspective taking involves under-
standing another's thoughts and motives, as well as feelings. A child becomes 
progressively better able to recognize that the other is in need and to anticipate 
the consequences of his or her own actions for others. Children with advanced 
perspective-taking skills can more accurately imagine and anticipate perspectives 
beyond their own and will also, therefore, experience empathy and related feelings 
such as sympathy much more often. 
It should be clear that empathie arousal and the child's perspective on a situa-
tion are closely related. Both can be stimulated by the parent's discipline tech-
niques. When the parent points out the consequences of an action for the victim, 
the child is stimulated to consider the victim's perspective and may become 
empathically aroused. Each time the parent gives an inductive message the child 
may react emphatically and may acquire knowledge about the perspectives of the 
other people playing a role within the situation. That is, the child's empathie 
capacity as well as perspective-taking abilities may be stimulated in the long run 
by such inductive strategies. 
What then happens in new moral encounters? Children's cognitive and 
affective responses to the parent's inductions in early discipline encounters are 
stored in memory (see section 3.2.2). Hoffman (1983) speculated that these 
cognitions and affects may later be evoked in moral encounters. Whenever the 
child is engaged in a new situation an empathie reaction motivates the child to 
consider the needs of the other. With an increasing perspective-taking ability, 
moreover, the effects of actions on others can be better comprehended or antici-
pated and the range of stimuli eliciting empathy may increase. In other words, 
empathy and perspective taking are both hypothesized to be mediating variables 
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in the relation between inductive strategies and moral internalization/ Whenever 
parents give inductive messages, the child's attention is directed toward another 
and the child is provided with information about the other. Consequently, the 
child develops the capacity to react with empathy in a variety of moral encoun-








Figure 2 Empathy and perspective taking as mediating variables between parental 
discipline and moral internalization 
In Figure 2 a model of moral internalization is presented. The parent arouses 
the child to listen by using an inductive discipline strategy. The information 
provided by the parent stimulates the child to consider the situation (perspective 
taking) and concurrently stimulates the child's empathie capacity. The feelings of 
empathy form the basis for subsequent moral decisions. A child who has a good 
sense of others can respond empathically to the situation, knowing the needs of 
others and taking them into account in moral decisions. This is what Hoffman 
called moral internalization. Thus Hoffman stressed an empathy-based morality 
and in the second part of this research the model presented in Figure 2 will be 
tested. 
Hoffman suggested that the child's language and social-cognitive skills (e.g. 
role-taking) influences the moral internalization because the effects of actions 
on others can be better comprehended or anticipated and the range of stimuli 
eliciting empathy increases (Hoffman, 1983, 1987). However, language and 
social cognition are affectively neutral skills that bear more directly on moral 
competence than on moral motivation. Empathy motivates the child to bene-
fit others. The child feels an internal compulsion to be moral. Empathy is a 
necessary mediating variable between discipline and moral internalization and, 
because of the close relationship between empathy and perspective taking, we 
have decided to consider both variables to mediate between discipline and mo-
ral internalization. 
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3.3 Generalizations from research 
The research on child-rearing characteristics and moral internalization have 
been reviewed several times (e.g., Hoffman, 1963, 1970; Maccoby & Martin, 
1983; Rollins & Thomas, 1979; Shaffer & Brody, 1981). Nevertheless it may be 
useful to summarize the results of these reviews briefly, as will be done in 
section 3.3.1. Much of this research has been correlational, neglecting the causa-
lity problem and the variables that may mediate between parental discipline and 
moral internalization. One of the exceptions is a study by Janssens and Gerris (in 
press) who found evidence for the mediating role of empathy in the relationship 
between discipline and prosocial development. Further evidence for the relation-
ship between empathy and moral internalization and between perspective taking 
and moral internalization will be presented in section 3.3.2. Finally, some 
evidence for the existence of a relationship between discipline and empathy and 
between discipline and perspective taking will be outlined in section 3.3.3. 
3.3.1 The relationship between discipline and moral 
internalization 
After reviewing studies on discipline and moral internalization Hoffman 
(1970) made the following empirical generalization. An advanced moral orienta-
tion is associated with the mother's frequent use of inductive discipline and a 
weak moral development is associated with discipline techniques having high 
power-assertive components (e.g., physical force, deprivation of material objects 
or privileges, or the threat of these). Love withdrawal (e.g., ignoring the child, 
saying that the parent does not like such children) infrequently relates to moral 
internalization and thus no apparent pattern could be detected. 
In the studies reviewed by Hoffman, induction was operationalized in diffe-
rent ways and usually consisted of a broad range of behaviors: Pointing out the 
consequences of the child's behavior for others, asking the child to account for 
the behavior, insisting upon reparation, suggesting appropriate alternative ac-
tions, and simply telling the child what aspects of the behavior are unacceptable 
were all classified as induction in the studies reviewed by Hoffman. 
The strength and consistency of the empirical relations appeared to depend on 
the operationalization of moral internalization. Hoffman distinguished two be-
havioral indicators of moral internalization: Resistance to the temptation to 
transgress and confession following transgression. These behavioral indicators 
showed minor correlations with parental discipline. However, two internal state 
indicators, guilt and moral judgment, showed the most clear-cut pattern of cor-
relation with parental discipline. Most of these results applied to middle-class 
subjects. Almost no relations are found for lower class subjects. Furthermore 
Hoffman concluded that, in contrast to the mothers, very few relationships are 
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obtained between father's disciplinary practices and the child's moral develop-
ment This was true for boys as well as for girls. 
Several years after Hoffman's publication, Rollins and Thomas (1979) also 
reviewed the studies on parental practices and moral development (operationalized 
as resistance to temptation, moral judgment, and conscience). Whereas Hoffman 
found only a few correlations between discipline and moral internalization 
Rollins and Thomas concluded that power assertion is negatively correlated with 
moral development and induction positively correlated, irrespective of the opera-
tionalization of moral development. Rollins and Thomas did not differentiate 
between sexes and their conclusions are therefore supposed to hold for boys as 
well as girls and fathers as well as mothers. Finally, Rollins and Thomas found 
love withdrawal to be associated with numerous conceptual and/or methodologi-
cal difficulties. Therefore they did not attempt to generalize about the relation 
between love withdrawal and moral development 
How can the different conclusions of Hoffman and Rollins and Thomas be 
explained? First, Hoffman distinguished between several indicators of child mora-
lity while Rollins and Thomas did not. Second, Rollins and Thomas did not dif-
ferentiate between fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters, even though no relation 
between father's disciplinary style and child moral development was found in the 
only two studies concerned with this. 
A more recent review is that of Shaffer and Brody ( 1981), although the 
studies they cited do not greatly differ from the studies Hoffman and Rollins and 
Thomas cited. All of the studies were published before 1975 and only four of 
them were published after 1970. It is therefore not surprising that the conclu-
sions are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Hoffman (1970). 
The aforementioned reviews found inconsistent relations between love with-
drawal and morality. Maccoby and Martin (1983), however, highlighted the 
possible influence of love withdrawal on moral development. After reviewing 
several studies they concluded that withdrawal of love may generate anxiety in 
children and this anxiety may in tum motivate compliance. Compliance does not 
automatically imply internalization, however. Maccoby and Martin suggested 
that, at least when used with very young children, love withdrawal may be 
similar to physical punishment a technique with which parents buy desired 
behavior. This contrasts with Hoffman's earlier suggestions of love withdrawal 
having similar effects as induction (Hoffman, 1963). 
In summary, the reviews mentioned above indicate that the use of inductive 
techniques lend to correlate positively with the child's moral development where-
as the use of power assertive techniques tend to correlate negatively with the 
child's moral development. The relationship between love withdrawal and moral 
internalization is unclear. It seems obvious that this statement is a generalization 
based on a number of studies. Nevertheless, numerous inconsistencies exist (e.g., 
findings of no relationship between parental discipline and the child's moral inter-
nalization). What may cause these inconsistencies? 
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Numerous explanations can be offered. First, a possible cause of the dis-
crepant Findings is the distribution of scores, which can show considerable varia-
tion from study to study. For example, a low to moderate use of power may 
stimulate the child to behave in a morally acceptable way. Research selecting a 
low to moderate range of power will therefore produce positive correlations. 
Severe punishment may not stimulate morality. Research selecting a moderate to 
severe range of power will therefore produce negative correlations. Studies 
measuring a broad distribution of scores, moreover, may find no correlation 
because of a possible curvilinear relation between power and moral internaliza-
tion (Rollins & Thomas, 1979; Shaffer & Brody, 1981). 
Second, interaction effects may exist between parental variables (Rollins & 
Thomas, 1979). In fact, such an interaction effect can be derived from Hoffman's 
theory. It can be hypothesized that when power assertion is totally absent no 
relation may be found between induction and moral internalization because the 
child is not motivated to listen to the parent Hoffman (1970) suggested that in 
reality such a situation may not occur because any discipline encounter generates 
a certain amount of activation to listen to the parent. When power assertion is 
low a positive relationship exists between induction and moral internalization. 
But when power assertion is high, again no relation is expected. This being the 
case one study might find something different from another study depending on 
the amount of power assertion used in the sample. 
A third possible cause put forward by Shaffer and Brody is that the effect of 
any disciplinary technique may depend upon the age and ihc sex of the child to 
whom it is administered as well as the sex, social class, and other attributes of 
the parent who administers the discipline. 
Fourth, discrepant findings may often be attributed to the imprecise definition 
and/or measurement of child variables (Shaffer & Brody, 1981). Hoffman (1970), 
for example, noted that different child variables give discrepant outcomes. 
Fifth, and analogous to the above explanation, parental variables can be defined 
and measured in different ways. Most studies use induction as an undifferentiated 
category. However, many studies suggest that there are qualitatively different 
categories of induction (Maccoby & Martin, 1983). Hoffman (1970) concluded 
that induction is the type of discipline most conducive to moral internalization, 
but he also suggested that other-oriented induction (i.e., referring to the implica-
tions of the child's behavior for other persons) may be of particular importance 
for moral internalization. Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) operationalized induc-
tion as referring to the consequences of the child's actions for others. They dif-
ferentiated between a category "induction regarding parent" (e.g., the action has 
hurt the parent, that an object was valued by the parent) and "induction regarding 
peers" (e.g., the parent makes reference to and shows concern for the feelings of 
the victimized child). Induction regarding parents correlated more frequently with 
the moral indicators than induction regarding victims. In an attempt to explain 
the development of altruistic behavior, Hoffman (1975c) stressed the importance 
of pointing out the harmful consequences of the child's behavior for the victim or 
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stimulating the child to imagine the self in the other person's place. These tech-
niques were called victim-centered techniques. Unlike other-oriented induction, 
these victim-centered techniques also referred to techniques that suggest concrete 
acts of reparation and techniques that suggest that the child apologize. 
Another study from Sims (cited by Keller & Bell, 1979) distinguished between 
active and passive induction. Active induction, where the child actively takes the 
other's role, appeared more effective in stimulating altruistic behavior than pas-
sive induction (lecturing by the parent). Staub (1979) distinguished between 
positive and negative induction and hypothesized that positive induction should 
provide a stronger incentive to act prosocially. Positive induction refers to 
pointing out the positive consequences of desirable behavior, the increased well-
being of other people, and the positive emotions that such behavior induces in 
the other person. Negative induction is pointing out the negative consequences of 
the child's undesirable behavior for other people. 
Apparently, several types of induction can be distinguished which may or 
may not bear a relation to the child's moral internalization. The correlation 
between the use of inductive discipline strategies and the child's moral internali-
zation may also be suppressed when several types of inductive discipline are 
lumped together. From the studies mentioned above it appears that techniques 
directing the child's attention to the other person and stimulating the child to be 
actively involved in the situation may be of particular importance for moral 
internalization. We will use the term 'victim-oriented discipline' to refer to tech-
niques that direct the child's attention to the other person. In the present study we 
will distinguish between inductive discipline and victim-oriented discipline and 
investigate their relationship to the child's moral internalization. Inductive disci-
pline strategies refer to the broad set of explanations or reasons the parent may 
use to convince the child of the inappropriateness of his or her behavior (see 
section 2.1). These techniques may not always direct the child's attention to the 
victim (e.g., "if you keep acting like this you'll lose all your friends"). When the 
child ignores the victim the child may not become empathically aroused and, as 
already shown, arousal may be of central importance for moral internalization. 
Also the child's perspective taking may not be stimulated by inductive tech-
niques. In contrast, victim-oriented discipline may direct the child's attention to 
the consequences of his or her behavior for someone else rather than for the self 
(e.g., "look how sad you made him by taking his favorite toy"). This may, 
indeed, cause empathie arousal. It may also teach the child to refrain from moral 
transgression by stimulating the child's perspective taking (e.g., "how do you 
think X would feel if you broke his toy"). And it may teach the child to help 
another and feel responsible (e.g., "make up to the child for what you did"). As a 
result, the child can make a causal connection between the own action and the 
physical or psychological state of the victim. Therefore we hypothesize that 
victim-oriented discipline relates stronger to moral internalization than global 
inductive discipline. In addition, we hypothesize that it is important to differen-
tiate not only between inductive discipline techniques but also to operationalize 
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moral internalization in different ways. Furthermore, variables such as the child's 
sex and age and the parent's sex has to be taken into account. 
3.3.2 The relationship between empathy, perspective taking 
and moral internalization 
Our model concentrates on the mediating role of empathy and perspective 
taking in the relationship between parental discipline strategies and moral inter-
nalization. There are some empirical indications that empathy and moral inter-
nalization may be related. 
In a correlational study, Roe (1980) found a significant positive relation between 
children's empathy level and consideration of others. Roe also found a positive 
relation between empathy and children's perception of their parents as fearsome 
and punitive. 
There is more evidence that empathy is a motive for morality (De Veer, Janssens 
& Gerris, 1988; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Feshbach, 1979). De Veer, Janssens 
and Gerris (1988) have also shown empathy to be positively correlated with 
cognitive and affective manifestations of moral internalization (i.e., an internal 
orientation in moral judgment tasks and feelings of guilt). Several times the 
research on the relation between empathy and morality has been reviewed. In his 
review, Feshbach (1979) concluded that a negative relation exists between empa-
thy and aggression. Virtually no relations has been found between empathy and 
social behaviors such as generosity, altruism, cooperation and moral thought. 
Most research pertains to the relation between empathy and prosocial behavior. 
In a meta-analytic review Underwood and Moore (1982) also concluded that there 
is no general relation between empathy and prosocial behavior. They suggested 
that a reliable association between empathy and altruism develops over time and 
is found in adults. In their analysis of more than eighty studies published since 
1971 Eisenberg and Miller (1987) grouped the studies according to the kind of 
measures used to assess empathy. Although a relation between empathy and 
prosocial behavior was found to exist, the degree of association between empathy 
and prosocial behavior varied depending on the particular measure of empathy. 
The association between story indices of empathy (presenting hypothetical 
stories and asking the child's feelings in response to each story) and prosocial 
behavior, when tested with meta-analytic procedures, was nonsignificant. The 
association between the other indices of empathy and prosocial behavior, how-
ever, were generally positive and significant. 
There is thus some evidence that empathy is related to aspects of morality. It 
should be noted that the reviews of Feshbach, Underwood and Moore, and 
Eisenberg and Miller primarily concentrate on the role of empathy in the perfor-
mance of moral actions such as prosocial behavior. That is, empathy may be 
related to overt behavior. Moral internalization refers to consideration of the 
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needs of others, however. Although moral behavior may be the result of consi-
dering the other's needs, it cannot be equated with moral internalization. 
In addition to the relationship between empathy and moral internalization the 
hypothesized relation between perspective-taking ability and moral internalization 
has been investigated. Perspective taking is often seen as an important prerequi-
site to moral development (Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1965; Selman, 1976). Per-
spective taking, then, is considered as a necessary but not sufficient precondition 
to moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1976; Walker, 1980). Nevertheless, many of the 
authors who have reviewed the literature concluded that the relation between per-
spective taking and variables such as prosocial behavior (lannotti, 1985; Radke-
Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler & Chapman, 1983; Shantz, 1975,1983), moral judgment, 
and altruism (Kurdek, 1978) is not consistent Underwood and Moore (1982) used 
a meta-analytical technique to aggregate over independent studies. In contrast 
with the above-mentioned reviewers, they concluded that a reliable relationship 
has to be found between perspective taking and altruism. 
It may be concluded that some evidence for an association between empathy 
and perspective taking, on the one hand, and moral behavior, on the other hand, 
exists. However, a distinction must be made between moral behavior and moral 
internalization. As already noted, moral behavior may be a consequence of moral 
internalization but moral internalization is a broader concept than moral be-
havior. This means that only limited empirical evidence for the existence of a 
relationship between the child's empathie capacity and moral internalization and 
between the child's perspective taking and moral internalization has been found. 
3.3.3 The relationship between discipline and the child's 
empathy and perspective taking 
Aside from the hypothesized relationship between empathy and perspective 
taking on the one hand and moral internalization on the other hand, parental 
discipline is also hypothesized to relate to empathy and perspective taking. 
Experimental studies manipulating the level of empathy and measuring subse-
quent helping behavior provide some evidence for the hypothesis that empathy 
motivates one to help another. Moreover, a child's empathy has also been shown 
to be influenced by the instructions used. Trying to imagine how another person 
feels about the situation arouses more empathy than instructions focussing on 
the objective information in the situation (Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy 
& Vamey, 1986; Toi & Batson, 1982). Howard and Bamett (1981) encouraged 
children to focus on the feelings of the less fortunate others. Children in the 
control group were encouraged to think about the less fortunate others, but 
without the mention of feelings. Children in the empathy arousal condition were 
found to show significantly more sad feelings than children in the control condi-
tion. These studies indicate that empathy may be aroused by the instructions 
given by the adult to the child. 
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There is also evidence for a relationship between perspective taking and disci-
plinary style. Some studies report the results of a training program of perspec-
tive-taking skills. In general, instruction can improve children's perspective-ta-
king ability (e.g.. Chandler, 1973; Lowell Krogh, 1985). For example, Bearison 
and Cassel (1975) studied the effectiveness of verbal communication and dif-
ferentiated between mothers making person-oriented statements and mothers ma-
king position-oriented statements. Person-oriented appeals included regulatory 
statements that draw attention to the feelings, thoughts, needs, or intentions of 
the mother, the child, or a third person who may be affected by the child's action. 
Position-oriented appeals referred to rules or statutes (e.g., "all children have to 
go to school"). They hypothesized that person-oriented statements would be more 
effective because they stimulate the child to take the perspective of others. 
Children whose mothers used person-oriented arguments rather than position-
oriented ones were more successful in taking the perspective of another person 
when required to in a game. Peterson and Skevington (1988) studied the relation 
between cognitive role-taking and child-rearing method. They distinguished 
distancing from didactic induction. Distancing typically involves questions that 
challenge the child's existing point of view, creating a cognitive conflict in the 
child. Didactic induction typically involves one-way communication strategies 
that provide logical reasons for the requested behavior change without encoura-
ging the child to discover such reasons himself or spontaneously think about the 
rationale. Distancing was significantly associated with the child's cognitive role-
taking skills, but didactic induction was not related to role-taking skills. This 
suggests that distancing discipline may influence perspective taking. In other 
words, it is important to differentiate between the types of information provided 
by the parent (cf. section 3.3.1). 
In summary, evidence has been found for a relationship between the kind of 
instructions given by an adult and the child's empathie and perspective-taking 
abilities. Empathy and perspective taking have also been shown to relate to 
moral internalization. Notwithstanding the fact that the relations between these 
concepts have been investigated regularly, the mediating role of empathy and 
perspective-taking ability as an explanation for the relation between disciplinary 
techniques and moral internalization has not been the focus of much research. In 
this research, therefore, a model will be tested in which discipline is hypothesized 
to influence the child's empathy and perspective taking, which are in turn hypo-
thesized to contribute to the child's moral internalization. 
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4 T H E RESEARCH: QUESTIONS AND DESIGN 
To date research focusing on the long-term influences of parental discipline 
strategies on children's moral intemalization is rather scarce. This study concen-
trates on these long-term influences. In section 2.4 we concluded that a panel 
study probably would be well-suited to studying long-term effects. The design 
used in this study is presented in Figure 3. Parental discipline at first measure-
ment occasion (time 1) can be related to the child's moral intemalization at the 
second measurement occasion (time 2). On the other hand the child's moral inter-
nalization at first measurement occasion (time 1) can be related to parental disci-
pline at the second measurement occasion (time 2). Comparison of all relations 
will give us information about the existence of long-term effects. 






Figure 3 Panel design for studying long-term influences of parental discipline 
strategies and child's moral internalization 
Three main hypotheses will be tested in this study. The first hypothesis 
bears on the cross-sectional relationships between parental discipline strategies 
and the child's moral intemalization (presented within rectangular forms in Figure 
3). In chapter 3 it appeared that Hoffman often mentioned inductive discipline 
strategies as particularly relevant to the child's moral intemalization. Parents who 
use inductive discipline strategies provide the child with reasons and explanations 
to motivate the child to change his or her behavior. Hoffman has also stressed 
the importance of directing the child's attention to the person who is victimized 
by the child. As a consequence of theoretical as well as empirical research it is 









cular be related to the child's moral internalization. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
is: 
1. Victim-oriented discipline should relate more strongly to the child's 
moral internalization than inductive discipline. 
The use of a panel model as presented in Figure 3 allows us to test this hypothe-
sis twice: with the data gathered at the first measurement occasion and with the 
data gathered at the second measurement occasion. 
Second, Hoffman presented a persuasive theoretical argument in favor of the 
dominant effect of parents on children's moral internalization (see chapter 2). His 
argument rests on the fact that the strength of parental power enables parents to 
place far greater constraints on the child than the reverse. A second aim in this 
study, therefore, is to discover whether there is empirical evidence for Hoffman's 
hypothesis. Consequently, the second hypothesis is: 
2. The long-term influence of parental disciplinary strategies on the 
child's moral internalization is stronger than the long-term in-
fluence of the child's moral internalization on the disciplinary 
strategies the parents choose. 
The third hypothesis concerns a further test of Hoffman's theory of moral 
internalization. In chapter 3 it was shown that the child's empathie capacity and 
the child's perspective-taking capacity may mediate the influence of parental 
disciplinary strategies on the child's moral internalization. Thus the third hy-
pothesis is: 
3. Parental discipline affects the child's empathie and perspective-
taking abilities, which in turn influence the child's moral inter-
nalization. 
Since the present research focuses on long-term parent-child influences con-
cerning the child's intemaUzation of norms and the parent's discipline strategy, 
using a cross-lagged panel design, various problems have to be solved. The first 
problem pertains to the measurement of moral internalization. Moral internaliza-
tion refers to the motivation to consider the needs of others. How can we assess 
the extent to which a child is willing to consider the needs of others? Few would 
disagree that morality lies in action (Blasi, 1980). We can ask ourselves what is 
left of moral internalization when this is not expressed in the behavior of a 
person. Moral action is not simply the expression of a moral motive but an 
attempt to achieve an acceptable balance between one's egoistic and moral mo-
tives. The activation of a moral norm, or motive, does not guarantee moral 
action, because the egoistic motive may be more powerful (Hoffman, 1983). 
Moreover, the motive for an apparently moral action need not be a moral one. 
For instance, a child may simply help another in order to please the parent and 
gain a reward. According to Hoffman's theory this action, no matter how bene-
ficial, would not be moral. Hoffman emphasizes considering the needs of others 
as characteristic of internalization. 
Besides a behavioral manifestation moral internalization also contains a cognitive 
component, including judgments of what is right and wrong (see section 3.1). 
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Thus, cognitions are also part of moral internalization. Empirical research in-
dicates a positive relation between maturity of reasoning and moral behavior 
(Blasi, 1980; Eisenberg, 1982), although Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and 
Chapman (1983) argued that, almost as often, no association have been found. 
Furthermore, morality may also be associated with feelings of guilt. Hoffman 
(1982a) described guilt as the bad feeling one has about oneself when one is 
aware of having harmed someone else. By pointing out the other's distress to the 
child, the child is stimulated to consider the perspective of the victim and empa-
thie feelings may be aroused. When the child thinks that (s)he caused the other's 
distress these empathie feelings are transformed into feelings of guilt. Children 
who have internalized norms may feel guilty even when they are an innocent 
bystander. For example, they blame themselves for contributing to the continua-
tion of the other child's distress by not intervening (Hoffman, 1987). 
In sum, behavioral, cognitive and affective indicators of moral internalization 
may exist, and therefore all three components will be studied in order to obtain a 
conceptualization of moral internalization as adequate as possible. 
The second problem pertains to the operationalization of parental discipline. 
Inductive discipline, and in particular victim-oriented discipline, are hypothesized 
to motivate the child to consider the other's needs. In the preceding chapter (see 
section 3.2.1) it was pointed out that power assertion and love withdrawal may 
influence the effect of induction on the child. Power assertion and love withdra-
wal can be considered moderator-variables. The aim of these techniques is to 
arouse the child. This arousal is optimal when the child is motivated to listen to 
the explanations and reasoning of the parent. The child probably neglects the 
inductive message when no arousal is achieved (Hoffman, 1983). Thus power 
assertive or love withdrawing elements have to be present. However, when arou-
sal is too high the child's attention may be directed to his or her own position 
rather than the inductive message. The central question then is: What is the 
optimal amount of power assertion and/or love withdrawal to stimulate the child 
to attend to the inductive message? As already mentioned in section 3.2.1 Lepper 
(1983) and Hoffman (1983) suggested that inductive messages may themselves 
contain enough arousal to motivate the child to listen. This leads to the predic-
tion that power or withdrawal of love in combination with induction may divert 
the child's attention from the inductive message rather than optimalize it. This 
has consequences for the operationalization of induction. For example, when a 
parent only uses an inductive message the child is probably motivated to pay 
attention to the message. But when the parent also uses power-assertion or love-
withdrawal the effectiveness of the inductive message decreases. In operationali-
zing inductive discipline and victim-oriented discipline the degree of power-asser-
tion and love-withdrawal must also, therefore, be considered. 
The third problem pertains to the amount of time needed for the parent's 
disciplinary strategies to show an effect on the child's internalization and vice 
versa. When we do not take account of time lags properly biased estimates of 
effects can be obtained (Plewis, 1985). On the one hand the time interval 
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between measures must be long enough to let influences have their long lasting 
effects. On the other hand, when the time interval is very long, correlations may 
be too much blurred by other variables influencing discipline and/or moral inter­
nalization. For example, it is possible that a change in disciplinary technique 
takes place early in the measurement interval and that its full effect on moral 
internalization may have dissipated by the second measurement. As a conse­
quence of not having the optimal time interval the relation may be an under­
estimation of the total causal affect of a variable on the other variable. In other 
words, the temporal lag between repeated measurements may be crucial in a 
longitudinal study. Gollob and Reichardt (1987), however, argued that it is not 
necessary to specify the optimal time lag. Although the time lag is important 
there is no one time lag the only correct one. Effects may be observable with 
both shorter or longer time lags than the optimal lag. Gollob and Reichardt 
suggested that the study of many different lags is important to understand causal 
lags fully. No suggestions in the literature are found pertaining to the best time 
interval to be taken to guarantee a substantial relation between discipline and 
moral internalization. In our study we chose the rather arbitrary interval of two 
years. In 1986 parental discipline and the child's moral internalization were 
assessed for the first time. Two years later, in 1988, we again assessed parental 
disci-pline as well as the child's moral internalization. 
The final question concerns the age of the children to be studied. It is pos­
sible that the influence of parents on children and vice versa depends on the age 
of the children. That is, parental influence on the children may be stronger wilh 
young children than with older children. For this reason we selected several sub-
samples of children at different ages. At time 1 we selected second, fourth and 
sixth grade children. That is, the sample can be divided into three age groups 
(cohorts), with two years in between each cohort. This design allows us to study 
changes in moral internalization and parental discipline within each family across 
a period of two years as well as changes in moral internalization and parental 
discipline across a period of six years (from 5/6-year-olds to 11/12-year-olds). 
Before testing the above-mentioned hypotheses, therefore, differences in parental 
discipline, children's moral internalization, empathie capacity, and perspective-
taking capacity will be examined across the different cohorts (see sections 6.1, 
time 1(1986) 5-6 years 
time 2 (1988) 7 - 8 У е а г е ^ • 9-10 years -M »• 11-12 years 
Figure 4 The cross-lagged panel design with two measurements in 1986 (time 1) 
and 1988 (time 2) and three age groups (cohorts) 
-9-10 years 
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6.2, and 6.3). The cohort design is illustrated in Figure 4. In Figure 4 the hori-
zontal arrows represent cross-sectional comparisons. Such cross-sectional compa-
rison can be made with the data from the first measurement occasion (time 1) as 
well as the data from the second measurement occasion (time 2). The diagonal 
arrows represent longitudinal comparisons. Each cohort was measured two times, 
with a two-year interval, which provides measurements of individual change. 
Finally, by comparing the scores of two independent groups of children at the 
same age (indicated by the vertical lines in Figure 4), the validity of our meas-





The sample consisted of 150 families with a child attending the second, 
fourth or sixth grade in one of fourteen elementary schools in the Netherlands at 
the time of the first measurement. The families were contacted by the teachers of 
their child. Originally we asked 64 schools to participate in the project. When a 
school was willing to cooperate a number of randomly selected families were 
then approached, and 46 % (n = 177) of these families responded positively. The 
families were visited twice with 22.5 to 24.0 months intervening (M = 23.00). 
During the first measurement, 177 families participated. When we contacted the 
families for the second visit 150 families were prepared to participate. Reasons 
for dropping out were migration (n = 15), family affaires such as divorce (n = 2), 
or enrollment of the child in a special school (n = 2). Some families simply did 
not want to participate a second time because they did not have the time (n = 7), 
and for one family the reason for dropping out was unknown. 
The total sample consisted of 150 mothers, 132 fathers, 72 boys and 78 
girls. Of the 150 children, at least one parent participated. Background informa-
tion on the families was collected during the first visit. During this first visit, 47 
children attended second grade (cohort 1: 23 boys, 24 girls, M = 5;9 years), 50 
children attended fourth grade (cohort 2: 24 boys, 26 girls, M = 7;11 years), and 
53 children attended sixth grade (cohort 3: 25 boys, 28 girls, M = 9; 10 years). 
Their position in the family was 5 % only child, 37 % firstborn child, 39 % 
youngest child, and 19 % middle child. 
All the families lived in the neighborhood of Nijmegen, mostly in the coun-
try. The mean age of the mothers was 35;6 years (s.d. = 3;9) and of the fathers 
was 37;8 years (s.d. = 4;1). Most inhabitants of this area are Roman Catholics. 
In our sample of 150 families, 66 % of the fathers^ and 71 % of the mothers 
were religious. During the first visit 93 % of the families were two-parent fami-
lies, and during the second visit 91 % were two-parent families. Thirty-one per-
cent of the mothers and 95 % of the fathers had jobs outside the house. 
The families were classified on the basis of 'ITS beroepenklapper' (Van Wes-
terlaak. Kropman & Collaris, 1975). Three percent of the fathers were classified 
as unskilled labourers, 21 % skilled labourers, 20 % low-level employees, 9 % 
self-employed persons, 19 % mid-level employees, and 21 % higher occupations. 
This classification indicates that there is a underrepresentation of the two lower 
levels and an overrepresentation of the two top levels. 




Each child was individually interviewed at school ~ The complete interview 
could be divided into three parts. With the Socio-Moral Interview (S.M.I.) cogni-
tive and affective aspects of moral internalization were assessed as well as the 
child's level of empathy. The child was then questioned about the relationship 
between parents and children to assess the child's perspective taking level. Final-
ly, all children were administered the prosocial moral judgment instrument. The 
interviews were audiotaped and transcribed afterwards. 
Parental discipline was assessed by the Discipline Technique Interview 
(D.T.I.). The parents were interviewed at home, and each parent was interviewed 
independently of the other parent During the time that a parent was being inter-
viewed, the other parent Med in questionnaires requesting additional information. 
All interviews were audiotaped and later transcribed. 
Each teacher also filled in a questionnaire concerning an individual child's 
behavior. 
The above-mentioned procedure was followed on the first as well as on the 
second measurement occasion. 
5.3 Measures 
5.3.1 Moral internalization 
As noted in chapter 4 it is important to consider behavioral, cognitive and 
affective aspects of moral internalization. Hoffman (1970) distinguished four 
aspects of internalization appearing in the parent-child research literature. First, 
the tendency to confess and accept responsibility for one's deviant behavior ("con-
fession'). Second, the amount of resistance to pressure/temptations to behave 
counter to the standard ('resistance to pressure to deviate'). Confession and resis-
tance to pressure to deviate are, thus, behavioral indicators of moral internaliza-
tion. The third aspect pertains to the amount of guilt experienced following 
transgression ('guilt'). And the last aspect refers to the extent to which the child 
judges moral action independent of any thoughts about sanctions ('internal judg-
ment'). 
Confession and resistance to pressure to deviate are rated by the child's 
teacher. The teacher completed a questionnaire concerning the child's behavior in 
the classroom. The child's guilt and internal judgment is assessed using the 
Socio-Moral Interview. We did not intend to treat the dimensions of moral inter-
nalization a priori as indicators of a single underlying 'moral internalization' 
concept. It is possible that different aspects of moral internalization begin to 
The complete interview took about one hour. For young children, however, 
this is too long; almost all children were therefore interviewed twice. 
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develop at different ages and change at different rates. The operationalizations of 
the four aspects of moral internalization will be described in this section. 
Confession 
A first measure of moral conduct is the child's tendency to confess and/or 
accept responsibility for deviant behavior, even when the likelihood of its detec­
tion by others is remote. A child who has internalized norms is expected to 
rectify the situation. 
The child's tendency to confess and accept responsibility for one's deviant 
behavior was rated by the child's teacher. More specifically, the teacher was admi­
nistered a questionnaire with items describing the child's behavior. The five-item 
subscale consisted of items referring to the tendency to confess (e.g., "when the 
child is caught doing something wrong he looks for someone else to blame", 
"when the child has done something wrong he tries, on his own initiative, to 
rectify situation"). The items are adopted from Hoffman (1971a). Each item was 
rated on a six-point scale ranging from never (1) to always (6). Analyses showed 
one item not to relate well to the other items on the list and after deletion of this 
item the internal consistency index Cronbach's alpha is .77 at time 1 and .78 at 
time 2. The final confession score consists of the average for the four remaining 
items (range 1-6). A low score indicates that the child usually does not confess 
after wrongdoing and does not accept responsibility. A high score indicates that 
the child usually confesses after wrongdoing and wants to rectify the situation. 
To validate the measurement of the child's tendency to confess and/or accept 
responsibility for wrongdoing the parents received similar questions about their 
child's behavior on the second measurement occasion. Confession rated by the 
teacher on the second measurement occasion is hypothesized to be related to con­
fession rated by the parent. The parent-teacher correlation is found to be positive 
but not significant (r (135) = .11, ρ > .05). This brings the validity of this meas­
ure into question. When the scale measures a characteristic of the child at least 
some agreement between parent and teachers has to be found. We may conclude 
that confession is not validly measured, although a number of alternative expla­
nations for this discrepancy are possible. It is possible that the child's reaction 
after transgression is mainly determined by the quality of the relation between the 
child and the adult, by how the adult intervenes after the transgression, and/or 
how the child expects the adult to react upon transgression. The child's tendency 
to confess is only manifested after a transgression. Thus, it is suggested that the 
child's behavior after transgression may also be influenced by the adult who is 
present in that situation or the immediate reaction of the adult upon the situa­
tion. Another possible explanation is that parents and teachers may use different 
moral standards when judging the child's behavior. For these reasons, no cross-
situational consistency of this behavioral aspect has to be found. 
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Resistance to pressure to deviate 
The second behavioral indicator is the amount of resistance the child offers to 
pressures to behave counter to the standard. Resistance to temptation is usually 
measured in an experimental situation (Hoffman, 1970), but we used a more 
indirect, possibly less situation-specific measure. The behavior questionnaire for 
teachers included three questions about the child's resistance to temptation ("The 
child can be led into doing unacceptable things", "The child will break a promise 
when he can benefit from this", "I have to keep an eye on the child and tell him 
to behave"). These items were rated on a six-point scale ranging from never (6) 
to always (1). The internal consistency index Cronbach's alpha is .85 at time 1 
and .78 at time 2. The child's resistance to deviation was obtained by averaging 
the ratings of the three items. Thus the minimum possible score equals 1 and the 
maximum possible score equals 6. High scores correspond to high resistance to 
pressure to deviate. 
At time 2 the parents received similar questions about their child's behavior. 
As with confession, we related the children's resistance scores as rated by the 
teacher to the resistance scores rated by the parent to validate the measurement. 
The parent-teacher correlation is found to be low but significant (r (134) = .35, 
ρ < .001). 
Guilt 
Hoffman (1976) viewed guilt arousal as a direct outcome of the harmful 
effects of wrongful acts on others. When a child responds with empathie distress 
to the cues of distress from another and the child is also aware of being the cause 
of another's upset, the child's distress may be called guilt. Guilt arousal, in this 
view, is a combination of empathie distress and the cognitive awareness of culpa­
bility for the other person's distress. 
The procedure to assess guilt is adopted from Thompson and Hoffman (1980). 
Guilt is operalionalized as a conscious, self-initiated, and self-critical reaction 
after wrongdoing (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Thompson & Hoffman, 1980). 
In this view guilt is not a purely affective measure but also has a cognitive 
component. 
Guilt was assessed by a semi-structured interview with the children. The 
Socio-Moral Interview (S.M.I., De Veer, Janssens & Genis, 1987) consists of 
four hypothetical stories describing a social situation followed by questions. 
Each story tells about a child who transgresses a norm. That is, following 
Hoffman's conception of a norm (see section 3.1), the child in the story does not 
take the needs of another into account. The protagonist hurts someone, breaks 
another's toy, cheats, or takes away a child's toy. Stories containing the last two 
themes were also used by Thompson and Hoffman (1980) to assess guilt. The 
events in these stories belong to the domain of moral situations classified by 
Turiel (1978) in that the themes concern the welfare and rights of others and 
entail the infliction of harm to persons. The stories vary along two aspects. The 
first aspect refers to the intentions of the transgressor; the transgression is an 
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accident or intended. The second aspect refers to the personal consequences of the 
act; the consequences are either only personal (e.g., the victim is sad, distressed) 
or material and personal (e.g., something is damaged or lost and the victim is 
distressed). Combining these aspects results in four stories. The role of authori-
ties, punishment, laws, rules and formal obligations is minimal. No authority 
figures are present 
The stories in the S.M.I. also closely parallel those of Chandler and Greenspan 
(Chandler & Greenspan, 1972; Edelstein, Keller & Wahlen, 1984). All stories 
have the same composition and consist of seven episodes, with each episode 
illustrated by a picture. 
One of the stories is described below, where the number refers to the episode 
and a global characterization of the content of the episode is presented. The last 
column shows the concrete text for one of the four stories. This story refers to an 
intentional transgression with personal as well as material consequences. The 
pictures that visualize the text of the story are presented in Appendix A.^  
1 introduction The child is playing with his new 
ball. 
2 frustrating event The ball rolls into the road and a car 
runs over the ball. The ball is broken. 
3 consequences The child sadly walks away. 
4 confrontation with new situation The child then sees his friend playing 
with a ball and starts crying. 
5 transgression He then snatches the ball on purpose. 
6 consequences for victim Now his Mend doesn't have a ball and 
starts to cry. 
7 introduction of new character Another boy comes along. 
The interviewer reads the story and concurrently presents the pictures. To 
make sure the child understands the story the child repeats the story. Afterwards, 
the standardized questions are asked, such as questions concerning the child's 
reflections about guilt, the child's internal judgment and empathy. Each story is 
followed by a similar set of questions, and the interviewers are provided with a 
standardized set of probes for additional information to use when necessary. 
The protagonist in each stories is of the same sex and age as the child in 
question. The stories were presented in random order, and the questions con-
cerning different aspects of moral internalization and empathy were also presented 
randomly. 
The Socio-Moral Interview was too extensive for the 5-6 year-olds, so they re-
ceived a shorter version consisting of only two stories (the story in which the 
child breaks another's toy and the story in which the child takes away another's 
toy). 
After each S.M.I.-story the child's guilt reaction to transgression was 
assessed. The child was stimulated to focus on the child who had committed the 
The pictures are partially based on material used in a study by Genis (1981). 
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transgression. Then the child was instructed to assume the role of the wrongdoer. 
Afterwards the interviewer asked the child to (a) describe how the child would feel 
after committing the wrongdoing, (b) indicate if the child would feel bad, (c) rate 
the intensity of that feeling on a seven-point quantitative scale, (d) explain why 
the child would feel that way, (e) indicate whether the child would feel differently 
when the act went undetected by others and (f) explain why the child would or 
would not feel differently. Finally, the child was asked to provide an ending to 
the story ("What happens next?", "How would you finish the story?"). 
Three (projected) guilt measures are created on the basis of the child's re-
sponses to the questions. The first measure is the intensity of the reported guilt 
feelings. The other measures are based on the child's explicit expressions of con-
cern for the victim and the quality of the justice principles used to explain the 
guilt feelings (Thompson & Hoffman, 1980). The guilt measures are scored as 
follows: 
a. Guilt intensity. The child's guilt intensity was assessed in terms of the self-
report of the child by means of the quantitative scale used in question (c). 
When the child felt guilty after wrongdoing, the rating on the quantitative 
scale reflected the intensity of these guilty feelings. This scale ranges from 
no guilt to very much guilt. When a child exhibited no guilt at all in re-
sponse to the wrongful act, a score of 0 was assigned. When the child exhi-
bited the maximum amount of guilt in response to the wrongful act, a score 
of 6 was assigned. The responses of the child to interview questions (a), (b), 
and (d) were relevant to determine whether the child's feelings reflected a 
conscious self-initiated and self-critical reaction. Feelings primarily reflecting 
feelings of fear to be punished may be seen as self-initiated meaning that 
these feelings are not evoked by an attendant authority figure. We wanted an 
indication of the intensity of truly internalized guilt. To prevent our measure 
of internalized guilt being confounded with external fear, a response re-
flecting fear of detection was scored as no explicit guilt (score 0). Some 
children indicated that they would be predominantly happy, that is, in re-
sponse to question (a) they said they feci happy. These children were also 
rated as having no explicit guilt (score 0). In other words, higher scores of 
guilt intensity correspond to more intense feelings of guilt after a trans-
gression. 
b. The child's explicit expressions of concern for the victim (in contrast to self 
concern, such as worry about punishment). The extent to which the child 
showed concern for the victim was primarily based on the answer to question 
(d). Concern for the victim was rated on a scale ranging from 0 to 6, adopted 
from Thompson and Hoffman (1980). Each point of the scale is described. 
At the low end of the scale, the child does not report feelings of distress or is 
motivated largely out of self-interested concerns. When a child exhibits no 
negative feelings (in this case the child often reports feelings of happiness) 
this is coded in the lowest category (score 0). The child is also scored in one 
of the lower categories when the child demonstrates distress about the possi-
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bility of punishment (score 1) or fear of the victim's revenge (score 2). In 
these cases, there is little or no concern for how the other person actually 
feels. At the high end of the scale, the child clearly shows a concern for the 
victim. The child's guilt feelings are linked to the perception of distress in 
the victim (score S) and sometimes the child spontaneously assumes the role 
of the victim and shows that he would be distressed were he or she to be the 
victim of a similar act (score 6). Some children report feelings of guilt pri­
marily because of behaving badly (i.e., violation of certain standards of con­
duct). They are not primarily motivated by self-interested concerns but also 
show little or no concern for the victim. Such responses are coded as an 
intermediate concern for the victim (score 3 or 4). In this case, the answer on 
the last question concerning the ending of the story is used to decide to 
which category the child's answer should be assigned. Only when the trans­
gressor tries to resolve the conflict with the victim is the answer scored as 4. 
Thus the concern for the victim is rated with a scale ranging from 0 (no con­
cern for victim) to 6 (high concern for victim). 
с The child's use of justice principles to explain guilt feelings, such as the 
importance of mutual trust, honesty or personal rights regardless of the 
external considerations of the wrongful act. This measure was primarily 
based on the answer to question (f)· The use of justice principles was rated 
on a scale ranging from 0 to 5, adopted from Thompson and Hoffman 
(1980). The higher the score on this scale, the more the child utilized justice 
principles to explain guilt feelings. Every category of the rating scale is 
described. At the low end of the scale, the child simply does not feel guilty 
(score 0) or is largely concerned with external consequences: fear of detection 
and punishment (score 1) or fear of the revenge of the victim (score 2). When 
the act remains undetected, such a child frequently indicates relief as well. At 
the high end of the scale (scores 4 and 5), the child really feels sorry for the 
victim independent of possible detection. The principled orientation of the 
child appears stable. The difference between a 4 and 5, however, is that for a 
score of 5 the child not only indicates guilt as an outcome of the principled 
moral orientation but also shows remorse which often leads the child to 
apologize and attempt reparation, even when the wrongdoing goes un­
detected. An intermediate level of the use of justice principles (score 3) is 
assigned when the child reports feelings of guilt and is not afraid of punish­
ment, but wavers (i.e., shows some relief) in undetected transgression. 
After some training sessions two independent judges categorized a randomly 
selected sample of 40 answers. To minimize a halo-effect when categorizing the 
answers, each guilt measure was scored independently of the other guilt meas­
ures. The interrater agreement was 96.3 % for guilt intensity and 88.0 % for both 
other guilt measures (number of similar codes/total number of codes χ 100 %). 
The answers were binally coded by single person. Guilt intensity, concern for the 
victim, and use of justice principles were coded separately. This same person also 
coded the data at time 2, two years later. A sample (n = 40) of the stories at time 
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1 was randomly selected. The intra-rater reliabilities between the original codes 
and the codes given two years later were 100 % for guilt intensity, 80.0 % for 
concern for the victim, and 85.0 % for the use of justice principles. 
The ultimate score of each guilt measure is the average of the scores of the 
stories in the S.M.I/* Thus the ultimate scores for guilt intensity and concern 
for the victim ranged from 0 to 6; the ultimate scores for the use of justice prin­
ciples range from 0 to 5. To control for whether the scores on the four S.M.I.-
stories are interrelated, the internal consistency Cronbach's alpha was calculated 
for each guilt measure. The internal consistency Cronbach's alpha is found to be 
.73 for guilt intensity at time 1 and .71 for guilt intensity at time 2. For concern 
for the victim Cronbach's alpha's are .81 and .73 for respectively time 1 and time 
2. Cronbach's alpha's for the use of justice principles are .83 at both measure­
ment occasions.^ 
Table 1 Correlations between 'guilt intensity', 'concern for the victim' and 'use 
of justice principles' at time 1 (Pearson correlations in upper triangle 
and correlations with age partialled out in lower triangle) 
guilt concern for use of justice age 
intensity the victim principles 
guilt intensity ... .75* .53* .12 
concern for the victim .74* .62* .21* 
use of justice principles .55* .60* ... .49* 
* ρ < .05 
At time 1 the youngest children (cohort 1) were administered the short version 
of the S.M.I.. Differences between cohort 1 and the other cohorts could be due 
to the differences in the number of stories used. To exclude this possibility 
the average score of the two stories of the short version is compared to the 
average score for the other two stories for the children who were administered 
the complete S.M.I, at time 1 (cohort 2 and cohort 3). All indicators, guilt 
intensity, concern for victim, and use of justice principles revealed no diffe­
rences (guilt intensity t (102) = -.22, ρ > .05; concern for victim, t (102) = 
.41, ρ > .05; use of justice principles, t (102) = -.23, ρ > .05). This corres-
ponds to earlier research, showing no differences of guilt responses across the 
four S.M.I.-storics (De Veer, Janssens & Genis, 1987). 
To calculate the internal consistencies Cronbach's alpha for the indicators of 
guilt at time 1 only cohort 2 and cohort 3 were included in the analyses be­
cause the children in cohort 1 were administered only two stories (i.e. the 
short version of the S.M.I.). 
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Guilt intensity, concern for the victim, and the use of justice principles are 
all indicators of guilt. Table 1 shows the correlations between the guilt measures 
at time 1. The correlations between the guilt measures at time 2 are presented in 
Table 2. As can be seen, the Pearson correlations among these guilt measures are 
high. Guilt, as an indicator of moral internalization, is expected to be positively 
related to the child's age. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, most guilt meas­
ures are moderately related to age. This shared relation with age increases the 
Pearson correlations. We, therefore, also calculated correlations with the variance 
due to age partialled out. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the relations between 
the guilt measures remain high. This may be due to how they are derived. First, 
they all derive from the same set of questions. Second, the possible range of a 
particular guilt measure is partly dependent on the level of another guilt measure. 
No feelings of guilt in response to interview question (c), for example, also indi­
cates the lowest score on concern for the victim and the use of justice principles. 
For reasons of economy the data were factor-analyzed and a unidimensional 
solution is found to be the best characterization of the data. As can be seen in 
Table 3, the factor loadings for all three indicators are high and the explained 
Table 2 Correlations between 'guilt intensity', 'concern for the victim' and 'use of 
justice principles' at time 2 (Pearson correlations in upper triangle and 
correlations with age partialled out in lower triangle) 
guilt concern for use of justice age 
intensity the victim principles 
guilt intensity ... .80* 
concern for the victim .80* 






* ρ < .05 
Table 3 Factor analysis on the three measures of guilt: loadings of two measure­
ment times 
factor loadings 
time 1 time 2 
guilt intensity .88 .90 
concern for the victim .91 .93 
use of justice principles .81 .82 
% variance explained 76% 78% 
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variance sufficient Furthermore, the factor loadings and explained variance of the 
data gathered at time 1 and the factor loadings and explained variance of the data 
gathered at time 2 are almost equal. In subsequent analyses, therefore, the factor 
score on the factor 'guilt' will be used as an indicator of guilt-
One way of testing the validity of these scores is to examine whether the 
guilt measure correlates to constructs which are theoretically related to the guilt 
concept. For example, anticipatory guilt can be expected to motivate resistance 
to wrongdoing. It may also relate to the antecedents of a positive norm (i.e., con-
sideration of others) (Hoffman, 1976). Therefore guilt is expected to relate to pro-
social development. When anticipating the possible consequences for the victim, 
the child may experience guilt of considering not to help. Children who are 
primarily self-oriented will experience a fear of punishment following wrong-
doing and relief when the act goes undetected. When confronted with a situation 
in which one has to decide whether or not to help, moreover these children might 
be expected to reason according to their own needs. When children empathically 
react to the needs of others, however, they will experience guilt upon seeing the 
consequences of their behavior and can generally be expected to act more pro-
socially. In other words, a high guilt level can be expected to correlate with more 
prosocial reasoning and more prosocial behavior. 
To assess prosocial reasoning all children were administered the prosocial 
moral-judgment instrument (Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979). Two moral dilem-
mas accompanied by illustrations were used. The central characters are children 
and the situations are ones that could happen to any child. The first story is 
about a child playing in a sandbox who views another child being beaten up by a 
bully and has to decide whether to assist or not. The second story is about a child 
who is asked to assist another child whose leg is injured, although helping would 
involve missing a birthday party. 
Each story depicts a situation in which the needs of the story protagonist are 
in conflict with the needs of another child. In each situation, the role of authori-
ties, punishment, laws, rules and formal obligations is minimal. One of the 
stories is as follows: 
One day while Marcel was playing in his yard, he saw a bully pushing 
and teasing another child who he did not know. There weren't any 
grown-ups around. As Marcel watched, the one boy kept pushing the 
other boy down every time he tried to get back up. Marcel was having a 
good time playing in his yard, and the bully might pick on him, too, if 
he tried to help. 
After the child has correctly repeated the story, standardized probes are used to 
ask the child about each story. The order of the stories was randomized. The sex 
and age of the story characters were matched to the sex and age of the child, and 
for all stories the child was asked what the story character should do and why he 
or she should act in the advocated manner. Subsequently, the children were asked 
what they would do if they were the protagonist and why. 
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The types of reasoning were coded using categories similar to those em­
ployed by Eisenberg-Berg (1979). Three categories refer to victim-oriented proso­
cial reasoning ('concern for the other's needs', 'overt empathie reaction or role 
taking', 'internalized affect or norm"). Two categories refer to hedonistic reason­
ing ("hedonistic reasoning" and "hedonistic pragmatism"). Twenty randomly se­
lected stories were coded by two independent judges, and the interrater agreement 
is found to be 79 % (number of similar codes/total number of codes χ 100 %). 
Afterwards, all interviews were coded by a single person. 
Each child was assigned two scores. The first score indicates the frequency 
with which the child used the various victim-oriented categories when discussing 
what the protagonist should do and why. Note that the pros and cons were dis­
cussed four times (twice for each story: first for the story character and second for 
the child himself). Given three victim-oriented categories, and four response 
opportunities, this score ranges from 0 to 12. The second score indicates the fre­
quency with which the child used hedonistic reasoning categories, and this score 
may range from 0 to 8. To obtain an overall index for prosocial reasoning, the 
number of hedonistic categories is subtracted from the number of victim-oriented 
categories. The overall index may range from -8 to +12 with high scores corre­
sponding to more prosocial reasoning. 
Prosocial behavior was assessed using a Dutch version of the Prosocial 
Behaviour Questionnaire (Weir & Duveen, 1981). The P.B.Q. was created for use 
by teachers. The questionnaire contains 20 items (e.g., "offers to share erasers or 
pencils being used in the task", "invites bystanders to join in a game"). Original­
ly, the items were rated on a three-point scale: doesn't apply, applies somewhat 
or certainly applies. In an attempt to better discriminate between the children, we 
used a six-point rating scale ranging from never (1) to always (6). Three items 
showed an uneven distribution of responses, i.e., at least 90 % of the teachers at 
time 1 and at least 90 % of the teachers at time 2 responded that the item applied 
to the child (score 4, 5 and 6) or did not apply to the child (score 1, 2 and 3). 
These items were discarded. The internal consistencies Cronbach's alpha's for the 
remaining set of 17 items are .90 at time 1 and .91 at time 2. The child's proso­
cial behavior was taken to be the average of the ratings on these 17 items (range 
1-6), and high scores were taken to indicate a strong predisposition to behave 
prosocially. 
The correlations between the guilt scores and prosocial reasoning and proso­
cial behavior are listed in Table 4. It is possible that some Pearson correlations 
are spurious due to a relation of both variables with the child's age. Therefore, 
Table 4 also presents correlations which are controlled for age. Low but signifi­
cant correlations are found between guilt and prosocial reasoning. However, guilt 
is only related to prosocial behavior at time 2. Validation of guilt by comparison 
with prosocial development is weak but satisfactory. 
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Table 4 The relation between guilt and prosocial reasoning and prosocial beha­






















* ρ < .05 
Internal judgment 
Hoffman (1970) distinguished between two different types of moral orienta­
tion. Children whose conduct is controlled by the anticipation of rewards for 
acceptable behaviors and punishment for unacceptable behaviors are said to have 
an external moral orientation. They reflect an orientation toward obedience and 
punishment. On the other hand, children who behave in accordance with their 
own standards even when authority figures are not present to approve or praise­
worthy conduct or to punish transgressions are said to have an internal moral 
orientation. They show conscience as a directing agent or a principled orientation 
and show interest the other's needs. 
The children were asked to make moral judgments about four transgressions, 
incorporated into the S.M.I.-stories. The purpose of this question is to determine 
what children think about moral issues and the extent to which their moral 
reasoning is independent of external sanctions. Assessments were made of the 
children's justifications for their evaluation of courses of action as right or 
wrong. We asked: "Can you take away a child's toy? Why or why not?; Can you 
hurt somebody? Why or why not?; Can you cheat in a game? Why or why not?; 
Can you break another's toy? Why or why not?" 
In a pilot study (De Veer, Janssens & Genis, 1987) all of the arguments put 
forth by the children were listed. The arguments were found to fall into six dif­
ferent categories: (1) Appeal to authority. The authority, typically a parent, pro­
hibits the act. The act is wrong because it is counter to the wishes of the parent 
and/or transgressions will be punished. (2) Appeal to the interpersonal relation­
ship between children. You better not do it because the victim will take revenge 
or will end the friendship. (3) The act is wrong because it harms another. The 
child refers to the welfare of others. (4) When you commit such an act you will 
be upset and distressed and you will feel guilty. (5) The act is wrong, you simply 
should not do it. (6) You should not do that because it is not kind, it is not fair. 
The child labels the acL 
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Every answer could be coded in at most two categories. Some children 
contented themselves merely by stating the violated rule (category 5) or affirming 
their evaluation (category 6) and then went on to give a rationale. To count such 
initial statements, however, seemed to distort the frequency data. Nominal-
evaluative statements were counted, therefore, only when they were the only 
response provided by the child. For each story the child's response was coded as 
external (score 0, categories 1 and 2, e.g., "you will be punished for that", "the 
child will get back at you") or internal (score 1, categories 3 through 6, e.g., "the 
other child does not like that", "I would feel guilty", "you are not allowed to do 
such things", "it is unfair"). When several arguments were offered the most inter­
nal argument was taken. Two independent judges coded a randomly selected sub-
sample of 40 stories. The interrater agreement is 88.0 % (number of similar 
codes/total number of codes χ 100 %). The remaining answers were coded by a 
single individual. This person also coded the data of time 2, two years later. A 
sample (n = 40 stories) of the answers at time 1 was randomly selected. The 
intra-rater agreement between the original codes and the codes given two years 
later is 86.7 %. 
The internal consistency Cronbach's alpha's of the scores for the four S.M.I.-
stories are .45 at time 1 and .46 at time 2." The relation between the scores for 
the four stories is found to be rather low. The final score is the average of the 
scores for each story. ' Because the answers are scored as either external (score 0) 
or internal (score 1) the internal judgment score also ranges between 0 and 1. 
The validity of this measure was checked by comparing the data with data 
from other research. Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) did not examine age-related 
changes or distributions of scores, nor did Hoffman in his 1970 review. Others 
(see Turici, 1983) have investigated the justifications children use in judging 
different social situations. In these investigations most children are found to con­
sider the moral transgressions wrong simply because these acts harm or deprive 
others (this corresponds with category 3 in the present research). The argument 
that the act is always wrong was also found to be frequently used (this 
corresponds with category 5 in the present research) (see Nucci, 1981). Davidson, 
To calculate the internal consistency Cronbach's alpha of the indicator of in­
ternal judgment at time 1 only cohorts 2 and 3 were included because the chil­
dren in cohort 1 were administered only two stories (i.e. the short version of 
the S.M.I.). 
At time 1 the youngest children (cohort 1) were administered the short version 
of the S.M.I.. Differences between cohort 1 and the other cohorts could there­
fore be due to the differences in the number of stories used. To exclude this 
possibility the average score for the two stories in the short version is com­
pared to the average score of the other two stories from the children who were 
administered the complete S.M.I, at time 1 (cohort 2 and cohort 3). There 
were no differences (t (96) = .65, ρ > .05). This corresponds with earlier 
research showing no differences in guilt responses for the four S.M.I.-stories 
(De Veer, Janssens & Gerris, 1987). 
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Table S Distribution of different justification categories used by different age 
groups for familiar moral transgressions (see Davidson, Turiel & Black, 
1983. Table 7. p. 60) 
Category 
appeal to authority or 
punishment avoidance 
others' welfare 

























a η = total number of responses per column 
Turiel and Black (1983) asked six-year-olds, eight-year-olds, and ten-year-olds to 
judge transgressions and they found a comparable use of justification categories 
for familiar moral transgressions. Their coding scheme differs slightly from the 
coding scheme used in the present research because their coding scheme also in­
cludes justifications of conventional transgressions (e.g., "a girl should greet her 
friends by bowing rather than by the customary greeting"). The main categories 
used in the Davidson et al. study to justify familiar moral transgressions are 
"appeal to authority", "punishment avoidance" (including social condemnation), 
"others' welfare", "appeal to fairness", and "obligation". When certain categories 
are collapsed, however, the two systems are quite comparable. Table 5 shows the 
frequency of categories mentioned by the different age groups in the Davidson et 
al. study. The answers given in our study, categorized according to the system of 
Davidson et al., are presented in Table 6. A comparison of Tables 5 and 6 shows 
that the distribution of answers within each age group and across age groups are 
very similar. Most answers refer to the others' welfare and the usage of this argu­
ment tends to decrease with age. References to authority and punishment (catego­
ries 1 and 2) also appear to decrease with age, while references to feelings of obli­
gation, norms, and fairness (categories 4, 5 and 6) appear to increase with age. 
This correspondence suggests that our assessment of internal moral judgment 
capacities is a valid one. 
The primary purpose of the judgments we elicited was to get an indication of 
the internal basis for the children's judgments. Following Hoffman's formulation 
of moral internalization it can be hypothesized that younger children are 
externally oriented because they are only aware of (heir own hedonistic needs. 
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Table 6 Distribution of different justification categories in the moral judgments 
of different age groups in the present research 
age of children 
number 5/6-yearsa 7/8-years 9/10-years 11/12-years 
of 
Category category n=104b n=422 n=464 n=219 
appeal to authority or 
afraid for revenge 1+2 32% 21% 17% 9% 
others' welfare 3 56% 57% 52% 47% 
appeal to fairness or 
obligation 4+5+6 13% 23% 31% 44% 
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
a 5/6-year olds are cohort 1 at time 1 
7/8-year olds are cohort 2 at time 1 and cohort 1 at time 2 
9/10-year olds are cohort 3 at time 1 and cohort 2 at time 2 
11/12-year olds are cohort 3 at time 2 
b η = total number of responses per column 








> .25 and й .50 














Socialization experiences, thus, might stimulate the child to become more inter­
nally oriented. At time 1 the number of internal judgments is only weakly asso­
ciated with the age of the child (r (148) = .19, ρ < .05). Moreover, an age-related 
shift towards a more internal basis of evaluation is not found at time 2 (r (150) = 
.13, ρ > .05). This lack of a finding is probably due to a ceiling effect. As can be 
seen in Table 7 the children are divided into four categories depending on their 
internal judgment scores. The categories are: external, predominantly external, 
predominantly internal, and internal. For example, a child is categorized as ex­
ternal when the ultimate score is less than or equal to .25. The percentages of 
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children within each category are presented in Table 7. As shown in Table 7 
most children gave internal or predominantly internal judgments. At time 2 a 
very few children gave external judgments. Eight percent of the children had a 
score that could be labeled as external or predominantly external. This puts 
doubts on the usefulness of this indicator to adequately differentiate between the 
moral internalization of the children in the sample of this study. The indicator 
internal judgment will therefore be excluded from further analyses. 
5.3.2 Empathy 
To assess the child's tendency to respond empathically we looked for emotio-
nal responses based on another's emotional state. We also considered whether the 
child's emotional responses were combined with feelings of sorrow or concern for 
another's welfare. Empathy is operationalized as a siluationally responsive meas-
ure having an affective as well as a cognitive component. Every S.M.I.-story 
ends with the introduction of a new character. This new character passes by after 
the transgression. In order to assess the child's empathie level the children were 
stimulated to take the role of this passer-by and were asked how they would feel 
if they saw the transgressor and the victim. In this assessment the interviewer 
presented a card with five faces illustrating five different emotional reactions. 
Four faces expressed four different emotions, either anger, sadness, fear or happi-
ness and one face was neutral ("just OK"). The child was asked to choose the 
emotion that most resembled the child's own emotion when seeing the children 
from the perspective of the passer-by. The interviewer then asked the child to 
motivate this choice ("Why do you feel that way?"). Answers were scored as 
empathie (score 1) when the child reacted affectively and also expressed a concern 
for the victim. For example, children who felt sad because they saw the victim 
crying and felt sorry for the victim were scored as giving an empathie response. 
During the interviews it appeared that the child's reaction was related with 
the child's perspective-taking ability. Older children knew that the figure passing 
by had not seen what had happened. They were able to differentiate between their 
information and the information available to the passer-by. They often responded 
to feel just OK because the passer-by could not know what had happened. 
Younger children could not correctly take the role of the other character and thus 
assumed that the figure passing by knew exactly what had happened and why the 
child was crying. These children often felt empathy for the victim or were angry 
with the transgressor. That is, these children were more likely to have an 
empathie reaction than the older children simply because they did not differentiate 
correctly between the perspectives of different characters. In other words, this 
measure of empathy does not appear to be a valid one and will therefore be 
excluded from any further analyses. 
At the time of the second assessment, two years later, we controlled for the 
confounding between perspective taking and empathy. In this assessment we 
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asked children how they would feel if they did not know what had happened. In 
addition, we also asked the children how they would feel if they did know what 
had happened before. Children who felt sad and referred to the victim ("I was sad 
because I feel sorry for him") showed an empathie reaction (score 1). When a 
child knows the reasons for the victim's distress empathie feelings of sadness can 
easily be transformed into feelings of anger and this was also scored as 1 
(Hoffman, 1982b, 1987). Children may feel angry with the transgressor because 
of his or her behavior toward the victim. Such responses were therefore coded as 
empathie because the children affectively reacted to the emotion of another and 
also referred to the situation of the other person. As seen in section 3.2.3 vi­
cariously induced empathie arousal may produce sympathetic concern for the 
other and/or aversive arousal (anger with the transgressor) by cognitive 
mediation. Hoffman (1987) called these emotions sympathetic distress and empa­
thie anger. In this study we measured both of these empathy-based moral affects. 
Affective reactions which could not be motivated by the child or are based on 
egocentric reasons (e.g., "Maybe that annoying child will start teasing me as 
well!") were also scored as nonempathic (score 0). 
As just mentioned each S.M.I.-story was evaluated twice by each child in the 
second assessment: when the figure passing supposedly did not know what had 
happened and when the figure passing supposedly knew what had happened). 
Empathy is scored as the total number of empathie responses (with a maximum 
number of eight) divided by the total number of responses. Thus the ultimate 
empathy score is the proportion of empathie responses. Therefore a minimum 
empathy score of 0 and a maximum empathy score of 1 could be obtained for 
each child. The relation between the eight responses is reflected by an internal 
consistency index Cronbach's alpha of .72. 
At the second measurement occasion we also asked parents and teachers to 
rate the child's tendency to react empathically. The scale consisted of eight items, 
selected from Bryant's Empathy Scale (Bryant, 1982). This scale is a self-report 
measure of emotional empathy designed for children. The eleven positive state­
ments formed the basis for our questionnaire. Six items intended to differentiate 
between cross-sex empathy and same-sex empathy were collapsed into three sex-
neutral statements. Because adults were asked to rate the child's empathy the 
remaining eight items were reformulated (e.g., "It makes him/her sad to see a 
child who can't find anyone to play with.", "He/she really likes to watch people 
open presents, even when he/she doesn't get a present him/herself."). The adults 
were asked to respond to each item on a six-point scale ranging from never (1) to 
always (6). The eight items constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha for the 
teachers is .72, Cronbach's alpha for the parents is also .72). The child's empathy 
score on our task correlates with the teacher's rating of the child's empathy (r 
(137) = .23, ρ < .05, with age partialled out because of possible artificial rela­
tions that may occur when both variables are related to age) and the parent's 
rating of the child's empathy (r (136) = .17, ρ < .05, with age partialled out). 
These correlations suggest that we have a valid measure of empathy. Given the 
57 
different foci of these measures, the first being context-specific and the latter 
being more global, these positive correlations provide some confirmation for the 
view that they are assessing the same empathy construct 
5.3.3 Perspective taking 
Selman (1976) has formulated a general developmental sequence of perspec-
tive taking. In his model, he describes five stages of social-cognitive under-
standing spanning the period from childhood to adolescence. Development of 
social-cognitive understanding is operationalized by Selman as a progressive 
increase in the number of elements and relations that must be kept in mind 
(Higgins, 1981). Each stage represents a cognitive structure used by the child to 
define and resolve issues of social interaction. The first level distinguished by 
Selman (1976) is the level of egocentric perspective taking. A child at stage 0 
(about 4 to 6-year-olds) is unable to differentiate between different points of 
view. About 6 to 8-years-old children realize that people feel or think differently 
because they are in different situations or have access to different information. 
This is the stage of subjective or differentiated perspective taking (stage 1). At 
stage 2, children are able to reflect on the selfs behavior as seen from the other's 
point of view (self-reflective or reciprocal perspective taking, about ages 8 to 
10). However, these reflections do not occur simultaneously. Only at stage 3, 
when the child is able to view the two-person situation from a third-person 
perspective does the child exhibit third person or mutual perspective taking. This 
stage 3 reasoning is typically shown by 10 to 12-year-olds. Finally, the highest 
level in Selman's stages of perspective taking is stage 4, which consists of social 
and conventional system perspective taking. That is, the perspective taking is 
raised from the level of the dyad to the level of the general social system and the 
child reahzes that each self considers the view of the social system. 
Selman distinguished several domains in which the child's level of perspec-
tive taking may be manifested, such as close friendships, peer group organization 
and parent-child relations. In the present research we confined ourselves to the 
domain of parent-child relations and several questions about the parent-child 
relationship were asked. The questions referred to four characteristic issues of the 
parent-child relationship: the function and rationale for punishment (e.g., "Why 
do parents sometimes punish their children?", "Do you think that children should 
be punished when they disobey?", "How does punishment work, what does it do 
for children?"), demands for obedience (e.g., "Should children always obey their 
parents?", "Why do parents want their children to obey them?"), factors that 
cause conflicts (e.g., "Parents and children sometimes do not get along, how can 
this happen?"), and methods parents and children employ for conflict resolution 
(e.g., " How can you best end a disagreement?"). The interview relied on a 
standard set of questions. The interviewers were also trained on the stages of 
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perspective taking development and encouraged to ask additional questions when 
unsure of the child's level of reasoning about a particular issue. 
The child's perspective on every issue was scored according to the system 
developed by Bruss-Saunders in Selman (1979). This coding system does not 
differentiate between the last two stages (stage 3 and 4). At the lowest level 
(stage 0) the child has egocentric and pragmatic conceptions of the parent-child 
relationship. The child can label other's overt feelings but does not see the cause 
and effect relation between social actions. Stage 1 conceptions are characterized 
by an identification with parental views. The child is aware that the parent has 
his or her own perspective which may or may not be similar to the child's per-
spective. However, the child tends to focus on the perspective of the parent. The 
main characteristic of stage 2 conceptions is a rather strong focus on the quality 
of the emotional ties between parent and child. The children can anticipate other's 
perspectives on their own psychological state and realize that this anticipation 
influences their perspective on others. A child showing stage 2 reasoning can 
form a coordinate chain of perspectives but cannot yet abstract from this process. 
At the highest level coded in this study (stage 3) the parent-child relationship is 
considered to be both a reflection of and an influence on the parent's and the 
child's personality functioning. The child can step outside the two-person dyad 
and view the interaction from a third-person perspective. 
Each of the four topics was coded independently. That is, all protocols were 
first considered for the level of perspective taking for the function and rationale 
for punishment. Subsequently, the child's perspective of demands for obedience 
was considered, etcetera. The following procedure was used in scoring the child's 
responses to each issue. To assign scores to the children's responses two judges 
were made familiar with the above mentioned stages. Then the part of the inter-
view concerning one of the four issues was read to evaluate the child's overall 
level of thinking and when the child clearly showed one level of thinking this 
level was assigned. When a child continuously showed stage 1 reasoning, for 
example, a score of 1 was assigned. Sometimes a child exhibited two levels of 
reasoning. In this case the judge had to decide which level was dominant. When 
one stage dominated the answer was scored as a major/minor stage (e.g., 2(3) = 
major stage 2 and minor stage 3, 3(2) = minor stage 2 and major stage 3). When 
no level clearly dominated the answer was assigned an intermediate score (e.g., 1-
2 = stage 1 as well as stage 2). Two judges coded all of the answers in the sam-
ple independently (300 protocols, 150 protocols at each measurement occasion). 
Inter-rater agreements were 79% for function and rationale for punishment, 78% 
for demands for obedience, 79% for causes of conflicts, and 83% for resolutions 
of conflicts. Protocols on which the two coders did not agree were discussed. 
Finally, there was an overall agreement about the scores. To compute an average 
issue score for all four issues we transformed the scores into the following 
numerical equivalents: 0 = 0, 0(1) = 0.33, 0-1 = 0.5, 1(0) = 0.67, 1 = 1, 1(2) = 
1.33, 1-2 = 1.5, 2(1) = 1.67, 2 = 2, 2(3) = 2.33, 2-3 = 2.5, 3(2) = 2.67 and 3 = 3 
(see also Selman, 1979, p. 350). These numerical equivalents of the four scored 
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issues are then added together and divided by four. That is, the children's perspec­
tive taking scores could vary between 0 and 3. The internal consistency Cron-
bach's alpha's for the four issues are .68 at time 1 and .73 at time 2. 
5.3.4 Parental discipline 
To get an idea of how the parents in this study disciplined their children, 
each parent was interviewed. In the Discipline Technique Interview (D.T.I.) the 
parent was confronted with eight hypothetical situations in which his or her child 
transgressed a norm. The stories describe situations where the child does some­
thing to someone else. Thus all situations contain a moral norm. Such situa­
tions may lead to a disciplinary encounter (see section 2.1). This means, ac­
cording to Hoffman, that the parent attempts to change the child's behavior. 
Because situational characteristics, such as intention of the child, the conse­
quences of the transgression and whether the victim is a child or an adult, 
influence the parental disciplinary reaction (Grusec & Kuczynski, 1980; 
Janssens, Janssen, Bemaerts & Gerris, 1985) the situations leading to discipline 
vary along three dimensions: The intention with which the child acted (on 
purpose versus accidental), the consequences of the child's action (personal versus 
personal and material), and whether something frustrating has happened to the 
child prior to transgression. Considered together, these three dichotomies resulted 
in eight different stories (see Table 8). The victim is always a child. In the case 
of something frustrating happening to the child prior to transgression, the stories 
are identical to those used in the S.M.I. (see Table 8, story numbers 1,2, 3 and 
4). The eight situations were presented to the parents in random order. 












of the act 
hurting someone 
breaking someone's toy 
cheating in a game 
snatching someone's toy 
hurting someone 
tearing another's clothes 
making fun of a classmate 

































ρ = personal damage (distress) 
m = material damage 
60 
The interviewer reads the story and asks whether the parent understands the story. 
Then the interviewer asks "Would you do or say something?". When the parent 
responds yes, the interviewer then asks "What would you do or say?". The inter-
viewers are provided with standardized probes for additional techniques or for 
more detailed information whenever the parent uses vague terms such as "I would 
explain" or "I would scold". 
All reactions of the parent to each hypothetical situation are coded with a 
modified version of the coding system used by Grusec and Kuczynski (1980). 
The coding system lists 25 disciplinary reactions, such as physical punishment, 
deprivation of material objects or privileges, ignoring the child, disapproval of 
the child's behavior, suggesting alternative ways of behaving, referring to the 
consequences of the child's action for the victim, and stimulating the child to 
repair the damaged There was 81.5 % agreement between two independent judges 
in the categorization of responses for eight randomly selected interview protocols 
(64 situations). 
Inductive discipline is defined as techniques in which the parent tries to moti-
vate the child to change his or her behavior by explaining. Inductive categories 
are pointing out the material or personal consequences of the act for the child 
him- or herself or for the victim, stimulating the child to take the role of the 
victim, and all other forms of explanation." For each situation the number of 
inductive codes was calculated. The internal consistency Cronbach's alpha across 
the eight different situations is found to be .57 at both measurement points. 
Victim-oriented discipline is defined as the frequency with which the child's 
attention was drawn to the consequences of the child's action for the victim. The 
victim-oriented categories are pointing out the material or personal consequences 
for the victim, stimulating the child to repair the damage or restore the relation-
8
 Labels for the list of disciplinary categories: 1. physical punishment, 2. 
threatening with physical punishment, 3. nonphysical punishment, 4. threa-
tening with nonphysical punishment, 5. isolating, 6. threatening with isola-
tion, 7. time-out to calm down or think the matter over, 8. physical interven-
tion, 9. nonphysical intervention, 10. ignore the child, 11. command to do 
something instantly, 12. disapprove of the child's behavior, 13. stimulating 
to restore the relationship with the victim, request to apologize, 14. request 
to repair the damage, 15. demand alternative future behavior, 16. point out the 
material consequences of the act for the victim, 17. point out the personal 
consequences of the act for the victim, 18. point out the material consequen-
ces of the act for the child as a transgressor, 19. point out the personal con-
sequences of the act for the child as a transgressor, 20. stimulate the child to 
take the role of the victim, 21. point out that the child him- or herself would 
not like that either, 22. point out that the victim would not act to the child in 
such way either (reciprocity), 23. give further information/explanation, 24. 
explanations which contain no new information, 25. say that the child has to 
solve the situation by him- or herself. 
9 Inductive discipline categories are categories 16 through 24 (for description 
see preceding note). 
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ship with the victim, and stimulating the child to take the role of the victim.1" 
The internal consistencies Cronbach's alpha across the eight situations are .48 at 
time 1 and .54 at time 2. 
Although the interview mainly consisted of standardized questions and 
standardized probes some parents tended to provide detailed descriptions while 
other parents remained fairly global. Moreover, some parents reported using 
punishment much more often than other parents. As already noted, punishment 
may distract the child's attention from the information being provided by the 
parent (see also chapter 3). To control for these effects the overall score is divided 
by the total number of reactions given by the parent. The final inductive disci-
pline score is the total number of inductive codes divided by the total number of 
reactions. Similarly, the final victim-oriented discipline score is the total number 
of victim-oriented codes divided by the total number of reactions. That is, the 
parent's score on inductive discipline reflects the proportion of inductive reactions 
present in the total number of parental reactions. The parent's score on victim-
oriented discipline reflects the proportion of victim-oriented reactions present in 
the total number of parental reactions. Because both scores are proportions the 
scores can range from 0 to 1. 
The low internal consistencies may have been a product of the choice of 
situations. As already noted the choice of a disciplinary strategy is determined at 
least in part by situational characteristics. Put differently, the D.T.I. is intended 
to obtain an overall impression of the parent's disciplinary style and thus in-
volves a variety of situations. This variety, however, may also suppress the 
degree of internal consistency. The finding of some internal consistency across 
different situations nevertheless suggests some coherence in parental disciplinary 
styles and that this variable can be treated as a cross-situational trait. Further-
more, if the choice of parental discipline strategy is completely triggered by 
situational characteristics we would expect only minor differences between 
parents when confronted with the same set of situations. As can be seen in Table 
9 parents clearly differ in the amount of inductive discipline and victim-oriented 
discipline. This also fits with the impression of the interviewers who visited the 
parents. 
We tried to get more evidence for the existence of a global disciplinary style, 
despite situational influences. More stable characteristics are expected to relate to 
disciplinary style as measured by the interview. One such characteristic is the sex 
of the parent. As can be seen in Table 10 mothers tended to use significantly 
more inductive discipline and more victim-oriented discipline than fathers. This 
difference is replicated in the second measurement point. This seems to fit with 
findings of Janssens and Gerris (1988) who tested a model to explain parental 
discipline. Part of the model concerned the hypothesis that discipline is a conse-
quence of how the parent thinks about childrearing. In their research, they found 
Victim-oriented categories are categories 13, 14, 16, 17 and 20. 
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Table 9 The distribution of inductive and viclim-oriented discipline by mothers 
and fathers 
mductive discipline victim-oriented discipline 
time 1 time 2 time 1 time 2 














































Table 10 Differences between mothers and fathers in the proportion of inductive 
















































that parents who focus more upon conformity in childrearing also tend to use 
more power assertion. In other words, situational factors may always play a role 
in parental discipline but there is also evidence for a general parental disciplinary 
style. 
To indirectly validate the data gathered in the D.T.I, the interviewers were 
asked to rate the amount of inductive discipline the parents used after the second 
measurement. This is a more subjective and intuitive judgment concerning 
parental inductive discipline. The interviewers were asked to consider all in­
formation available during the visit. The ratings were predominantly based on 
information obtained from the parent. Mostly the child was not present during 
the visit, so parent-child interactions could not be observed. Inductive discipline 
strategies were defined as strategies used by the parent to influence the child's 
behavior by giving information, explaining. The interviewers rated on a five-
point scale. Interviewers were trained prior to data collection. Measures of 
interrater-agreement were established by computing the percentage of agreement 
among the scores of two raters for 17 videotapes where the parent interacts with 
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the child, who is trying to solve a puzzle (Wiggly Block).11 Agreement was 
defined as the occurrence of scores which differed by no more than one point (see 
also Jay & Farran, 1981; Russell & Russell, 1989; Ten Haaf & Janssens, in 
press). The mean percent of agreement between two raters was 86 % (range 77 % 
-100 %). The correlations between the ratings of the interviewers and the degree 
of inductive discipline assessed during the interview are moderately high in 
magnitude (for mothers r (149) = .29, ρ < .05; for fathers r (129) = .58, ρ < .05). 
This indicates that there is an association between the more subjective, intuitive 
judgment of the interviewer and the parental use of inductive discipline. 
There is some other research on the relation between parental discipline 
assessed through self-report (e.g., an interview) and another person's perceptions 
of parental discipline. In a study by Brook, Whiteman, Gordon, Brenden and 
Jinishian (1980) a substantial correspondence was found to occur between ma­
ternal self-reports and adolescent reports of maternal behavior. Nevius (1984) also 
found a significant correlation in the lower-class sample between mothers' and 
10-years-old sons' perceptions of the mothers' inductive discipline strategies. 
This correlation disappeared with a middle-class sample, however. Such cor­
respondence between the parent's and the child's perceptions may indicate that 
parental self-report data give an indication of the parent's behavior in real-life 
situations. 
Another question concerning the predictive value of parental self-reports in 
an interview concerns the relation between self-report through an interview and 
actual child-rearing behaviors. Ten Haaf and Janssens (in press) studied the rela­
tion between measures of inductive discipline obtained by using different assess­
ment methods. They also assessed the parent's use of inductive discipline strate­
gies with the same type of interview as the D.T.I. In this interview parents were 
confronted with a hypothetical situation and asked how they would react. Ten 
Haaf and Janssens also observed the parent-child interaction. Observations were 
carried out in two different types of situations. First the parent-child interactions 
were observed while the family was having dinner. This was done for a period of 
three days. Second, the parent-child interaction was observed with three different 
problem-solving tasks. After all data were collected the research assistant rated 
the degree of inductive discipline strategies employed by the parent on a five-
point scale. Ten Haaf and Janssens found moderate relations between inductive 
discipline assessed within the interview, observed inductive discipline (dinner and 
task situation), and overall ratings. They concluded that evidence exists for the 
validity of the measures. 
Janssen (1990) also investigated the relation between reported behavior and actual 
behavior. In this research, he distinguished between four types of parental reac­
tions. One of these types was giving information. The operationalization of 
We thank Prof. dr. C. van Lieshout and dr. M. Riksen-Walraven, Department 
of Developmental Psychology, University of Nijmegen who provided us with 
the videotapes. 
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giving information closely resembles our operationalization of inductive disci­
pline. It includes a diversity of explanations and reasons. This type of behavior 
was assessed with an interview as well as by observing the parent-child interac­
tion when the child tried to solve a puzzle (Wiggly Block). In the interview pa­
rents were asked how they would react on several hypothetical situations. Janssen 
found a significant relation between the information provided by the parent when 
observed with the child solving a puzzle and the disciplinary information pro­
vided by the parent in response to hypothetical situations (r (81) = .38, ρ < .05). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that there is a correspondence between 






The results of the study will be presented in seven sections. As already indi-
cated at the end of chapter 4 the panel design (see Figure 4) allows us to study 
changes responding with the children's age. Therefore, the first section involves a 
description of the changes in moral internalization that occur across age and any 
sex differences in the children's responding. In addition, the interrelations among 
the different indicators of moral internalization will also be reviewed. In the se-
cond and third sections the variables of empathy and perspective taking will be 
considered (section 6.2), along with the parental discipline variables (section 
6.3). Changes occurring with age and sex are examined. Linear relations between 
parental discipline and moral internalization will be the focus of the fourth sec-
tion (section 6.4). The relative importance of inductive discipline strategies and 
victim-oriented disciplinary strategies to moral internalization will also be exam-
ined, involving separate analyses for mothers and fathers. Furthermore, evidence 
for a cause and effect relation between parental discipline and moral internaliza-
tion is presented using Structural Equation Analysis (section 6.5). Given affirma-
tion of Hoffman's thesis that parental discipline is an antecedent to moral inter-
nalization, the hypothesis that empathy and perspective taking mediate this rela-
tionship will then be examined in the sixth section. In section 6.6 the mediating 
role of the child's empathy and perspective taking in the relationship between 
parental discipline and the child's moral internalization will be tested. To assess 
the mediating role of empathy and perspective taking specification of a model is 
problematic. Three types of variables are relevant, i.e. parental discipline, the 
mediating variables of empathy and perspective taking, and the variables meas-
uring moral internalization. These three types of variables are ordered repre-
senting a longitudinal sequence. Ideally, three measurement occasions are needed 
to test such a longitudinal sequence. Because only two measurements are carried 
out part of the model must be tested with cross-sectional data. Two patterns of 
relationships can be tested. First, the influence of parental discipline at time 1 on 
the child's empathie reactions and perspective taking at time 2 can be examined, 
which may in tum influence the child's moral internalization at time 2. Thus in 
this model the child variables are measured cross-sectional. Second, the influence 
of parental discipline at time 1 on the child's perspective taking at time 1, which 
influences future moral internalization (time 2) can also be examined. When evi-
dence is found that discipline precedes moral internalization both patterns will be 
tested. Note that the last pattern is only tested with perspective taking as media-
ting variable because the assessment of empathy at time 1 proved to be invalid 
(see section 5.3.2). Finally, in the last section, some nonlinear relations between 
parental discipline and moral internalization are considered (section 6.7). 
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6.1 Descriptive statistics for the indicators of moral 
internalization 
The perceived seriousness of the S.M J.-stories 
To further document the validity of the moral internalization indicators we 
first examined whether the stories in the S.M.I, were judged to be equally serious 
across the age groups. If we want to take reported guilt experiences across the 
cohorts as an indication of moral internalization the transgressions must be expe­
rienced as equally severe. We therefore asked the children to judge the severeness 
of the act in each story on a four-point rating scale (e.g., "How wrong is it to 
break another's toy?", "How wrong is it to deceive someone in a game?"; 0 = not 
wrong, 1 = little wrong, 2 = moderately wrong, 3 = very wrong). 
Analyses of variance reveal young children judge the acts to be equally as wrong 
Table 11 Mean judgment of the perceived seriousness of the act descnbed in each 
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a these stories were not included in the shortened version of the S.M.I. 
* ρ > .05 
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as older children (Table 11). An exception is the story in which a child breaks the 
toy of another child measured at time 2. Children in the first and third cohorts 
evaluated this act as more serious than children in the second cohort at time 2. 
The mean judgments of the other transgressions also show this trend. Neverthe­
less, these analyses show in general consistent nonsignificant results and there­
fore it is concluded that children at different ages do not significantly differ in 
their judgment of the severity of a particular act. 
Developmental trends for the indicators of moral internalization 
Because children internalize norms in the course of their development, we 
examined whether the older children receive higher scores for the indicators of 
moral internalization than the younger children. The guilt measure is a factor 
score (see section 5.4.1). A child's guilt score only reflects the child's rank rela­
tive to the scores of the other children (z-scores). We were also interested in the 
absolute scores for the children on the rating scales because these scores give us a 
better image of the answers given by the children. Therefore, we analyzed inde­
pendently the original scores of the children on the three guilt measures: guilt 
intensity, concern for the victim, and use of justice principles. A Table showing 
the mean scores for each cohort on confession, resistance to pressure to deviate, 
and the three guilt measures at the two measurement occasions can be found in 
Appendix В (Table B-l). Before analyzing developmental trends the data provide 
the opportunity to get one more indication of the validity of the child variables. 
If moral internalization is measured validly then no differences should exist 
between the mean scores for two independent groups with a similar age. In this 
case it is hypothesized that the mean scores for cohort 2 at time 1 should equal 
the mean scores for cohort 1 at time 2. Likewise, the mean scores for cohort 3 at 
time 1 should equal the mean scores for cohort 2 at time 2. T-tests comparing 
mean scores of confession, resistance to deviation, guilt intensity, concern for 
the victim, and use of justice principles show no differences (p > .05). ^  
The mean scores for the variables confession and resistance to pressure to 
deviate for each cohort are high (for confession the lowest mean is 4.36 for 
cohort 3 at time 1; for resistance to pressures to deviate the lowest mean is 4.08 
for cohort 1 at time 1; see Appendix B, Table B-l). That is, the means for these 
behavioral measures are skewed towards the higher end of the 1-6 scale. Develop­
mental trends were analyzed cross-sectionally with a 3 (cohort) by 2 (sex) analy­
sis of variance for each variable at each measurement point. The results of these 
analyses of variance can be found in Table 12. No significant cohort effects 
For the comparison of the means of cohort 2 at time 1 with cohort 1 at time 
2 and for the comparison of the means of cohort 3 at time 1 and cohort 2 at 
time 2 the t-values are respectively: confession t (93) = .52, t (99) = 1.61; re­
sistance to deviation t (92) = .41, t (100) = .43; guilt intensity t (95) = .27, 
t (101) = .59; concern for the victim t (95) = 1.20, t (101) = .52; use of justi­
ce principles t (95) = 1.87, t (101) = .30. 
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Table 12 Three (cohort) by two (sex) analyses of variance with the indicators of 




























































































































gnificam linear con ipo-
nent (p < .05). Use of justice principles at time 1 also has a significant 
nonlinear component (p < .05). For the remaining cohort effects no devia­
tions from linearity are found. 
Note No significant interaction effects between age and sex are found 
* ρ > .05 
for confession are found. Thus older children confess just as often as younger 
children after transgression. At time 1 it is found that girls scored significantly 
higher on confession than boys. However, this main effect is not present at time 
2. Analyses of variance with resistance to deviation as a dependent variable show 
a main effect of cohort at time 1. However, the F-value is small and the cohort 
effect is not found at time 2. At time 1 as well as at time 2, moreover, analyses 
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of variance show a significant sex effect. Girls scored higher on resistance to 
pressure to deviate than boys. When we consider the two behavioral measures, 
we can conclude that three analyses of variance show no cohort effect and the 
cohort effect for resistance to deviation found at time 1 is only small. If children 
internalize norms between the age of 5 and the age of 11, then main effects of 
cohort are expected. This is not found to be the case and it is suggested that when 
teachers use the other classmates as a frame of reference to rate a child any cohort 
effect may be neutralized. All but one of the analyses show that girls to score 
higher than boys on the two behavioral indicators. 
To detect developmental trends in guilt we analyzed the scores on the three 
indicators of guilt. A small but significant cohort effect at time 2 is found for the 
intensity of the experienced guilt feelings (Table 12). Older children report more 
intense feelings of guilt than younger children. However, this main effect is not 
found at time 1. No sex effects are found. We also asked children the reasons for 
their feelings. The expressed concern for the victim and the number of justice 
principles employed by the children were rated. Most analyses show main effects 
of cohort and sex (Table 12). Young children are primarily concerned with them­
selves and older children are more often concerned for the victim and blame them­
selves of having violated their principles (see Appendix B, Table B-l). The small 
but significant main effects for sex indicate that girls show more concern for the 
victim (at time 2) and more often mention the importance of justice principles to 
explain their feelings than boys. This is in contrast to Thompson and Hoffman 
(1980) who reported no significant sex differences. Young children often mention 
egoistic reasons, such as fear for punishment or say that they feel guilty simply 
because they have broken a behavioral rule without referring to other reasons. 
Similar findings are reported by Thompson and Hoffman (1980) and Nunner-
Winkler and Sodian (1988). 
To summarize, almost no age effects are found for the behavioral indicators 
of confession and resistance to pressure to deviate. The lack of changes with age 
in the behavioral indicators could be explained by the possibility that teachers 
only rate the children on this scale relative to other classmates (e.g., taking the 
middle of the scale as the mean for the class). Older children also do not differ 
from younger children with respect to the intensity of guilt feelings they report 
after transgression, but the reasons for their guilt feelings do appear to change 
with age. Older children refer more often to the victim and stress the importance 
of justice principles in explaining their feelings. Finally, six of ten analyses 
show girls to score higher than boys on the indicators of moral intemalization.2 
Three (cohort) by two (sex) analyses of variance with the factor score for guilt 
as dependent variable reveal main effects of cohort (time 1, F (2, 141) = 8.47, 
ρ < .001; urne 2, F (2, 144) = 9.75, ρ < .001) and sex (time 1, F (1, 141) = 
4.36, ρ < .05; time 2, F (1,144) = 5.85, ρ < .05). Older children have higher 
scores on the guilt factor than younger children and girls score higher on 
guilt than boys. Cohort is linearly related to guilt. No significant nonlinear 
component is found. 
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Intercorrelations between the indicators ofmoral internalization 
In the end we used three indicators of moral internalization (see chapter S): 
the child's willingness to confess after transgression, the child's resistance to 
pressure to deviate, and the child's guilt experiences after transgression. Tables 13 
and 14 show the correlations between these indicators at times 1 and 2. The Pear­
son correlations for the indicators with the age of the children affirm the cohort 
effects reported in the preceding section. Confession and age are not correlated and 
resistance to pressures to deviate is only positively associated with age at time 1 
(r (146) = .22, ρ < .05). Guilt and age are positively correlated at both meaure-
ment occasions (time 1, г (147) = 29, ρ < .05; time 2, r (150) = .32, ρ < .05). 
Closer examination of the correlations reported in Table 13 and Table 14 reveals 
very high correlations between confession and resistance to pressure to deviate at 
time 1 as well as at time 2 (time 1, r (146) = .68, ρ < .05; time 2, г (142) = .81, 
ρ < .05). No or very low correlations are found between confession and guilt or 
resistance to pressure to deviate and guilt When age is partialled out confession 
and resistance to pressure to deviate are not related with guilt. We conclude, 
therefore, that moral internalization is not a unitary construct. Other authors have 
Table 13 Pearson correlations (upper triangle) and partial correlations controlling 
for the child's age (lower triangle) at time 1 
confession resistance guilt age 
to deviate 
confession ... .68* .07 -.03 
resistance to deviate .71* .16* .22* 
guilt .08 .11 ... .29* 
* ρ > .05 
Table 14 Pearson correlations (upper triangle) and partial correlations controlling 
for the child's age (lower triangle) at time 2 
confession resistance guilt age 
to deviate 
confession ... .81* .15* .09 
resistance to deviate .81* .12 .01 
guilt .13 .13 ... .32* 
* ρ < .5 
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already suggested that moral judgments or feelings are not always expressed in 
behavior (e.g., Blasi, 1980; Eisenberg, 1982; Eisenberg, Shell, Pasternack, 
Lennon, Beller & Mathy, 1987; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler & Chapman, 
1983). Both confession and resistance to deviate are behavioral measures while 
guilt refers to reflections about feelings. The high correlations between confes­
sion and resistance to pressure to deviate, moreover, may have been inflated by 
the fact that the two indicators are subscales on the same questionnaire. Given 
this high correlation and the fact that both subscales constitute behavioral meas­
ures, the items on the two subscales are combined into a seven-item scale labeled 
'moral behavior'. The internal consistencies Cronbach's alpha for this scale are 
found to be .87 at time 1 and .88 at time 2.3 
6.2 Descriptive statistics for empathy and perspective taking 
Developmental trends in empathy and perspective taking 
Recall that only the measurement of empathy at time 2 proved to be valid. 
The mean scores for each cohort are presented in Table B-2 of Appendix B. 
According to Hoffman's model of empathy, in which empathy develops as a 
function of cognitive development and social experience age-related changes in 
empathy should be expected. A 3 (cohort) by 2 (sex) analysis of variance was 
performed to test for any significant developmental trends, the results of which 
can be found in Table 15. No significant differences between cohorts are found. 
The lack of age-related changes is confirmed by the nonsignificant Pearson corre­
lation between empathy and the child's age (r (150) = -.11, ρ > .05). The analysis 
of variance reveals that girls and boys are equally emotionally responsive. 
The mean scores for each cohort on perspective taking are also presented in 
Table B-2 of Appendix B. As for moral internalization no differences are expected 
between the mean scores of cohort 2 at time 1 and cohort 1 at time 2 and be­
tween cohort 3 at time 1 and cohort 2 at time 2. T-tests comparing mean scores 
for perspective taking show no significant differences between these subsamples 
(t-values are respectively: t (95) = .22, t (101) = .27, ρ > .05). 
The 3 (cohort) by 2 (sex) analyses of variance for the data on each measure­
ment occasion show the mean scores for perspective taking from the cohorts to 
differ (Table 15). This effect is affirmed by the significant correlations with age, 
moreover (time 1, r (149) = .64, ρ < .05; time 2, г (150) = .66, ρ < .05). Thus, 
T-tests reveal no significant differences in the moral behavior of cohort 1 at 
time 2 and cohort 2 at time 1 (t (93) = -0.55, ρ > .05) and cohort 3 at time 1 
and cohort 2 at time 2 (t (98) = 1.05, ρ > .05). Three (cohort) by two (sex) 
analyses of variance with moral behavior as dependent variable show main ef­
fects of sex (time 1, F (1, 140) = 22.25, ρ < .001; time 2, F (1, 138) = 3.95, 
ρ < .05). That is, girls are rated as showing more moral behavior than boys. 
No main effects of cohort are found (time 1, F (2, 140) = 1.65, ρ > .05; time 
2. F (2, 138) = 0.71, ρ > .05). 
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Table 15 Three (cohort) by two (sex) analyses of variance with the indices of 


















T=l cohort 2, 143 50.69 .000 
sex 1, 143 1.73 n.s. 
T=2 cohort 2. 144 63.00 .000 
sex 1, 144 2.26 n.s. 
Note All significant differences between cohorts have a significant linear compo­
nent (p < .05). No significant deviations from linearity are found. 
Note No significant interaction effects between age and sex are found 
* ρ > .05 
older children show higher levels of perspective taking than younger children. No 
sex differences are found. Girls and boys do not differ in perspective taking. 
We next compared the perspective-taking level of the children in our sample 
with the levels of perspective taking found in Selman's theory. Selman (1976) 
suggested that egocentric role taking (stage 0) is characteristic of 4 to 6-year-olds. 
Six to 8-year-olds primarily show stage 1 reasoning. Children at about 8 to 10-
year of age are capable of self-reflective role taking (stage 2), whereas mutual role 
taking (stage 3) is displayed only by 10 to 12-year-olds. To compare our results 
with Selman's results, a global stage score, based on the child's average issue 
score was computed. The child received a pure stage score (respectively 0,1,2 or 
3) when the average issue score did not deviate more than 0.25 from the pure 
stage score. Average issue scores that deviated more than 0.25 from the nearest 
pure stage score were transformed into a global stage score somewhere between 
the two pure scores (see Table 16). As can be seen in Table 16, most 5 to 6-year-
olds (cohort 1 at time 1) show stage 0 reasoning as well as stage 1 reasoning. 
That is, these children sometimes show no differentiation of perspectives and 
sometimes realize that people feel or think differently. Two years later, when the 
children were 7 to 8-years-old most of them distinguished between different 
perspectives (stage 1). However, they often failed to coordinate these perspec­
tives. Nine to 10-year-olds (cohort 2 at time 2 and cohort 3 at time 1) appear to 
reason transitionally between stages 1 and 2. Whereas 11 to 12-year-olds (cohort 
3 at time 2) seem to be aware that people think or feel differently because each 
person has his own perspective. They are also able to reflect on the selfs behav­
ior as seen from the parent's view. They seem to reason less authority-oriented 
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Table 16 Percentage of children reaching a given perspective-taking level of each 
cohort 
global average cohort 1 cohort 2 cohort 3 
stage score issue score time 1 time 2 time 1 time 2 time 1 time 2 
Ö < 0.25 9 ~2 
0-1 > 0.25 and < 0.75 59 11 16 2 2 
1 > 0.75 and < 1.25 30 74 62 44 36 11 
1-2 > 1.25 and < 1.75 2 13 20 52 51 57 
2 > 1.75 and < 2.25 2 2 9 30 
2-3 è 2.25 and < 2.75 2 2 
3 à 2.75 
Total НЮ% ÏÖÖ% 100% 100% 100% КЮ% 
Note Cohort 1 at time 1 are 5 to 6-year-olds (n=47). Cohort 1 at time 2 (n=47) 
and cohort 2 at time 1 (n=50) are 7 to 8-year-olds. Cohort 2 at time 2 
(n=50) and cohort 3 at time 1 (n=53) are 9 to 10-year-olds. Cohort 3 at time 
2 (n=53) are 11 to 12-year-olds. 
and become more aware that both parent and child can put the self in the other's 
place. None of the children in our sample, however, consistently showed stage 3 
reasoning even though Selman predicted this level of reasoning to be displayed 
by 10 to 12-year-olds. Perhaps thinking about peers differs from thinking about 
parents (Damon, 1983). It may be more difficult to engage in perspective taking 
when there is a asymmetry in authority, as in the parent-child relation. Neverthe­
less, the general sequence of perspective-taking levels found in our data closely 
parallel those reported by Selman, which suggests that our assessment of per­
spective taking is valid. 
The relation between empathy and perspective taking 
Because of the lack of valid data on empathy at time 1, the relation between 
perspective taking and empathy could only be analyzed at time 2. No relation be­
tween perspective taking and empathy is found when using a Pearson correlation 
coefficient (p > .05). Empathy and perspective taking are found to be weakly but 
significantly related when the variance due to age is partialled out (r (146) = .17, 
ρ < .05). Empathy and perspective taking are theoretical constructs that mutually 
influence each other. On the one hand perspective taking can trigger an empathie 
reaction, on the other hand an empathie reaction can be modified by further infor­
mation about the situation (e.g., placing oneself in the other's position; seeing 
that someone has been abused). 
In the S.M.I. we asked the children to imagine that they were a bystander in the 
described situation and to report what they felt Children's affective reaction was 
only coded as empathie when the children clearly condemned the act of the trans-
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grcssor or referred to the distress of the victim. Thus, the children had to realize 
that their feelings were in response to cues outside the self. The perspective-
taking capacity necessary for such realization may be rather low. That is, the 
level of perspective taking needed for this cognitive act probably corresponds to 
stage 1 of Selman's stages. At stage 1, the child is aware that each person has a 
unique subjective personal perspective. Most children show at least this level of 
perspective taking at time 2 (see Table 16). That is, most children have the 
necessary cognitive capacity to show an empathie reaction in the S.M.I.-stories. 
Thus, when children do not show an empathie reaction this may not be a conse-
quence of their perspective-taking ability. Differences in empathy scores, rather, 
may reflect differences in children's predisposition to react affectively. Another 
possible explanation for the variance in empathy observed here may be that some 
children are more willing to report their affective response than other children. 
6.3 Descriptive statistics for inductive discipline and victim-
oriented discipline 
The perceived seriousness and recognizability of the DJ'J. -stories 
In the interview assessing disciplinary styles, eight stories were used. We 
formulated stories thought to be relevant to the youngest children (5-year-olds) as 
well as to the oldest children (12-year-olds) in order to hold the behavioral situa-
tion as constant as possible. That is, the behavior of the child in each story must 
have the same significance for all parents. To control for this supposition all 
parents were asked to rate the seriousness of each situation if it were to happen to 
their own child. This seriousness was rated on a five-point scale ranging from 
not at all serious (0) to very serious (4). In addition, we asked whether a similar 
situation had ever occurred with their child. Table 17 shows the average serious-
ness for each situation as rated by the parents. Analyses of variance show three 
situations to be rated differently by the parents in each cohort. For example, at 
time 2 parents of children in cohort 1 tended to judge the situation in which their 
child cheats in a game as less serious than the parents of children in cohorts 2 
and 3. Similar differences are found when the child snatches someone's toy (both 
at times 1 and 2) and when the child tears up another's favorite poster (only at 
time 2). As can be seen in Table 17 these differences are not necessarily due to 
the age of the children in the different cohorts. If this were to be the case, then 
we might expect some transgressions to be experienced as less serious with 
younger children, that is 7 to 8-years-old at time 2. However, when we consider 
the ratings for the 7 to 8-year-olds at time 1 (cohort 2) the transgressions are not 
judged as less serious when compared to the ratings for older children. Thus we 
cannot conclude that some transgressions are more or less serious depending on 
the age of the transgressor. Rather, we must conclude that some transgressions 
are rated as less serious by the parents in cohort 1. 
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Table 17 The perceived seriousness of each story used in the Disciplinary Tech­
nique Interview (means) 
cohortb 
situation short description time coh. 1 coh. 2 coh. 3 F ρ 










breaking someone's toy 
cheating in a game 
snatching someone's toy 
hurting someone 
tearing another's clothes 
making fun of a classmate 


































































































a The numbers correspond with the situations described in Table 8 
b Numbers of parents (mothers and fathers) in each cohort with complete data for 
perceived seriousness are 89, 95 and 98 for cohorts 1, 2 and 3 respectively at 
time 1 and 89, 95 and 96 for these cohorts at time 2. 
* ρ > .05 
Table 18 Perceived seriousness of the stories in the Disciplinary Technique Inter­




















a Numbers of parents (mothers and fathers) with complete data for the perceived 
seriousness in each cohort are 89, 95 and 98 for cohorts 1, 2 and 3 respective­
ly at time 1 and 89, 95 and 96 for these cohorts at time 2. 
The number of parents with a son is 134 at both measurements. The number of 
parents with a daughter is 148 at time 1 and 149 at time 2. 
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Table 19 Main effects of the 3 (cohort) by 2 (sex) analyses of variance with the 





























a No significant interaction effect of cohort by sex is found (p > .05) 
* ρ > .05 
The average seriousness of the complete set of eight stories was also calcu­
lated. A comparison of the average ratings for the eight transgressions reveals a 
similar set of findings (Table 18). The overall judgments of parents in cohort 1 
show the stories to be perceived as less serious when compared to the parents in 
the other two cohorts at both measurement times. Analyses of variance show 
only a cohort effect at time 2 (Table 19). When interpreted as an age effect, how­
ever, this effect is not confirmed by the data at time 1 (i.e., no significant cohort 
effect is found at this time).^ Transgressions of boys and girls are judged as 
equally serious. 
The percentage of children where at least one parent reported the situation to 
have occurred is shown in Table 20. As can be seen, some situations are more 
often recognized (e.g., situations 1,3 and 5) than other situations (e.g., situation 
4). Most situations, however, are recognized as applying to the child by most 
parents. The mean number of situations parents recognized is 6.3 at time 1 and 
5.7 at time 2. The mean number of situations recognized for each cohort is 
shown in Table 21 (total of 8 possible). As can be seen, most situations applied 
to most children. The 3 (cohort) by 2 (sex) analyses of variance on the number of 
situations recognized as relevant by the parents show a cohort effect at both 
measurement times (see Table 22). That is, according to Table 21, situations 
It can be hypothesized that the significant cohort effect at time 2 need not be 
interpreted as an age effect. The parents of cohort 1 seem to judge the trans­
gressions as less serious than the parents of cohorts 2 and 3. If this is due to 
the age of the children (7 to 8-year-olds), then the parents of the 7 to 8-year-
olds at time 1 (= cohort 2) should judge the transgressions equally as serious 
as the parents of the 7 to 8-year-olds at time 2. No evidence for this sugges­
tion is found. A t-test comparing the means of cohort 2 at time 1 and of co­
hort 1 at time 2 provides evidence for the suggestion that the parents of co­
hort 1 experience the transgressions as less serious and that this difference is 
not explained by the age of the children (t (182) = 3.24, ρ < .01). 
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Table 20 The percent of children where at least one parent recognized the situa-
tion in the Disciplinary Technique Interview as applying to their own 
child 
cohortb 
situation short description time cohort 1 cohort 2 cohort 3 










breaking someone's toy 
cheating in a game 
snatching someone's toy 
hurting someone 
tearing another's clothes 
making fun of a classmate 


































































a The numbers correspond to the situations described in Table 8 
b Numbers of children in each cohort are 47, 50 and 53 for cohorts 1, 2 and 3 
respectively at both measurement times. 
Table 21 Mean number of situations in the Disciplinary Technique Interview 




















a Number of children is 47, 50 and 53 for cohort 1, 2 and 3 for each measure-
ment. The number of boys is 72 and girls is 78 for each measurement. 
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Table 22 Main effects of the 3 (cohort) by 2 (sex) analyses of variance on the 
number of situations in the Disciplinary Technique Interview recognized 
























a No significant interaction effect of cohort by sex is found (ρ > .05) 
may be more frequently recognized by the parents of younger children than by the 
parents of older children. Moreover, the situations better apply to boys than to 
girls at time 1 (see Tables 21 and 22). 
In summary, clear age-related changes in parent's ratings of the seriousness 
of transgressions are not found. Parents recognized most situations in the D.T.I. 
as applying to the child, although the set of situations appeared to be somewhat 
better suited to younger children. The perceived seriousness of the transgressions 
is not related to the child's sex. An analysis of the data of time 1 suggests that 
the set of situations might have been more relevant for boys than for girls (a 
finding not confirmed by the data from the second measurement occasion). 
Age-related differences in inductive and victim-oriented discipline 
As with the child variables, we first compared the mean scores from the 
parents of comparable groups to check the validity of our disciplinary measures. 
The mean scores for inductive discipline of cohort 2 at time 1 and cohort 1 at 
time 2 are equal, both for mothers and fathers (for mothers t (95) = .07, ρ > .05; 
for fathers t (85) = .12, ρ > .05; see Appendix В Table B-3 for complete data). 
Also no differences arc found between the mean scores for inductive discipline of 
cohort 3 at time 1 and cohort 2 at time 2, for either mothers or fathers (for 
mothers t (101) = .44, ρ > .05; for fathers t (87) = .24, ρ > .05). This is also 
found to be true for victim-oriented discipline (for mothers t (95) = .23, ρ > .05 
for the difference between the means of cohort 2 at time 1 and cohort 1 at time 2 
and t (101) = .96, ρ > .05, for the difference between the means of cohort 3 at 
time 1 and cohort 2 at time 2. For fathers these t-values are respectively t (85) = 
.53, t (87) = .38, ρ > .05. See Appendix В Table B-4 for mean scores). 
To assess any age trends in parental use of disciplinary techniques, 3 (cohort) 
by 2 (sex) analyses of variances were performed on each variable. With respect to 
paternal inductive discipline only a small but significant effect of sex at time 2 is 
found (F (1, 144) = 4.01, ρ < .05). Fathers tend to be more inductive towards 
girls than boys at time 2. At time 1 no differences between girls and boys are 
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found with respect to paternal discipline (p > .05). Mothers of boys and mothers 
of girls do not differ in the amount of inductive discipline. No significant effects 
are found for cohort or sex on the victim-oriented scores of either fathers or 
mothers (p > .05). 
The analyses indicate that the way in which parents discipline their children is 
not related to the age of the child. Parents may adapt their words to the child's 
cognitive level, but their overall preference for inductive messages and victim-
oriented messages does not seem to change with the age of the child (5 to 12-
years old). No significant differences between boys and girls are found, except for 
paternal inductive discipline at time 2. 
The relation between maternal and paternal discipline 
Use of inductive discipline strategies is found to be related to use of victim-
oriented discipline strategies, both for mothers (time 1, г (149) = .39, ρ < .001; 
urne 2, г (149) = .31, ρ < .001) and for fathers (time 1, r (131) = .45, ρ < .001; 
time 2, г (131) = .43, ρ < .001). Parents who frequently use inductive discipline 
also often use victim-oriented discipline. This is not surprising for these two 
discipline techniques are conceptually related. Explanations drawing the child's 
attention to the victim are inductive as well as victim-oriented. The operationa-
lization of both disciplinary techniques also include overlapping categories. 
Pointing out the consequences of the transgression for the victim and stimulating 
the child to take the role of the victim are inductive as well as victim-oriented 
categories (see also operationalizations section 5.3.4). 
We also analyzed the relations between maternal and paternal discipline. 
Pearson correlations show only a weak but significant relation between maternal 
inductive discipline and paternal inductive discipline at time 1 (r (131) = .23, ρ < 
.01). However, at time 2 no relation between maternal and paternal discipline is 
found (p > .05). 
Where victim-oriented discipline is concerned, however, a weak positive relation 
is found at time 1 (r (131) = .22, ρ < .05) and at time 2 (r (130) = .15, ρ < .05). 
In other words, when the mother prefers to use victim-oriented messages the 
father also tends to rely on victim-oriented messages. 
6.4 Tbe relation between discipline and moral internalization 
Linear relations between inductive discipline and the child's moral internalization 
An important aim in this study is to explore the long-term influence of 
parent and child on each other. It is hypothesized that there is a relation between 
parental discipline and moral internalization. Before analyzing the long-term 
relations we examined whether parental discipline appears to be related to moral 
internalization within each measurement occasion. Recall that we also hypothe­
sized the use of victim-oriented discipline strategies to stimulate the intemaliza-
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Table 23 Pearson correlations between parental use of inductive discipline and the 





























* ρ < .05 
tion of norms more than the diversity of techniques constituting the category of 
inductive discipline. 
The intercorrelations between the cross-sectional assessments of inductive 
discipline and moral internalization are shown in Table 23. Significant correla­
tions between maternal or paternal inductive discipline and moral behavior are 
not found, either at time 1 or at time 2 (p > .05), and only a significant correla­
tion between paternal inductive discipline and guilt at time 1 is found (r (130) = 
.23, ρ < .05). These intercorrelations suggest that inductive discipline and moral 
internalization are not linearly related. However, the long-term effects of these 
variables may simply not be visible in the cross-sectional data. For example, 
parents who frequently use inductive discipline may stimulate the child's moral 
internalization but this effect may only be seen after an extended period of time. 
The correlations between data assessed at time 1 and the data assessed at time 2, 
thus, are also presented in Table 23. Again, however, no relations are found. 
That is, the use of inductive discipline at time 1 does not relate to the child's 
moral internalization at time 2. Likewise, the child's moral internalization at 
time 1 does not relate to the amount of inductive discipline used by the parent at 
time 2. This is found for mother-child dyads as well as for father-child dyads. 
This confirms the conclusion that inductive discipline and moral internalization 
are not related. 
The correlations between inductive discipline and moral internalization may 
differ for the different subgroups, which means that a nonsignificant correlation 
can be expected when the subgroups are combined. For example, the influence of 
parents on their children may be particularly strong for young children and de­
cline as the children grow older. If such substantial cohort effects exist an overall 
analysis (cohort membership ignored) will confound them. Consequently, inde­
pendent analyses for each cohort and for each sex were conducted. Very few signi-
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Table 24 Pearson correlations between parental use of victim-oriented discipline 
and the child's moral internalization 
T=l T=2 
mother father mother father 
T=l moral behavior 
guilt 
T=2 moral behavior 
guilt 
* ρ < .05 
ficant correlations are found (10% of the eighty calculated correlations had a 
probability of less than .05), and no cohort-dependent or sex-dependent patterns 
of correlation with some consistency could be detected (correlations for each 
subsample are included in Appendix B, Table B-5). In conclusion, the use of 
inductive discipline does not appear to be linearly related to moral internalization. 
Linear relations between victim-oriented discipline and the child's moral 
internalization 
Linear relations between the use of victim-oriented discipline and moral 
internalization were also analyzed using Pearson correlations. The results are 
presented in Table 24, As can be seen victim-oriented discipline does not appear 
to be related to the child's moral behavior at time 1 (p > .05). This is consistent 
with the findings in the preceding section which show parental inductive disci­
pline and moral internalization to not be related. However, significant relations 
between victim-oriented discipline and guilt are found for both mothers (r (149) = 
.43, ρ < .05) and for fathers (r (131) = .30, ρ < .05) at time 1. When a parent 
frequently uses victim-oriented discipline techniques the child appears to show 
higher guilt scores. This holds for mothers and fathers as well. Moreover, the 
data of time 2 confirm these findings. Victim-oriented discipline and moral 
behavior are also not related, while a frequent use of victim-oriented discipline 
does appear to be associated with a high guilt level for both mothers (r (149) = 
.22, ρ < .05) and fathers (r (130) = .25, ρ < .05) at time 2. The consistency of 
these findings across time, moreover, suggest that the reported relations are 
valida Just as for inductive discipline, however, it is not unreasonable that 
The correlations within each cohort and within each sex are reported in the 
Appendix В (Table B-6). As for cross-sectional correlations, similar patterns 
are found. Some of the correlations are not significant (p > .05), but this may 


















victim-oriented discipline relates to future moral behavior and that our measures 
simply did not pick up on this fact. Table 24 shows no relation between moral 
behavior at time 1 and victim-oriented discipline at time 2, nor victim-oriented 
discipline at time 1 and moral behavior at time 2. 
To summarize, we may conclude that victim-oriented discipline and guilt are 
related. Children who experience much guilt following transgression have parents 
who frequently use victim-oriented discipline. Similarly, children who do not feel 
very guilty following a transgression most likely have parents who do not direct 
the child's attention toward the distress of others. Moral internalization, operatio-
nalized as the amount of moral behavior, does not relate to the frequency of 
victim-oriented references, however. This suggests that mere victim-oriented 
discipline is not sufficient to create moral behavior; conversely, the child's moral 
behavior does not necessarily elicit a victim-oriented style of discipline. We 
consistently found no relation between the child's guilt experience and parental 
use of inductive discipline. The amount of explanations used by the parents to 
motivate children to change their behavior appears not to be related to children's 
moral behavior. These findings seem to confirm the suggestion that victim-
oriented discipline is more important than inductive discipline. 
6.5 Causes and consequences of parental discipline and moral 
internalization 
The results from the correlational analysis of the cross-sectional data have 
already shown that the amount of victim-oriented discipline is related to the 
children's guilt experience and that the amount of victim-oriented discipline is 
not related to children's moral behavior. Up to this point, however, the causal 
direction of the relation between discipline and moral internalization has been 
ignored. In this section, therefore, we will examine these effects over time using 
structural equation modeling. Causal hypotheses will not be tested for inductive 
discipline and moral internalization for no relation between these two concepts 
was found. Similarly, causal hypotheses relating victim-oriented discipline and 
moral behavior will also not be tested. Only causal hypotheses for victim-orien-
ted discipline and the child's experience of guilt will be tested in the following. 
In these analyses, the cross-lagged correlations between guilt at time 1 and 
victim-oriented discipline at time 2 and victim-oriented discipline at time 1 and 
guilt at time 2 are examined. These cross-lagged correlations are presented in 
Table 24. For the father-child dyads there is a significant correlation between the 
use of victim-oriented discipline at time 1 and the child's guilt at time 2. The 
correlation between the child's guilt at time 1 and paternal use of victim-oriented 
discipline at time 2, however, is less strong and nonsignificant. As shown in 
Table 24 only the cross-lagged correlation between guilt at time 1 and maternal 
victim-oriented discipline at time 2 is found to be significant (p < .05), sugges-
ting that the child's level of moral internalization may influence maternal disci-
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plining rather than the other way around. Alternative explanations for this pattern 
of cross-lagged correlations are possible, however. For example, it is possible 
that guilt at time 1 concurrently affects maternal discipline and thereby leads to 
maternal discipline at time 2. A frequently used method for exploring the relative 
influence of parent and child is the method of cross-lagged correlations (e.g., 
Clarke-Stewart, 1973). This approach has also been frequently criticized (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Duncan, 1969; Rogosa, 1979). Rogosa (1979), for example, 
has suggested that the differences in the cross-lagged correlations may not only 
reflect different causal influences but also different variances. An alternative 
statistical technique that appears to be more appropriate for our needs and avoid 
the limitations inherent in cross-lagged panel analyses was therefore undertaken: 
Structural equation modeling. 
Figure 5 The starting model to test the causal direction 
The model of causality specified in Figure 5 was taken as our original 
starting point (Plewis, 1985). In this model, xi and yi are measured variables at 
time 1 and x2 and y2 are measured variables at time 2. Variables x2 and y2 are 
assumed to be caused by variables xi and yi, and variables x2 and y2 are 
assumed to have no causal link between them. It is recognized that xi and yi 
may not account for all of the variation in either X2 and y2 and therefore ει and 
62 are included as error terms. In the present model, variables are treated as if 
they were perfect indicators of the underlying concept. The inclusion of latent 
variables in the model results in a model that is seriously underidentified. 
Several criteria may be used for judging the fit of the model. First the dis­
crepancy between the hypothesized model and the observed data may be tested 
using a chi-square test. Since the chi-square statistic is a direct function of 
sample size, however, almost any model is found to not fit with larger sample 
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sizes (Anderson, 1987). Hence, additional indicators will be used to judge the 
model. The second indicator will be a goodness-of-fit index. This index estimates 
the degree to which the model accounts for the variances and covariances charac-
teristic of the data. The third indicator will be an adjusted goodness-of-fit index 
which adjusts the goodness-of-fit index to degrees of freedom and eliminates bias 
for models with few degrees of freedom. The fourth indicator is the root mean 
square residual, which is the average of the square of the residuals (mean of unex-
plained variances and covariances). The statistical distributions for the second to 
fourth indicators (goodness-of-fit index, adjusted goodness-of-fit index, and root 
mean square residual) are unknown; hence probability values cannot be assigned 
to the test statistics. Anderson and Gerbing (1984) assessed the effect of model 
characteristics on the distribution of these indicators, but only models for con-
firmatory factor analysis were tested and no direct values of the indices are 
formulated for our model without factor analysis. Notwithstanding these limita-
tions, we deduced some guidelines for the interpretation of the indicators from the 
research of Anderson and Gerbing for our nonfactor analytic model. We chose the 
most conservative indicators for a model with two indicators for each factor and a 
sample size of 150 as a guideline for the interpretation of our indicators. We 
tentatively concluded that values above .94 for goodness-of-fit index, above .88 
for adjusted goodness-of-fit index and below .064 for the root mean square residu-
al are indicative of acceptable fits. A fifth criterion for judging the fit of our 
model is the statistical significance of each path coefficient (t-values) and the 
nonsignificance of the normalized residuals. Finally, the model is also evaluated 
by examining the amount of variance explained in the dependent variables. 
We analyzed the data for the mother-child dyads and father-child dyads in-
dependently, and because guilt was found to be related to the child's age all 
correlations among the measures for victim-oriented discipline and guilt are 
controlled for age. The intercorrelations are reported in Table 25. This matrix 
served as the input to the LISREL-VI analysis (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1981). In 
Table 25 Intercorrelations among maternal victim-oriented discipline and guilt 




































Note Goodness-of-fit indicators: χ 2 (1) = 5.22 (ρ = .022); goodness-of-fit = .982; 
adjusted goodness-of-fit = .824; root mean square residual = .052. 
Proportion of variance in victim-oriented discipline time 2 explained = .16. 
Proportion of variance in guilt time 2 explained = .09. 
Figure 6 Structural representation of the relations between maternal victim-
oriented discipline and guilt (n = 144) 
Figure 6 the model generated by the LISREL-analysis is reported. As can be seen 
in Figure 6 the goodness-of-fit indicators do not consistently show an acceptable 
fit. The chi-square statistic shows that the model does not adequately fit the data 
(χ2 (1) = 5.22, ρ = .022). The estimated value of the path from victim-oriented 
discipline at time 1 to guilt at time 2 and the path from guilt at time 1 to 
victim-oriented discipline at time 2 are called cross-lagged paths. An inspection 
of the path estimates shows that these cross-lagged paths do not reach signifi­
cance (p > .05). Thus the way mothers discipline does not appear to influence the 
child's future guilt experiences. Also, no evidence is found for the hypothesis 
that mothers adapt their disciplining to the child's guilt experiences. The sig­
nificant cross-lagged correlation between victim-oriented discipline at time 1 and 
guilt at time 2 (r (149) = .25, ρ < .05, controlled for age) therefore seems to be 
an artifact of an already existing association between discipline and guilt and the 
stability of these variables. This suggests a reduced model in which the variables 
are stable across time. In this model, victim-oriented discipline and the child's 
guilt at time 2 are completely explained by the relationship between these varia­
bles at time 1 and the stability of these variables. No cross-lagged paths are pre­
sent in this model and this model seems to provide an adequate explanation of the 
data: χ2 (3) = 6.96 (ρ = .073), goodness-of-fit index = .976, adjusted goodness-
of-fit index = .921, root mean square residual = .060. However, modification 
indices suggest the existence of a relation between victim-oriented discipline and 
















Note Goodness-of-fit indicators: χ^(2) = 1.61 (ρ = .448); goodness-of-fit = .994; 
adjusted goodness-of-fit = .972; root mean square residual = .027. 
Proportion of variance in victim-oriented discipline time 2 explained = .16. 
Proportion of variance in guilt time 2 explained = .08. 
Figure 7 Structural representation of the reduced model of relations between 
maternal victim-oriented discipline and guilt (n = 144) 
stability of victim-oriented discipline and guilt. As a consequence, the fit will 
once again be improved by taking into account the relation between the unex­
plained variances of victim-oriented discipline at time 2 and the child's guilt at 
time 2. This third model is shown in Figure 7 and provides a good fit for the 
data: χ2 (2) = 1.61 (ρ = .448), goodness-of-fit index = .994, adjusted goodness-
of-fit index = .972, root mean square residual = .027. The nonsignificant chi-
square statistic and the fact that the values of the latter three indicators fall well 
within the acceptable ranges suggest that the measurement model is well-defined. 
The normalized residuals are nonsignificant; the stability-coefficients are signifi-
canL Although the variables show stability over time this need not imply that 
the parents and children have not changed over the two years. That is, only 16% 
of the variance in maternal victim-oriented discipline at time 2 and 8% of the 
variance in the child's guilt at time 2 is explained by the scores from two years 
prior. 
Similar analyses for the existence of long-term relations between father's 
discipUne and the child's guilt are done. Table 26 represents the intercorrelations 
between paternal victim-oriented discipline and the child's guilt with age par-
tialled out. On both measurement occasions paternal victim-oriented discipline is 
found to be significantly related to the child's guilt. Both cross-lagged correla­
tions are small and do not differ greatly. The correlation between the child's guilt 
score at time 1 and paternal victim-oriented discipline at time 2 is significant. A 
model with cross-lagged paths is tested first (Figure 5). The significant chi-square 
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Table 26 Intercorrelations among pateraal victim-oriented discipline and guilt 





















* ρ < .05 
statistic (χ2 (1) = 7.58, ρ = .006) indicates that the data do not fit the model. The 
goodness-of-fit index is acceptable (.971), but the adjusted goodness-of-fit index 
is low ( .714). The root mean square residual is acceptable (.063). Neither of the 
t-values of the cross-lagged paths are significant (p > .05) and, as with the 
mothers, the significant path coefficients between the scores of victim-oriented 
discipline at both measurement occasions and between the two guilt scores indi­
cate the stability of these measures. In the second model, the full model (see Fig­
ure 5) is reduced by removing the cross-lagged paths. This model still provides a 















Note Goodness-of-fit indicators: χ 2 (2) = 0.47 (ρ = .789); goodness-of-fit = .998; 
adjusted goodness-of-fit = .991; root mean square residual = .022. 
Proportion of variance in victim-oriented discipline time 2 explained = .25. 
Proportion of variance in guilt time 2 explained = .09. 
Figure 8 Structural representation of the reduced model of relations between 
paternal victim-oriented discipline and guilt (n = 126) 
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adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .900, root mean square residual = .075). 
This analysis suggests that a relation between the unexplained variance of vic­
tim-oriented discipline at time 2 and the unexplained variance of guilt at time 2 
should be introduced and indeed this model (see Figure 8) provides a viable 
account of the observed data, which is shown by the nonsignificant chi-square 
statistic (χ2 (2) = 0.47, ρ = .789) and the three goodness-of-fit indicators falling 
in the appropriate range. The stability-paths, moreover, are statistically signifi­
cant (p < .05). 
In summary, long-term effects of parents on children and children on parents 
are not found in this research. No evidence is found for Hoffman's hypothesis 
that parents influence the moral internalization of children.^ On both measure­
ment occasions victim-oriented discipline is found to be associated with the 
child's guilt experiences, and this is found to apply to mothers as well as fathers. 
This repeated finding suggests that the relation between victim-oriented discipline 
and guilt is valid. It should be noted that (he path estimate between guilt on the 
first occasion and guilt measured two years later remains the same in the reduced 
model for mothers and the reduced model for fathers. This certainly does not 
indicate that the child's guilt experience does not change during two years. Only 
8-9% of the variance in guilt measured at time 2 is explained by the earlier guilt 
level, however. Thus considerable changes within the total sample of children 
may have occurred. The guilt experience is also age related. Across the span of 
two years the children's guilt experiences may increase although the child's rank 
in comparison with the other children remains the same. The amount of victim-
oriented discipline strategies a parent uses also shows stability. Fathers appear to 
be a little more consistent than mothers (regression coefficient mothers = .40; 
regression coefficient fathers = .50). It is concluded that although victim-oriented 
discipline and guilt are related, long-term influences across a period of two years 
are not observed. It is possible, however, that children and parents are continu­
ously adjusting to each other and these reciprocal processes result in rather strong 
stability-coefficients over time, but not in significant cross-lagged paths. As 
suggested in chapter 2, such a dynamic model does not exclude the possibility of 
long-term influences. Such long-term influences, however, that are presumed to 
operate over a discrete time interval of two years are not found in this research. 
It is possible that the relative strength of the long-term effects vary with the 
child's age. When the child is quite young the influence of parental discipline 
techniques on the child's moral internalization may be stronger than the 
influence of the child's moral internalization on discipline technique. Older 
children may nevertheless have an increasingly stronger influence on the 
parental discipline strategy. Examination of the correlations between the 
variables within each cohort and sex group revealed no such trends, however. 
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6.6 The role of empathy and perspective taking in the relation 
between victim-oriented discipline and moral internaliza­
tion 
One of the aims in this study was to find evidence for the mediating role of 
empathy and perspective taking in the relation between victim-oriented discipline 
and moral internalization. It is hypothesized that if victim-oriented discipline 
strategies influence moral internalization this is because pointing out the vic­
tim's distress stimulates the child to take the other's perspective and have empa­
thy and thereby the child's level of moral internalization. The correlations of 
empathy and perspective taking to moral behavior and guilt are presented in 
Table 27, along with the correlations when age is partialled out. As before, we 
will first consider the relations within each measurement occasion. 
Table 27 The relations between perspective taking, empathy, moral behavior and 
guilt (pearson correlation/partial correlation controlled for age) 
T=l T=2 
perspective perspective empathy 
taking taking 
T=l moral behavior .25+/.25* .12 /.08 .07 /.08 
guilt .46*1.37* .37*/.25* .11 /.15* 
T=2 moral behavior .08 /.04 .14*/. 13 .05 /.06 
guilt .32*/.16* .36*1.22* .30*1.36* 
* ρ < .05 
As can be seen in Table 27, cross-sectional relations between perspective taking 
and both indicators of moral internalization (moral behavior and guilt) are found 
at time 1. Children showing a high capacity to take the perspective of another 
also show more moral behavior and experience more guilt than children with a 
low perspective-taking capacity. This relation is also found at time 2, although 
the Pearson correlation between perspective taking and moral behavior just 
reaches significance at time 2 and disappears when age is partialled out. Empathy 
could only be analyzed at time 2 and is found to be associated with guilt meas­
ured at time 2. No relation is found between empathy and moral behavior, how­
ever. 
Thus, at a given point of time, perspective taking and empathy may be re­
lated to guilt and only perspective taking to moral behavior. This suggests that 
guilt and empathy are very closely related in part because feelings of empathy 
constitute a basis for guilt. When a child feels empathy for another and also 
realizes that he or she may have caused the damage, feelings of guilt may be the 
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result (Hoffman, 1987). In turn, these feelings of guilt may motivate the child to 
behave morally. However, moral behavior need not be the result of feelings of 
empathy or feelings of guilt. For example, a child may know that the victim 
will not accept help (and therefore not act), or the child may want reinforcement 
(and therefore act). In these situations, that is, the child simply has to make the 
correct judgment 
Perspective taking and empathy are hypothesized to mediate the influence of 
parents on children's moral internalization, which predicts that relations between 
victim-oriented discipline and perspective taking and empathy must be found. As 
can be seen in Table 28, cross-sectional relations between victim-oriented disci­
pline from both mothers and fathers and perspective taking exist. No relation 
between victim-oriented discipline and child empathy is found, however, which 
suggests that empathy may not mediate between victim-oriented discipline and 
moral internalization. 
Table 28 The relations between perspective taking, empathy and victim-oriented 
discipline (pearson correlation) 
T=l T=2 
perspective perspective empathy 
taking taking 
T=l maternal victim-oriented discipline .16* .11 .02 
paternal victim-oriented discipline .29* .28* .02 
T=2 maternal victim-oriented discipline .21* .22* .05 
paternal victim-oriented discipline .03 .16* .13 
* ρ < .05 
Long-term effects of victim-oriented discipline on the child's moral internali­
zation are not found, which makes it difficult to test the hypothesis that empathy 
and perspective taking mediate between the two. An additional analysis was 
therefore attempted to tap the possibly mediating role of perspective taking in 
this relation. In section 6.5 victim-oriented discipline and guilt were shown to be 
related for both mothers and fathers at a given point in time but not longitudinal­
ly. We therefore decided to model the possibly mediating role of perspective 
taking in this relation using cross-sectional data. Of course, it would be 
preferable to use longitudinal data to estimate effects, but we now are concerned 
with making the best of things when no longitudinal effects over a two-year time 
lag are found. 
Many studies try to make causal inferences based on cross-sectionally 
gathered data. As Gollob and Reichardt (1987) observed, these models fail to 
















Figure 9 Model used to test the mediating role of perspective taking in the rela­
tion between victim-oriented discipline and guilt, with victim-oriented 
discipline, perspective taking, and guilt at time 1 as causes of victim-
oriented discipline, perspective taking, and guilt at time 2 
these models do not consider already existing associations between the variables 
in the model. Already existing relations between such variables can be seen as 
background variables. When these background variables are not part of the model, 
the values of the paths will be overestimated. It is very difficult to estimate the 
values of background variables (Gollob & Reichardt, 1987). For example, the 
stability coefficient often depends on the time lag. Short lags produce high 
stability coefficients, whereas long lags produce lower stability coefficients. 
Because data from two measurement occasions are available in the present study, 
however, we could start from the background relations present at time 1 and test 
a model based on the data at time 2. Victim-oriented discipline and empathy 
proved not to be related, which suggests that empathy also docs not mediate 
between victim-oriented discipline and moral internalization. Only perspective 
taking, thus, may mediate between victim-oriented discipline and moral internali­
zation. Such a model is tested and is presented in Figure 9. The variables are 
treated as perfect indicators of the concept, and the model is tested separately for 
mothers and fathers. The matrix presented in Table 29 is the input for the 
LISREL-VI analysis of the mother-child dyads. Age was also controlled for. In 
Figure 10 the model generated by the analysis of the mother-child dyads is 
reported. The various goodness-of-fit indicators are also noted in Figure 10. As 
can be seen, the model depicted in Figure 10 provides a good fit: χ2 (7) = 10.10 
(ρ = .183), goodness-of-fit index = .977, adjusted goodness-of-fit = .931, root 
mean square residual = .055. The nonsignificant chi-square statistic, and the fact 
that the values of the latter three indicators fall well within the acceptable ranges, 
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Table 29 Intercorrelations between matemal victim-oriented discipline, perspec­
tive taking, and guilt (controlled for age) 
T=l T=2 
maternal perspective maternal perspective 
























ρ < .05 
victim-oriented 
discipline ^  












Note Goodness-of-fit indicators: χ 2 (7)= 10.10 (ρ = .183); goodness-of-fit = .977; 
adjusted goodness-of-fit = .931; root mean square residual = .055. 
Proportion of variance in guilt time 2 explained = .10. 
Figure 10 Structural representation of the model testing mediation of the relation 
between maternal victim-oriented discipline and guilt by perspective 
taking (n = 144) 
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Table 30 Intercorrelations between patemal victim-oriented discipline, perspec­
tive taking, and guilt (controlled for age) 
T=l T=2 
paternal perspective paternal perspective 
victim-oriented taking guiltvictim-oriented taking guilt 
discipline discipline 
T=l paternal victim-
oriented discipline .22* .26* .51* .21* .13 
perspective taking ... .37* .06 .34* .16* 
guilt ... .15* .25* .30* 
T=2 paternal victim-
oriented discipline .23* .22* 
perspective taking ... .27* 
guilt 
* ρ < .05 
suggest that the model is well-defined. Only 10 % of the variance in guilt at time 
2 is explained by the other variables in the model. An inspection of the path 
estimates for the model shows low but significant regression coefficients for 
maternal victim-oriented discipline on perspective taking and perspective taking 
on guilt. 
This indicates that a model in which victim-oriented discipline influences guilt 
by stimulating the child's perspective taking is confirmed. 
This model is also tested for the influence of victim-oriented discipline by 
fathers on perspective taking and guilt. The data matrix for father-child dyads is 
presented in Table 30, and Figure 11 is the structural representation of this 
model. This model also provides a viable account of the observed data, as in­
dicated by the nonsignificant chi-square statistic (χ2 (7) = 9.32, ρ = .231) and the 
fact that the values of the three goodness-of-fit indicators all fall in the appropri­
ate range. The model explains 10 % of the variance in the children's guilt scores 
at time 2. All of the regression coefficients, moreover, are found to be signifi-
canL It should be noted that the path estimates for victim-oriented discipline and 
perspective taking and perspective taking and guilt are almost equal to the re­
gression coefficients found for the mother-child dyads. 
It may be concluded that a model in which victim-oriented discipline stimu­
lates perspective taking which in tum stimulates guilt fits the observed data. 
That is, a parent who frequently uses victim-oriented disciplinary techniques may 
stimulate perspective taking, and the better the child's perspective-taking capacity 
the more guilt the child may experience following a transgression. No evidence 

















Note Goodness-of-fit indicators: χ 2 (7) = 9.32 (ρ = .231); goodness-of-fit = .976; 
adjusted goodness-of-fit = .929; root mean square residual = .051. 
Proportion of variance in guilt time 2 explained = .10. 
Figure 11 Structural representation of the model testing mediation of the relation 
between paternal victim-oriented discipline and guilt by perspective 
taking (n = 126) 
ates between victim-oriented discipline and guilt. It should be noted, however, 
that the regression coefficients found in the LISREL-analyses are very low but 
significant. Furthermore, a true causal structure should be tested on longitudinal 
data. Finally, the fact that this causal model is confirmed does not mean that 
other models cannot be confirmed; parental discipline might also be influenced 
by the child's guilt experiences.^ Thus, no decisive answer can be given about 
the relative influence of parents and children on each other. 
One model is tested in which perspective taking at time 2 is assumed to 
influence guilt at time 2 and this guilt assumed to influence the amount of 
victim-oriented discipline used by the parent at time 2. Estimates of the 
values of background variables were based on the data at time 1. Low but 
significant regression coefficients are found for perspective taking on guilt 
(mother-child dyads the regression coefficient = .16; father-child dyads the 
regression coefficient = .16) and guilt on victim-oriented discipline (mother-
child dyads the regression coefficient = .19; father-child dyads the regression 
coefficient = .21). The chi-square statistic is nonsignificant and the other 
goodness-of-fit indicators are acceptable, both for mother-child dyads and for 
father-child dyads. This indicates that the observed data also fit a model in 
which the child's level of moral internalization influences the parental disci­
plinary strategies. 
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6.7 Beyond correlations: Nonlinear relations between parental 
discipline and moral internalization 
In the preceding analyses of relations between discipline and moral internali-
zation we mainly have relied on correlational analyses to expose linear relation-
ships. Pearson correlations may not be suitable for assessing relations between 
parental discipline and moral internalization, however. For example, independent 
and dependent variables may only be related for some children. Moral internaliza-
tion is the process by which children become more and more motivated to con-
sider the needs of others (cf. chapter 3). It is possible, however, that having auto-
matized this activity, children are less likely to refrain from doing it. Thus, it 
may be suggested that children do not easily regress. Then, most children are 
hypothesized to show stability or progression in their moral internalization. We 
can check the plausibility of this statement by examining how many children 
display a regression in their moral internalization scores at time 2 when 
compared to their moral internalization scores at time 1. As we have seen in 
section 6.1, the absence of a developmental trend in moral behavior generally 
disconfirms the hypothesis that moral internalization is age-related. Two 
explanations can be offered for this result. Each child's behavior may have been 
rated only relative to peers in the same age range by the teacher, that is, the child 
was rated only relative to children of the same age rather than in general. It is 
also possible that moral internalization is only one of many factors that deter-
mine what shall be done. When the changes of guilt-scores across two years are 
considered, it is found that most children remained stable or progressed (the 
percentage of children who remained stable or progressed on the measures of guilt 
intensity, concern for victim, and use of justice principles are 58%, 64%, 74% 
respectively; that is, the absolute score on a guilt measure at time 2 minus the 
absolute score on that guilt measure at time 1 is zero or positive). Nevertheless, 
a considerable percentage of the children regressed. The guilt experiences may 
have been too globally assessed in this study. 
If it should be true that children not easily regress and when it is assumed 
that moral internalization is influenced by the way parents discipline this may 
apply to parent-child dyads of which the parent starts using more inductive disci-
pline techniques, respectively victim-oriented techniques. In addition, it may be 
suggested that when parents use less inductive or victim-oriented discipline 
techniques at time 2 this has no or little effect on the child's moral internaliza-
tion. Thus, in analyzing these relations we are not interested in the subject's 
scores at time 1 but changes. Parents were divided into categories according to 
the degree of change in disciplining. Each parent was assigned to a category: 
Parents whose use of inductive discipline declined, was stable, or increased at 
time 2. A similar tripartition was made of parents for changes in victim-oriented 
discipline. The question was whether the children in these categories showed 
related changes. Similarly, it was asked whether the disciplinary styles of parents 
with children who showed more or less change in their level of moral intemaliza-
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tion also changed. Therefore, children were categorized into three groups 
according to their changes in moral internalization. In this analyses the question 
was whether the parents in these categories showed related changes. With these 
nonlinear analyses we may find long-term relations that are not found with linear 
analyses. 
Nonlinear relations between inductive discipline and moral internalization 
Inductive discipline may be characterized in ways other than the proportion 
of inductive discipline used by the parent when attempting to change the child's 
behavior. Mothers in this study were divided into three categories based on the 
degree of change in their disciplinary styles. The position of each mother relative 
to the total sample of mothers is expressed as a z-score. This z-score is calculated 
for the assessment at time 1 as well as for the assessment at time 2. A com-
parison of these z-scores, thus, gives an impression of how the mother changed 
relative to the other mothers. A rather conservative measure was selected to 
indicate decrease and increase of disciplinary style, and a change in the z-score of 
at least 1 unit was required. 
The first group consists of mothers who showed an increase in the proportion of 
inductive discipline (n = 27). The difference between their z-score at time 2 and 
their z-score at time 1 was 1 or more. The second group consists of mothers who 
remained relatively stable (n = 96). Their z-scores differed by less than 1 unit. 
Finally, the third group consists of mothers who declined in the proportion of 
inductive discipline they used (n = 27). The z-score for these mothers decreased 
by 1 or more units. There were no sex or cohort differences made in this classifi-
cation. It was suggested that if parental inductive discipline relates to moral 
internalization, then the children of mothers who become more inductive should 
show a greater increase in moral internalization than children in other groups. 
Such analyses ignore the child's specific scores at times 1 and 2 and focus on the 
amount of change in moral internalization from time 1 to time 2. The change for 
each child is operationalized as the difference between the score at time 1 and the 
score at time 2. Changes in the indicators of moral internalization, moral be-
havior, and guilt are then compared. 
Table 31 shows the mean change in the child's moral behavior with mothers 
who decreased their use of inductive discipline, remained stable in their use of 
inductive discipline, or increased their use of inductive discipline. For a correct 
interpretation of the mean changes of the indicators of moral internalization it 
should be noted that the children's scores of moral behavior can range between 1 
and 6 and that the children's guilt scores are factor scores (see section 5.3.1). 
Analyses of variance indicate that mothers' changes in inductive discipline are not 
reflected in the child's moral internalization scores. 
The fathers are divided into three similar groups (i.e., according to their z-
score changes in inductive discipline). Twenty-three fathers decreased, 84 fathers 
remained the same, and 24 fathers showed a reduction in the use of inductive 
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Table 31 Mean changes in the child's moral internalization as a function of 
change mother's inductive discipline 
group I 
(decrease) 



















* ρ > .05 
Table 32 Mean changes in the child's moral internalization as a function of 
change in father's inductive discipline 
group I 
(decrease) 



















* ρ > .05 
discipline.8 Sex and cohort differences were not found for these groups. As can 
be seen in Table 32, the child's changes in moral behavior and guilt are the 
dependent variables. The results indicate that changes in the father's use of in­
ductive discipline do not relate to changes in the child's moral internalization. 
As already mentioned, the children are divided into three groups according to 
changes in the relative positions of their scores on moral internalization. This 
was done separately for moral behavior and for guilt. A chi-square analysis, 
calculated to test for any cohort differences, revealed that the children in cohort 1 
showed less stability and more change in their guilt scores than the children in 
the other cohorts (χ2 (4) = 17.35, ρ < .01). This relation was not found for 
moral behavior. No sex differences were found between the groups. For moral 
behavior, 20 children increased their relative position, 96 children were stable, 
and 24 children decreased. For guilt these numbers were 31, 89 and 27 
respectively.^  
The sum of the subjects in each group sometimes is less than the maximum 
due to missing data. In this case, one father is missing. 
It should be noted where guilt is concerned that a stability in the z-scores 
over a period of two years does not imply that the guilt experience does not 
increase. Guilt is age-related. Thus the child's z-score is not only determined 
by the child's advanced or retarded moral internalization but also the age of 
the child. To eliminate this influence of age the z-scores of guilt and moral 
behavior were calculated within each cohort. 
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Table 33 Mean changes in parental inductive discipline as a function of change 
























* ρ > .05 
Table 34 Mean changes in parental inductive discipline as a function of change in 
























* ρ > .05 
The mean changes in the use of inductive discipline as a function of changes in 
the child's level of moral internalization are presented in Tables 33 and 34. The 
parent's scores represent the proportion of inductive reactions given in discipli­
nary encounters. Consequently, changes of the use of inductive discipline repre­
sent changes in proportions. Analyses of variance show maternal and paternal 
changes in inductive discipline not to reflect the children's changes in moral be­
havior and guilt. Thus, no relations are found between inductive discipline and 
moral internalization over a time interval of two years. 
Nonlinear relations between victim-oriented discipline and moral internalization 
The same procedure as with inductive discipline was followed in an 
examination of changes in victim-oriented discipline and moral internalization. 
Mothers were divided into three groups. The first group consists of mothers who 
increased the amount of victim-oriented discipline (n = 30). The second group 
consists of mothers who remained stable (n = 93). The third group consists of 
mothers who decreased the amount of victim-oriented discipline (n = 27). There 
were no sex or cohort differences in this classification. Table 35 shows the mean 
change in the level of moral internalization for each group. Mothers' changes in 
victim-oriented discipline are, to a limited extent, reflected in the changes asso­
ciated with the children's moral internalization. For each variable, the highest 
mean change in moral internalization is found for children whose mothers had 
increased their use of victim-oriented discipline and the lowest mean score is 
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Table 35 Mean changes in the child's level of moral internalization as a function 
of changes in mother's use of victim-oriented discipline 
group I 
(decrease) 



















* ρ > .05 
Table 36 Mean changes in the child's level of moral internalization as a function 
of changes in the father's use of victim-oriented discipline 
group I 
(decrease) 



















* ρ > .05 
obtained for children whose mothers had decreased their use of victim-oriented 
discipline. However, the three parental groups differed significantly only on the 
changes in guilt measure. T-tests show that the mean scores for group II and 
group III differ significantly (t (144.0) = 2.38, ρ < .05), while the difference 
between group I and group II is not significant (t (144.0) = 1.72, ρ > .05). This 
suggests a nonlinear long-term relation between victim-oriented discipline and 
guilt. That is, the guilt experience of children whose mothers increased the use of 
victim-oriented discipline developed to a greater degree than the guilt experience 
of other children. It appears, moreover, that a decrease in victim-oriented disci­
pline does not necessarily imply a regression in experienced guilt. Note, how­
ever, that these conclusions are somewhat arbitrary; that is, the result is one just 
significant t-value (p = .019) and one just nonsignificant t-value (p = .088). 
When the data for the fathers are analyzed in a similar fashion, similar re­
sults are found (Table 36). Eighteen fathers showed a decrease in the use of vic­
tim-oriented discipline (group I). Ninety-one fathers remained stable (group II). 
Twenty-two fathers increased their use of victim-oriented discipline (group III). 
Cohort 3 is a little overrepresented in group I and a little underrepresented in 
group III (χ2 (4) = 9.93, ρ < .05). The mean changes of the moral internalization 
scores show differences between the three groups. The highest mean change in 
moral behavior and guilt is obtained for children whose fathers increased their use 
of victim-oriented discipline over time, and the lowest mean scores are obtained 
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Table 37 Mean changes in parental victim-oriented discipline as a function of 
























* ρ > .05 
Table 38 Mean changes in parental victim-oriented discipline as a function of 
























* ρ > .05 
for children whose fathers used less victim-oriented discipline at time 2. In 
contrast to the analyses for maternal discipline, however, these differences do not 
prove to be statistically significant. In other words, no relations are found 
between changes in paternal victim-oriented discipline and changes in the child's 
moral internalization. 
The mean change in the use of victim-oriented discipline by mothers and 
fathers as a function of children grouped according to changes in moral behavior 
and according to changes in guilt experience (for characteristics of these groups 
see preceding subsection) are presented in Tables 37 and 38. Although the dif­
ferences were in the predicted direction, only the difference for changes in ma­
ternal victim-oriented discipline between groups divided according to changes in 
guilt are significant The difference in mean changes between group I and group 
II is significant (t (144.0) = 2.48, ρ < .05). Thus mothers whose children's guilt 
scores regressed also slightly decreased their use of victim-oriented discipline 
(mean change in proportion victim-oriented discipline is -.03), while mothers 
whose children's guilt scores remained stable slightly increased their use of 
victim-oriented discipline (mean difference in proportion victim-oriented disci­
pline is .02). The difference in mean changes between group II and group III is 
not significant. Thus, no differences are found between children who remained 
stable and children who, relative to other children, progressed. 
In summary, no relation is found between changes in victim-oriented disci­
pline by fathers and changes in the child's moral internalization. Also, no re-
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lation is found between changes in victim-oriented discipline by mothers and 
changes in the child's moral behavior. Small but significant relations are found 
for changes in maternal victim-oriented discipline and changes in the child's guilt 
experiences. When mothers increased their use of victim-oriented discipline 
children's guilt experiences also increased relative to children of mothers who 
remained stable in their use of victim-oriented discipline. When mothers de-
creased their usage of victim-oriented discipline this is not reflected in the 
children's guilt scores when compared with children whose mothers did not 
change the amount of victim-oriented discipline used. Conversely, mothers of 
children who regressed in relative guilt also appeared to decrease their use of 
victim-oriented discipline when compared to children with a stable relative 
position. This indicates that relations between changes in the use of maternal 
victim-oriented discipline and changes in the child's development of guilt may 




The aim of the present research was to investigate the relationship between 
disciplinary techniques used by parents and the child's internalization of moral 
norms. This general aim was specified into three research questions. The first 
question concerned which disciplinary techniques (inductive discipline versus 
victim-oriented discipline) appear to be important in the relationship between 
parental discipline and moral internalization. The second question was whether 
the long-term influence of parental discipline and children's moral internalization 
is unidirectional. The third question was whether the child's capacity to react 
empathically or the child's perspective-taking ability mediate between parental 
discipline and the child's moral internalization (see chapter 4). In this chapter, the 
answer to each of these questions will be discussed. 
7.1 The relation between discipline and moral internalization 
The first question in this study concerned the relationship between parental 
discipline strategies and the child's internalization of norms. Before going into 
this matter some remarks will be made about the assessment of moral internali-
zation. Four indicators of moral internalization were distinguished: confession, 
resistance to deviation, guilt, and internal judgment. When these variables are 
indicators of the same underlying construct, how are these variables related to 
each other? Children barely differed in the kind of judgments they made. A 
comparison of the answers given by the children in this study with research by 
Nucci (1981) and Davidson, Turiel and Black (1983), moreover, seemed to 
validate these results. We may conclude, therefore, that only children younger 
than about seven tend to give moral judgments motivated by authority figures or 
the (negative) consequences of a moral transgression for themselves. It is sug-
gested, thus, that the degree of 'internal judgment' may be an accurate indicator of 
moral internalization for younger children. Internal judgment was excluded from 
further analyses. 
The two behavioral measures of moral internalization (confession and resistance 
to deviation) were found to be highly correlated, but bore no significant correla-
tion to measures of guilt. This suggests that moral internalization is not a uni-
tary construct and that the latter three measures (confession, resistance to devia-
tion, and guilt) reflect two, virtually independent, dimensions of morality: Moral 
behavior, which is the result of combining the two behavioral measurement 
scales, and guilt 
As the first dimension of moral behavior is concerned, it should be noted 
that behaviors associated with the moral behavior indicator are limited to the 
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child's behavior in the classroom as reported by the teacher. Our measure of 
moral behavior (see chapter 5) may be of limited validity. That is, moral be-
havior may be domain-specific, and thus the child may act differently in the 
classroom than outside the classroom. In particular, the child may be motivated 
to behave morally in the classroom but not in other situations. Besides this 
suggested domain-specificity, we must take into account two other problems. 
First, teachers are asked to indicate the degree of resistance to deviate and the 
willingness to confess after transgression demonstrated by the child. The occur-
rence of such behaviors does not necessarily reflect the internalization of norms, 
however. The manifestation of this behavior may also represent compliance to 
external pressure or the seeking of social approval. Children do not deviate or 
confess after a transgression because they think that the teacher expects them to 
act in this way. This might also explain the lack of age-related changes in moral 
behavior. Second, the lack of age-related changes in moral behavior may also be 
the result of the teachers' frame of reference. That is, the children in each age 
range were rated only relative to other children in the same age range and not 
more generally. 
In addition to moral behavior there is a second dimension of moral internali-
zation: guilt. Guilt is a factor consisting of three measures: guilt intensity, con-
cern for the victim, and the use of justice principles. Thompson and Hoffman 
(1980) regarded these measures to all be indicators of guilt experience. This is 
verified by the high correlations between the three guilt measures. Children with 
high scores on guilt report intense feelings of remorse, even when the trans-
gression goes undetected, and do not worry about external punishments; they also 
emphasize the distress of the victim and the importance of mutual trust or 
personal rights. As a result, the factor guilt consists of an affective component 
(the experienced feelings of remorse after transgression) and a cognitive compo-
nent (the rationale for those feelings). Nevertheless, the affective component was 
assessed by self report in the present study. We did not measure real affects. That 
is, guilt should not be seen as an affective measure here but a cognitive measure 
with an affective aspect 
Age-related changes are found for guilt. Older children experience more intense 
feelings of guilt, associated with concern for the victim and violation of basic 
justice principles. Younger children do not experience much guilt and are prima-
rily concerned with the consequences of the transgression for themselves. They 
fear punishment when the parents might detect the transgression and are afraid 
that the victim might take revenge or not want to play with them anymore. This 
confirms the results reported by Thompson and Hoffman (1980), and similar 
findings are reported by Barden, Zelko, Duncan and Masters (1980) and by 
Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, for example, 
found most 4-year-olds in their study to predict happiness after committing an 
undetected transgression. Most of the 8-year-olds, however, predicted negative 
emotions and motivated this with morally-oriented reasons. 
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In our study, no relations are found between moral behavior and guilt. That 
moral judgments or feelings are not always expressed in behavior has often been 
observed (e.g. Blasi, 1980; Eisenberg, 1982; Eisenberg, Shell, Pasternack, 
Lennon, Beller & Mathy, 1987; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler & Chapman, 
1983). In reviewing studies of the relation between prosocial reasoning and beha-
vior, Radke-Yarrow et al. (1983) observed that significant correlations in the .20 
and .40 range can be found as well as no association whatsoever. According to 
Maccoby (1980) there are several reasons why moral cognitions and moral be-
havior may not go together. In concrete situations a number of implications of 
the act may be considered (e.g. other's needs, self-interest, information available 
about the situation, the presence of other persons). These considerations can 
cause a discrepancy between an intra-individual indicator such as guilt and an 
inter-individual indicator such as moral behavior. 
The first question in this study concerned the relationship between parental 
discipline and the child's moral internalization. The hypothesis was that the use 
of victim-oriented discipline strategies relates stronger to the child's moral inter-
nalization than inductive discipline strategies. No relations are found between 
inductive discipline and the indicators of moral internalization, but victim-
oriented discipline is found to be related to guilt. The strength of the relation-
ships is not particularly strong, but the correlations replicated across the two 
measurements. These findings, moreover, appeared to be independent of the 
child's age and sex and held for mother-child dyads as well as father-child dyads. 
The findings verify Hoffman's suggestion that drawing the child's attention to the 
victim is most important for stimulating the internalization of norms (Hoffman, 
1970). The conclusion that especially victim-oriented discipline strategies are 
related to guilt can be explained by the emphasis victim-oriented discipline 
strategies put on the victim's distress and by the demanding aspects which are 
often included in a victim-oriented disciplinary reaction. 
Victim-oriented discipline is distinguished from inductive discipline because 
inductive discipline includes to a large extent only one-way communication 
strategies (i.e. didactic induction, according to Peterson and Skevington, 1988). 
Inductive discipline was operalionalized as the proportion of reactions following 
transgressions in which the parent tried to motivate the child to behave different-
ly by explaining (e.g. "If everyone did this the world would be a mess", "If you 
act like this you will lose all your friends"). Such explanations often do not chal-
lenge the child's existing point of view or stimulate the child to rectify his ac-
tions. Moreover, inductive discipline does not necessarily direct the child's atten-
tion to the other's distress and does not explain the nature of it. Victim-oriented 
discipline clearly directs the child's attention to the other's distress. Victim-
oriented discipline was operalionalized as stressing the consequences of the child's 
behavior for others, stimulating the child to take the perspective of another, and 
stimulating repair. By pointing out the needs of the other person, a parent may 
create a conflict between hedonistic needs and the needs of others, and such a 
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conflict may be of particular importance for stimulating moral internalization 
(Hoffman, 1975a). 
A second characteristic of victim-oriented discipline that is not always pre-
sent in (he inductive message is the demand aspect Hoffman (1970) assumed that 
without some communication of responsibility the child might respond empathi-
cally but dissociate himself from the causal act or deny it Victim-oriented disci-
pline not only informs the child about the victim's distress but also appeals to 
the child's responsibility by stimulating perspective taking and repair. 
Demandingness refers to behavior by which the parent makes an appeal to the 
child's responsibility, to mature behavior, to independence or to resolution of 
problems. A clear relation between demandingness and moral development has 
been documented, moreover (Maccoby, 1980). Victim-oriented discipline clearly 
communicates to the child that he is responsible for the distress of another per-
son and that he must take the needs of the victim into account 
A third possible characteristic that differentiates between victim-oriented 
discipline and inductive discipline is the suggestion that the child repairs the 
damage or apologizes. With the use of victim-oriented discipline, the parent not 
only points out the situation of the victim to the child, but also communicates 
how the child might relieve the victim's distress. From this viewpoint, victim-
oriented discipline may teach children that they can control their environment. 
Such perceived control may influence behavior beyond the parent-child interac-
tion, moreover. For example, Skinner (1986) has suggested that the child's 
perceived control may take over or supplement the mother's role in guiding and 
regulating child behavior in problem-solving tasks. It can be speculated, there-
fore, that perceived control also plays a role in the child's moral internalization 
and moral behavior. In our study, however, no relation between victim-oriented 
discipline and moral behavior could be found. As already said before, the validity 
of the assessment of moral behavior can be questìoned. 
Although victim-oriented discipline is related to guilt, no relation between 
victim-oriented discipline and moral behavior could be found. Parents may in-
fluence the development of guilt by a guilt-inducing discipline technique such as 
victim-oriented discipline. However, they cannot guarantee the transformation of 
a guilt experience into moral behavior. A second possible explanation is that we 
measured compliance in addition to morally motivated behavior. There seems to 
be a relation between compliance and the parental use of power to force the child 
to behave differently (Saltzstein, 1976). When a parent uses many power asser-
tive strategies (such as punishment or threatening the child) and does not give 
many explanations or reasons (and as a consequence the parent has a low score on 
victim-oriented discipline) the parent may cause the child to end the undesired 
behavior or to avoid this behavior. It also can stimulate the child to repair. How-
ever, the child is forced to act in that way by the parent. Therefore, the hypothe-
sized relation between victim-oriented discipline and moral behavior need not to 
be found. 
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7.2 Causes and consequences of parental discipline and moral 
internalization 
Across a period of two years no cross-lagged causal linear relations could be 
found between victim-oriented discipline and guilt That is, maternal and paternal 
victim-oriented discipline on the first measurement occasion is found to be not 
related to guilt on the second measurement occasion two years later. A relation is 
found between initial guilt and maternal use of victim-oriented discipline on the 
second measurement occasion. Paternal use of victim-oriented discipline is found 
to be related with the child's guilt two years later. LISREL-analyses showed, 
however, that these relations could be explained by the cross-sectional correlation 
between victim-oriented discipline and guilt at time 1 and the stability of victim-
oriented discipline and guilt over a time interval of two years. Cross-sectional 
relations between victim-oriented discipline and guilt are found at both measure-
ment occasions for both mother-child and father-child dyads. When changes over 
time are related small relations are found between changes of maternal victim-
oriented discipline and changes of guilt. Victim-oriented discipline and guilt 
appear to be related but there is little evidence for the existence of long-term 
influences. Only cross-sectional relations are found and a stability over time. 
Stability is indicated by the relation between the measures on separate occasions. 
What mechanisms might account for the lack of a long-term relation be-
tween discipline and moral internalization? First, the age-range of the children in 
this study may not have been appropriate for examining the long-term relation 
between discipline and moral internalization. For example, the relation between 
discipline and moral internalization may already be established before the child's 
fifth year. Second, the lag between measurements may have been incorrect to 
capture long-term influences. Finally, little or no long-term relation between 
parental disciplining and the child's moral internalization may exist. A trans-
actional model may better characterize the relation between these two variables. 
The first explanation concerns the age of the children in this research. From 
the time a child starts interacting with the environment, parents try to influence 
the child's behavior. Parents try to comfort their child or ignore the child to make 
the child stop crying. Encounters with a moral norm also occur in early interac-
tions with brothers, sisters and peers and as soon as the child understands verbal 
messages this content may influence the child. These interactions, moreover, all 
take place before five years of age. The relationship between the use of victim-
oriented discipline and the child's moral internalization, thus, may be consoli-
dated in the first five to six years. After this period, relations between victim-
oriented discipline and guilt may be explained by the stability of the parental 
preference for victim-oriented discipline and the stability of the child's level of 
moral internalization (stability does not imply that the child's moral internaliza-
tion does not change. As noted before stability of moral internalization refers to 
the stability of the position of the child on indicators of moral internalization 
relative to peers). In other words, the study of quite early parent-child interactions 
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may be critical to the investigation of long-term relations between discipline and 
moral internalization. 
As already noted, it is also possible that the lag between the two measure-
ment occasions was either too long or too short to find cross-lagged relations. 
The literature contained no recommendations, and it is therefore possible that the 
time interval should have been extended to tap really long-term effects of parental 
discipline on moral internalization or vice versa. Conversely, the lack of cross-
lagged relations might have been the result of a too long interval. In a period of 
two years, many things can happen that also reduce the correlation between the 
initial measurements and measurements two years later. Thus long-term in-
fluences may be found when another time lag is chosen. The use of repeated 
measurements across a somewhat smaller interval is therefore recommended for 
future research because both minor and major long-term changes can then be 
documented. 
The third possible conclusion we offer is that long-term effects of parental 
disciplinary style on the child's moral internalization (or vice versa) simply do 
not exist If we assume both the age of the children and the measured time inter-
val to be correctly selected, then no evidence has been found for Hoffman's claim 
that parental discipline has a unidirectional influence on the child's moral inter-
nalization. Evidence for the converse, a unidirectional influence of moral inter-
nalization on parental discipline, was also not found; a bidirectional model of 
long-term influences was also not confirmed. These results raise questions about 
the utility of such a model and the cross-lagged design for understanding the 
relation between parental discipline and moral internalization. 
In chapter 2 we mentioned two levels of possible influence: short-term effects 
and long-term effects. Long-term effects refer to the possible influence of the 
parent's preference for victim-oriented discipline on the child's internalization of 
norms over an extended period of time; they also refer to the possible influence 
of the child's level of moral internalization on the parent's preference for victim-
oriented discipline over a period of time. That is, over a large number of interac-
tions between parent and child. Short-term effects refer to the daily interaction 
between parent and child within a single disciplinary encounter. The course of a 
parent-child episode may be determined by both the parent's long-term preference 
for a victim-oriented style and numerous other variables: The value attached to 
change of the child's behavior by the parent, the parental perception of effective-
ness of the reactions, the parental state of mind, the perception of the situation 
by the parent (e.g. the causal attributions), the child's immediate reaction fol-
lowing transgression, the child's capacity and willingness to listen to the parent, 
and the child's cognitive capacity, etc. It is plausible that a child who is startled 
by the distress of the other and demonstrates some guilt elicits a different reaction 
from the parent than the child who flees or simply denies the transgression. In 
such a way, the child may influence the parental reaction. Similarly, the parental 
reaction may also influence the child. For example, when a parent points out the 
distress of the victim and clearly explains the victim's situation to the child, this 
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may stimulate the child to consider the perspective of the other. Maybe the child 
will try to repair. But if the child neglects this message the parent may choose 
another strategy to influence the child. 
Within a single episode parent and child are interacting, searching for an optimal 
fit between the behavior of the parent and the child. It is therefore hypothesized 
that within a single episode both parent and child influence each other. Because 
of these enduring influences of each partner on the other the question of who 
influences whom within an episode may not be relevant anymore. It may become 
impossible to disentangle the reciprocal influences. 
A particular interaction episode is not only determined by situational characteris-
tics. The course of the interaction may be influenced by child characteristics such 
as level of moral internalization, cognitive development, and temperament, as 
well as by parental characteristics such as the parent's cognitions, expectations, 
and preferences for a particular discipline strategy. These characteristics are not 
easily changed. For example, results of a study by Roberts, Block, and Block 
(1984) indicated considerable continuity in the child-rearing orientations described 
by parents of children between the ages of 3 and 12. Individual episodes, there-
fore, may confirm already present cognitions, expectations, preferences, or 
behavioral tendencies rather than elicit change. Only minor changes in future 
preferences of a particular discipline technique and the child's moral internaliza-
tion will take place. Consequently, every new episode can be considered as a 
continuation and confirmation of the preceding episodes. At best small changes 
in both preferences for victim-oriented discipline and moral internalization may 
occur as the result of a sequence of reciprocal interactions. 
Finally, the child's level of moral internalization may not only be the product of 
episodes where the child transgresses and the parent tries to influence the child by 
using discipline strategies. In this study only such a reactive mode of disci-
plining is investigated. It is likely that there are much more episodes which have 
an effect on the child's moral internalization. For example, episodes where the 
parent (or another person) functions as a model for the child. Also episodes in 
which the parent reacts responsive to the child or initiates affective interactions 
with the child may play a role in the child's moral internalization. Similarly 
there may be much more episodes which have an effect of the parental use of 
victim-oriented discipline strategies. For example, the information the parent 
receives about the child or about childrcaring may change the use of a particular 
discipline strategy. 
We may conclude that no unidirectional long-term relation exists between 
use of victim-oriented discipline and moral internalization. Rather, these factors 
manifest themselves in every-day interactions and probably reciprocally influence 
each other. Child characteristics will affect not only the outcome of the socializa-
tion process, but also the parents' practices themselves, so that parents' and 
children's interrelationships are best viewed as 'transactional', with each partner 
continually influencing the behavior of the other. Several authors have suggested 
that a transactional model is perhaps the best model of child socialization (e.g. 
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Dodge, 1986; Gerris, 1989; Grusec & Lytton, 1988; Riksen Walraven, 1989; 
Sameroff & Seifer, 1983; Vuyk, 1986). Adoption of such a transactional model, 
however, suggests that the pursuit of unidirectional long-term relations between 
parental discipline and moral internalization by the child may be futile. Causes 
and consequences may be indistinguishable. 
To summarize, no long-term effects from the child's moral internalization on 
the parent's preference for victim-oriented discipline are found. The cross-
sectional relationship may be the result of a mutually regulating process. The 
actions and cognitions of each interaction partner are in part determined and 
modified by the actions of the other person. Such a transactional model was not 
formulated at the time this study was designed. As a consequence it is a post hoc 
explanation for not finding evidence for long-term causal effects in this study. 
7.3 The role of empathy and perspective taking in the relation 
between victim-oriented discipline and moral internaliza-
tion 
In the LISREL-analyses only cross-sectional relations between parental 
victim-oriented discipline and the child's guilt are found combined with a stabi-
lity of victim-oriented discipline and guilt over a two-year interval. Because no 
causal linear relations are found between victim-oriented discipline and guilt the 
mediating role of empathy and perspective taking could not be tested. Therefore 
we looked whether this model could be tested cross-sectionally. In correlational 
analyses, however, both empathy and perspective taking are found to be related to 
the child's experience of guilt. Children who show more empathy also experience 
more guilt. Children who show a higher level of perspective taking also expe-
rience more guilt. Perspective taking is also found to be related to the use of 
victim-oriented discipline. The children of parents who frequently use victim-
oriented discipline have a higher level of perspective taking than the children of 
parents who do not frequently use victim-oriented discipline. Although it was 
predicted that the use of victim-oriented discipline would increase empathie 
behavior, empathy was not found to be related to the use of victim-oriented 
discipline. 
These findings for empathy are puzzling. Empathy is found to be related to 
guilt, but empathy is not related to either age, perspective taking, or maternal 
and paternal victim-oriented discipline. Several explanations are possible for 
these findings. First, the lack of a relation between empathy on the one hand and 
age, perspective taking, and victim-oriented discipline on the other hand, may be 
due to a ceiling effect on the measure of children's tendency to react empathically. 
The situations used to assess children's empathy may have been too simple to 
adequately measure differences in empathy. Nevertheless, children's empathy 
scores positively related to their guilt scores. How can this be explained when 
this ceiling effect is valid? This may have been caused by the correspondence 
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between the assessment of empathy and the experience of guilt. The concepts 
were assessed with the same instrument (S.M.I.), and it is possible that the child 
who reports empathie feelings is also likely to experience guilt. This may 
explain that, despite of the possible ceiling effect, the child's empathy and guilt 
scores are moderately related. This does not, however, explain why relations 
between guilt and perspective taking and between guilt and victim-oriented 
discipline are found and no relations for empathy. Perhaps, the stories in the 
S.M.I. are simply more adequate for assessing guilt than empathy. 
A second possible explanation for the finding that empathy does not relate to 
the child's age may be that older children simply do not easily admit empathie 
distress in response to another's distress. As children get older they may be more 
embarrassed to show feelings of empathie distress. In addition to the lack of a 
correlation between empathy and children's age, this tendency might also explain 
why correlations between empathy and victim-oriented discipline, and perspective 
taking are not found. But this would not explain why the guilt scores are also 
not similarly suppressed, unless we assume that guilt has a rather strong cogni-
tive component as well as an affective component. That is, the experience of 
guilt in this study may be less sensitive to social influences and therefore 
correlate more directly with age than empathy. 
A third possible explanation is that victim-oriented discipline, perspective 
taking, and guilt are predominantly associated with cognitions whereas empathy 
is predominantly associated with affects. By using victim-oriented discipline, 
parents explain the perspective of the victim. This may directly stimulate 
children's perspective taking and this perspective-taking ability may, in tum, 
arouse guilt feelings and stimulate the children's cognitions about their guilt 
feelings. This third explanation results in a rather cognitive model of the rela-
tionship between the use of victim-oriented discipline and the child's moral 
internalization. 
It is clear that none of the above-mentioned explanations can satisfactorily 
account for the findings concerning empathy in this study. Taken together, 
however, they may contribute to a better understanding of the findings. 
A cross-sectional model is tested in which victim-oriented discipline in-
fluences perspective taking and perspective taking influences the child's guilt 
experiences. The cross-sectional data gathered at time 2 were then incorporated 
into the model already corrected for the relations existing at time 1. The data fit 
the model. Thus, the relations found at time 2 could not be completely explained 
by the relations found at time 1 and the stability of the variables. However, the 
regression coefficients for victim-oriented discipline on perspective taking and 
perspective taking on guilt are very low. The percentage of variance in the 
children's experience of guilt explained by these variables is also low. Neverthe-
less, the mediating role of perspective taking in the relation between discipline 
and guilt appears to be confirmed. 
Note that the verification of a model in which victim-oriented discipline in-
fluences the child's guilt experience by stimulating perspective taking does not 
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exclude the possibility that the child's moral internalization also influences the 
way parents discipline their children. That is, the data might also fit a model in 
which moral internalization mediates the influence of the child's perspective-
taking capacity on the parental use of victim-oriented discipline. In any case, 
perspective taking appears to play a role in moral internalization. 
7.4 Some concluding remarks 
Hoffman (1975a) presented a persuasive theoretical argument for the domi-
nant effect of parental discipline on children's moral internalization. In the pre-
sent study inductive discipline strategies are distinguished from victim-oriented 
discipline strategies. It was hypothesized that the use of victim-oriented disci-
pline in particular would be related to the child's moral internalization. A test of 
the cross-lagged model showed clear cross-sectional relations between the use of 
victim-oriented discipline and guilt. Evidence for a relation between parental 
discipline and behavioral indicators of moral internalization are not found, how-
ever. Inductive discipline appeared not to relate to moral internalization. In 
section 7.2, three possible explanations for this lack of long-term effects were 
considered. First, long-term effects of parents on children may only be detected 
with younger children or infants. Second, a different time interval may have been 
needed. Finally, the relation between discipline and moral internalization may be 
best characterized by a transactional causal model. However, as Vuyk (1986) has 
remarked, the existence of such a transactional relation between parental disci-
pline and moral internalization will be difficult to verify. 
How can a transactional model of parental discipline and the child's moral 
internalization therefore be empirically verified? We do not know possible solu-
tions to this problem but we want to terminate this chapter with some specula-
tions. First, consideration of the patterns of variability over time may be more 
fruitful than focusing on linear relations. The continuous nature of parent-child 
interactions and the hypothesized importance of cognitions, expectations, and 
attitudes suggests that the parent's victim-oriented discipline, the child's moral 
internalization, and the relation between these two variables may primarily show 
stability. Each new episode may be a confirmation of what has happened in the 
preceding episode. Changes in one partner over a number of episodes, moreover, 
may be directly associated with changes on the other partner. The transactions 
may result in an escalating feedback loop characterizing the parent-child. If over a 
period of time the parent uses less victim-oriented discipline and the child shows 
a lesser degree of moral internalization, a negative escalation can be said to have 
taken place. A positive escalation or spiral can be said to occur when a parent's 
disciplinary strategy becomes more victim-oriented and the child's moral inter-
nalization also becomes stronger relative to peers whose parents show a stable 
amount of victim-oriented discipline. It may be needed to investigate sequences 
of episodes in order to understand the transactional relation between discipline and 
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moral internalization. This suggestion leads to the second and third suggestion 
offered below. 
A second factor critical to the study of transactional relations will be the use 
of multiple measurements with shorter intervals. Lewis (1989) emphasized the 
need to study development with short ranges in order not to miss any possible 
discontinuities in development. He argued that rather than seeking prediction over 
wide intervals we should recognize that order may exist only within limits. 
When multiple measurements are used we can seek predictions across a wider 
interval without losing sight of the complex details. 
A third factor to consider the transactional nature of the relation between 
parental discipline and moral internalization is the general pattern of social rela-
tions involving the parent and child (Linney & Seidman, 1989). It may be more 
fruitful to find variables that characterize the parent-child dyad in moral en-
counters. For example, general indicators of the moral climate in the family or 
the match between parental behavior and the child's moral internalization may be 
particularly useful. Theoretical assumptions in which reciprocity, or contingent 
social interaction, are considered to be essential aspect of stimulation that pro-
motes the child's moral internalization may require variables that characterize the 
system. That is, it may be important to look for variables that characterize an 
episode on the level of the social system (e.g. dyad, triad) rather than just meas-
uring individual variables. 
Finally, if the lack of long-term influences can be explained by adopting an 
ongoing sequence of transactions, the existence of any correlation between 
victim-oriented discipline and moral internalization still has to be explained. 
Maccoby and Martin (1983) recommended, for example, research with infants to 
determine how a parent-child pair starts their relationship. Researchers may exa-
mine parental characteristics such as childrearing attitudes and child-centeredness 
before the child's birth and than consider how these characteristics interact with 
child characteristics in subsequent parent-child interactions. Research may also 
concentrate on how inborn child characteristics influence parent-child interac-
tions. An example of such research is a study by Van den Boom (1988) showing 
that the infant's inborn irritability clearly influences the parent's reactions to the 
child. In Hoffman's theory about moral internalization the child's empathy plays 
a central role. Hoffman assumed that empathy is an inborn characteristic. Perhaps 
differences in the infants inborn capacity to react empathically also trigger diffe-
rent parental reactions and these parental reactions may constitute the basis for 
future disciplinary style and/or moral internalization. 
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In this dissertation part of Martin Hoffman's theory of child moral internali-
zation is tested. The study focused on three main topics. First was the relation of 
inductive versus victim-oriented discipline to the child's moral internalization. 
Second was the relative strength of the long-term relations between parental 
discipline and moral internalization. Third was the mediating roles of the child's 
empathy and perspective taking in the relationship between parental discipline 
and moral internalization. 
According to Hoffman, an infant is motivated by only hedonistic needs. A 
child must learn to take another's needs into account. A child who has inter-
nalized the norm to consider the needs of others may experience a conflict be-
tween hedonistic needs and the needs of others. Hoffman argued that parents' 
disciplinary strategies under such circumstances may be critical to children's 
moral internalization. In particular, the parents can place great constraints on the 
child because of their powerful position. In chapter two it is also argued that 
child characteristics such as temperament also affect parental behavior. According 
to Hoffman, however, this does not invalidate the argument that the long-term 
influence of parental discipline on moral internalization will be greater than the 
long-term influence of the child's level of moral internalization on parental disci-
pline. 
In chapter three the details of why parental discipline is of particular im-
portance for moral internalization are outlined. Hoffman stressed the importance 
of directing the child's attention to the person who is victimized by the child. He 
also argued that use of an inductive disciplinary style is particularly important for 
moral internalization because parents provide the child with reasons for distress 
and give explanations to motivate the child's change of behavior. On the basis of 
both theoretical and empirical research it is suggested that the use of a victim-
oriented disciplinary strategy may be of particular importance for the child's 
moral internalization. Such techniques are considered to be important because 
they may trigger empathie arousal in the child and may stimulate perspective 
taking. It is also shown that the child's empathie responses and perspective-
taking capacity may be mechanisms by which parental disciplinary strategies 
influence the child's moral internalization. 
In chapter four, the design of the study is presented. A cross-lagged panel de-
sign was undertaken with two measurement occasions and a time interval of two 
years. The sample of children was divided into three age groups or cohorts (5/6-
year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, 9/10-year-olds), which allowed us to examine changes in 
moral internalization and parental discipline across a period of two years (within 
each cohort) as well as a period of six years (5/6-year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, 9/10-
year-olds, 11/12-year-olds). 
Chapter five outlines the general methodology. Data were gathered from 150 
families: 150 mothers, 132 fathers, 72 boys and 78 girls. Discipline strategies 
for the parents were assessed using an interview, where each parent was asked 
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how he or she would react to eight hypothetical situations. In each situation the 
son or daughter harmed another child. Four different aspects of moral internaliza-
tion were operationalized. Two behavioral aspects were the child's tendency to 
confess/accept responsibility for deviant behavior and the child's resistance to 
pressure to deviate. To measure these, a questionnaire about the child's moral 
behavior was completed by the teacher. The third aspect of moral internalization 
was the experience of guilt following transgression. The fourth aspect was the 
child's propensity to make moral judgments independent of external sanctions. 
The Socio-Moral Interview was developed to assess the child's level of guilt and 
moral judgment. The results indicated most of the children to make moral judg-
ments independent of external sanctions. This aspect was, therefore, excluded 
from further analyses, and we were left with three indicators of moral internaliza-
tion. Confession and resistance to pressure to deviate proved to be highly corre-
lated and were therefore collapsed into a single measure of moral behavior. 
Finally, the children were interviewed to assess their capacity for perspective 
taking and propensity to react empathically. 
In chapter six the findings of this study are reported. Cross-sectional analyses 
showed that the use of inductive disciplinary strategies and the child's moral 
internalization to not be related, for either mother-child dyads, or father-child 
dyads. Victim-oriented discipline was found to be related to the child's experience 
of guilt, but not to the child's moral behavior. This was found, moreover, for 
both mother-child and father-child dyads. Furthermore, this was found at both 
measurement times. In other words, pointing out to the child that another person 
is in need is of particular importance for the child's experience of guilt. 
The hypothesized long-term influences were analyzed using LISREL-VI. Evi-
dence for Hoffman's hypothesis about the existence of long-term influences, 
however, was not found. Parental discipline did not appear to influence the child's 
moral internalization two years later. Similarly, the child's level of moral inter-
nalization was not found to influence future parental discipline. Rather, parental 
victim-oriented discipline and the child's moral internalization appeared to be 
quite stable across a period of two-years. In addition to these linear analyses some 
non-linear analyses were also performed. Changes in inductive discipline over a 
two-year interval and changes in moral internalization were found to bear no 
relation whatsoever. A weak relation between changes in the amount of victim-
oriented discipline and changes in the child's moral internalization was found, 
however. 
Because no causal linear relations were found between victim-oriented discipline 
and moral internalization, the mediating roles of empathy and perspective taking 
could not be tested. We tested therefore such a model cross-sectionally. Empathy 
and victim-oriented discipline were not found to be related. That is, empathy does 
not appear to mediate between victim-oriented discipline and guilt. However, the 
data were found to fit a model in which victim-oriented discipline influenced the 
child's perspective taking and, in turn, the child's experience of guilt 
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Finally, in chapter seven, these findings are interpreted. The difference be-
tween victim-oriented discipline and inductive discipline for moral internalization 
is emphasized. It is concluded that behavior is not a direct, unambiguous, mani-
festation of moral internalization, which might explain the lack of relation be-
tween parental discipline and moral behavior as well as the lack of relation be-
tween the child's guilt experiences and moral behavior. Several explanations for 
the absence of a long-term relation between discipline and moral internalization 
are considered, and it is hypothesized that a transactional model may be the best 




In dit proefschrift wordt een gedeelte van Martin Hoffman's theorie over de 
morele intemalisatie van kinderen beschreven en empirisch onderzocht. Het 
onderzoek was gericht op de beantwoording van drie hoofdvragen. Ten eerste werd 
gekeken naar verschillen tussen inductief disciplineren en slachtoffer-georiënteerd 
disciplineren in relatie tot de morele intemalisatie van het kind. Op de tweede 
plaats werd gekeken naar de lange-termijn invloed van de wijze van disciplineren 
door de ouders op de morele intemalisatie van het kind. Deze invloed werd verge-
leken met de lange-termijn invloed van de morele intemalisatie van het kind op 
de wijze van disciplineren door de ouders. Ten derde werd de rol van empathie van 
het kind en het perspectief nemen van het kind in de relatie tussen disciplineren 
en morele intemalisatie onderzocht 
Volgens Hoffman wordt het gedrag van pasgeboren kinderen geleid door 
hedonistische behoeften. Het rekening houden met behoeften van anderen is het 
resultaat van een leerproces. Men zou kunnen spreken van morele intemalisatie 
als het kind een intern conflict ervaart tussen hedonistische behoeften en de 
behoeften van een ander. Hoffman veronderstelde dat deze morele intemalisatie 
een gevolg is van opvoeding. Hij hield een theoretisch betoog dat het handelen 
van ouders meer invloed heeft op de morele intemalisatie van het kind dan omge-
keerd. Deze sterke invloed van ouders op kinderen is volgens Hoffman het gevolg 
van de grotere macht die ouders hebben. Hoffman's betoog wordt gepresenteerd in 
hoofdstuk twee. Men zou kunnen tegenwerpen dat het handelen van ouders ook 
beïnvloed wordt door het kind. Bijvoorbeeld, door het temperament van het kind. 
Hoffman beaamde dat kinderen het gedrag van hun ouders beïnvloeden. Echter, 
volgens Hoffman impliceert dit niet dat zijn veronderstelling, dat het discipline-
ringsgedrag van de ouder op lange termijn invloed heeft op de morele intemalisa-
tie, ongeldig is. 
In hoofdstuk drie wordt nagegaan waarom Hoffman veronderstelde dat vooral 
disciplinering een rol speelt in de morele intemalisatie van het kind. Hoffman 
suggereerde dat inductief disciplineren gerelateerd is aan morele intemalisatie. 
Door uitleg te geven zou het kind gemotiveerd worden zijn of haar toekomstig 
gedrag te veranderen. Hoffman benadrukte dat het belangrijk is dat het kind 
gewezen wordt op het leed van het slachtoffer. Hoofdstuk drie bevat een kort 
overzicht van theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen de wijze 
van disciplineren en de morele intemalisatie van het kind. Geconcludeerd wordt 
dat waarschijnlijk vooral slachtoffer-georiënteerde disciplinering verband heeft 
met morele intemalisatie. Doordat opvoeders wijzen op het slachtoffer kan het 
kind empathisch reageren. Bovendien kan het kind gestimuleerd worden om het 
perspectief van het slachtoffer in te nemen. Daardoor zou het kind gemotiveerd 
kunnen worden om een volgende keer meer rekening te houden met een ander. 
Volgens deze rationale zouden empathie en perspectief nemen de relatie tussen 
disciplineren en morele intemalisatie kunnen mediëren. 
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In hoofdstuk vier wordt het design van de studie gepresenteerd. Het gebruikte 
design is een cross-lagged panel design met twee meetmomenten en met een 
interval van twee jaar tussen de twee metingen. De kinderen werden verdeeld in 
drie leeftijdsgroepen of cohorten (bij de eerste meting 5/6 jarigen, 7/8 jarigen, 
9/10 jarigen). Twee opeenvolgende cohorten hadden een leeftijdsverschil van 
gemiddeld twee jaar. Dit design gaf de mogelijkheid om te kijken hoe de morele 
internalisatie en het ouderlijk disciplineren veranderen over een periode van twee 
jaar. Door het gebruik van drie cohorten werd het ook mogelijk om de morele 
internalisatie en het disciplineren te bestuderen over een periode van zes jaar (5/6 
jarigen, 7/8 jarigen, 9/10 jarigen, 11/12 jarigen). 
De opzet van het onderzoek staat in hoofdstuk vijf. Gegevens werden verza-
meld bij 150 gezinnen: 150 moeders, 132 vaders, 72 jongens, 78 meisjes. Via 
een interview werd gemeten hoe ouders reageren op normovertredingen van hun 
kind. De ouder werd geconfronteerd met acht hypothetische situaties. In elke 
situatie doet de zoon of dochter iets waardoor een ander kind benadeeld wordt De 
ouder werd gevraagd hoe hij of zij zou reageren in zo'n situatie. 
Vier, door Hoffman onderscheidden, aspecten van morele internalisatie werden 
geoperationaliseerd. Twee daarvan betreffen moreel gedrag. Ten eerste is dit de 
geneigdheid van het kind om na een overtreding de verantwoordelijkheid voor het 
eigen gedrag op zich te nemen. Ten tweede is dit de weerstand die het kind biedt 
tegen de verleiding om iets te doen dat niet door de beugel kan. Het moreel gedrag 
van het kind werd gemeten met behulp van een vragenlijst die ingevuld werd door 
de leerkracht van het kind. De samenhang lussen deze twee aspecten van morele 
internalisatie was hoog. Daarom werden de twee aspecten gecombineerd tol één 
indicator van morele internalisatie die moreel gedrag werd genoemd. De derde 
indicator van morele internalisatie heeft betrekking op de schuld die het kind 
ervaart na een overtreding. De vierde indicator van morele internalisatie vormt het 
moreel oordeel van het kind. Daarbij werd gekeken of het moreel oordcel vrij was 
van overwegingen waarin straffen of autoriteitsfiguren een rol spelen. Voor het 
bepalen van de schuldervaringen en het morele oordeel werd een interview, het 
Socio-Moreel Interview, ontwikkeld. Dit interview is bij de kinderen afgenomen. 
Uit de resultaten bleek dat de meeste kinderen een moreel oordeel gaven, dat onaf-
hankelijk is van straf of autoriteitsfiguren. Daarom is besloten om deze indicator 
niet in de analyses te betrekken. Dus uiteindelijk zijn er twee indicatoren van 
morele internalisatie: moreel gedrag en schuld. De geneigdheid van een kind om 
empathisch te reageren en de vaardigheid van perspectief nemen werden eveneens 
bepaald door een interview met het kind. 
In hoofdstuk zes staan de resultaten van het onderzoek. De relatie tussen 
disciplineren en morele internalisatie is eerst onderzocht op cross-sectioneel 
niveau. Zowel bij de data van de eerste meting als de data van de tweede meting 
werden geen verbanden gevonden tussen inductief disciplineren en morele inter-
nalisatie. Daarentegen werd er consistent een positieve relatie gevonden tussen 
het gebruik van slachtoffer-georiënteerde disciplinering en de schuldbeleving van 
het kind. Het gebruik van slachtoffer-georiënteerde disciplinering bleek niet 
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samen te hangen met het morele gedrag van het kind. Dit werd gevonden zowel 
voor vaders als ook voor moeders. Bovendien was het patroon van correlaties bij 
de eerste en de tweede meting vergelijkbaar. Dus alleen slachtoffer-georiënteerde 
disciplinering was gerelateerd aan de morele intemalisatie van het kind. 
De hypothese dat disciplinering de morele intemalisatie van het kind op lange 
termijn bepaalt, werd getest met behulp van LISREL-VI. Er is geen bevestiging 
gevonden voor het bestaan van lange-termijn invloeden. Dit geldt zowel voor de 
invloed van oudere op kinderen, als voor de invloed van kinderen op ouders. Wel 
bleek er een stabiliteit aanwezig in de wijze van disciplineren over een periode 
van twee jaar. Ook bleek er een stabiliteit in de mate van morele intemalisatie 
over een periode van twee jaar. Naast een analyse van lineaire verbanden zijn er 
ook enkele analyses gedaan waarin gezocht werd naar de aanwezigheid van non-
lineaire verbanden tussen disciplineren en morele intemalisatie over een periode 
van twee jaar. Er werd gekeken of veranderingen in het gedrag van ouders gepaard 
gaan met veranderingen in de morele intemalisatie van het kind. Wederom werden 
er geen relaties gevonden met betrekking tot inductief disciplineren en morele 
intemalisatie. Er was echter wel een verband tussen een verandering in het ge-
bruik van slachtoffer-georiënteerde disciplinering en een verandering in de morele 
intemalisatie van het kind. 
Omdat er geen causale verbanden gevonden zijn tussen slachtoffer-georiënteerde 
disciplinering en morele intemalisatie kon de hypothese dat deze relatie geme-
dieerd wordt door empathie en perspectief nemen alleen getoetst worden op cross-
sectioneel niveau. Er is geen relatie gevonden tussen slachtoffer-georiënteerd 
disciplineren en empathie. Een LISREL-analyse toonde aan dat de data overeen-
stemden met een model waarbij slachtoffer-georiënteerde disciplinering de morele 
intemalisatie van het kind beïnvloedt via het stimuleren van perspectief nemen. 
Tenslotte worden de resultaten van het onderzoek in hoofdstuk zeven bedis-
cussieerd. De gevonden verbanden tussen disciplineren en morele intemalisatie 
hebben alleen betrekking op de indicator schuld. Met betrekking tot moreel 
gedrag wordt geconcludeerd dat gedrag wellicht geen directe eenduidige manifesta-
tie is van morele intemalisatie. De verschillen tussen slachtoffer-georiënteerd 
disciplineren en inductief disciplineren worden bediscussieerd in het kader van het 
belang van deze disciplineringstechnieken voor de morele intemalisatie van het 
kind. Voor de afwezigheid van lange-termijn invloeden worden verschillende 
verklaringen gegeven. Hierbij wordt de relatie tussen de wijze van disciplineren 





A story of the Socio-Moral Interview (version for boys): 
The child is playing with his new ball. 
The child sadly walks away. 
He then snatches the ball on purpose. 
The ball rolls into the road and a car 
runs over the ball. The ball is broken. 
The child then sees his friend playing 









Now his friend doesn't have a ball and 
starts to cry. 




Table B-l Means and standard deviations for different indicators of moral 
nalization 
Index: confession 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 3 T=l 
T=2 
Index: resistance to 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 



























































































































Index: guilt intensity 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 
























































Index: concern for the victim 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 
























































Index: use of justice principles 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 
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a Only empathy scores assessed during the second measurement are available 
Table B-3 Means and standard deviations for inductive discipline used by mothers 












































































































































Table B-4 Means and standard deviations for victim-oriented discipline used by 
mothers and by fathers 
Mother 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 3 T=l 
T=2 
Father 
Cohort 1 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 2 T=l 
T=2 
Cohort 3 T=l 
T=2 












































































mean st.dev. η 
.19 .10 23 
.22 .09 23 
.24 .10 24 
.25 .10 24 
.21 .10 25 
.24 .09 25 
.15 .09 21 
.20 .10 21 
.18 .08 21 
.23 .09 20 
.19 .10 20 
.17 .12 20 
137 
Table B-S Pearson correlations for parental use of inductive discipline and the 






























































































































72 boys with 72 mothers and 62 fathers 
78 girls with 78 mothers and 70 fathers 
cohort 1: 47 children, 47 mothers, 42 fathers 
cohort 2: 50 children, 50 mothers, 45 fathers 
cohort 3: 53 children, 53 mothers, 45 fathers 
ρ < .05 
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Table B-6 Pearson correlations for parental use of victim-oriented discipline and 





























































































































Note The number of subjects within each subsample are: 
72 boys with 72 mothers and 62 fathers 
78 girls with 78 mothers and 70 fathers 
cohort 1: 47 children, 47 mothers, 42 fathers 
cohort 2: 50 children, 50 mothers, 45 fathers 
cohort 3: 53 children, 53 mothers, 45 fathers 
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